February 8, 1955, President Eisenhower's Message: The Battle for Men's Minds

 

[Delivered over closed-circuit television from the White House]

I AM happy to be with you tonight for I strongly believe that Radio Free Europe and the Crusade for Freedom are vital to success in the battle for men's minds.

Many of us learned during the war that the most potent force is spiritual; that the appeal to men's minds produces a dedication that surmounts every trial and test until victory is won.

To toughen, strengthen, fortify such dedication to the cause of freedom is the mission of Radio Free Europe.

Substantial progress has already been made. The free world is growing stronger because its peoples are growing in their determination to stand together and in their faith that freedom and justice will triumph.

Radio Free Europe, each day of the year, nourishes this growth.

Here at home, we Americans face the future with confidence. But we must also face up to the dangers that still lurk about us. We must ever work to strengthen our posture of defense and to reinforce our alliances and friendships in the free world.

While we maintain our vigilance at home and abroad, we must help intensify the will for freedom in the satellite countries behind the Iron Curtain. These countries are in the Soviet backyard; and only so long as their people are reminded that the outside world has not forgotten them--only that long do they remain as potential deterrents to Soviet aggression.

The great majority of the 70 million captives in these satellite countries have known liberty in the past. They now need our constant friendship and help if they are to believe in their future.

Therefore, the mission of Radio Free Europe merits greater support than before. It serves our national security and the cause of peace.

I have long given the Crusade for Freedom my strong endorsement. I did that because I am familiar with its purposes, its operations, the people who run it, and, perhaps, most important--its hard-hitting effectiveness as an independent American enterprise.

I know that our country and our friends behind the Iron Curtain can count on you for active participation and leadership in this most critical of all battles--the winning of men's minds. Without this victory, we can have no other victories. By your efforts, backed up by America, we can achieve our great goal--that of enabling us and all the peoples of the world to enjoy in peace the blessings of freedom.

 

Note: This message was broadcast to 35 meetings held under the auspices of the American Heritage Foundation.

 

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Message to Nationwide Meetings in Support of the Campaign for Radio Free Europe. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/233885

 

 

The Cold War Misadventures of Ukrainian Parachutist Alexei Pavlovich Kurochkin, Part Two ©

 

Part Two

    

Before being sent to the USSR on espionage missions, he graduated from an American intelligence school for seven months in West Germany. It trained agents-radio operators, and therefore the main subject at the school was radio communications, which he did every day until 6 o'clock. Classes on the study of radio and parachuting took place in the city of Kaufbeuren. The agent trainees also were constantly in the town of Bad Worishofen, where they studied: 

 

·      conspiracy, 

·      the structure of aviation and tank units of the USSR, 

·      photography, 

·      topography, and 

·      sabotage.

·      how to forge seals and signatures on documents, which introduced us to Soviet documentation, radar, the Navy, the category of agents, etc.

 

They were forced to systematically listen to Voice of America programs in which vicious slander against the Soviet Union was stated and to read anti-Soviet newspapers published by various white émigré organizations in West Germany. In a word, they were presented with all kinds of slander against Soviet reality, while the American way of life was praised in every possible way.

 

At the same time, to be aware of the events taking place in the Soviet Union and freely navigate the territory of the USSR, they were allowed to read Soviet newspapers daily and listen to radio broadcasts. About a month before graduation, they practiced a cover story under which they were supposed to act when performing espionage missions.

 

The teaching staff of the reconnaissance school, with the exception of one instructor, consisted of Americans who carefully conspired their real names, replacing them with fictitious, moreover Russian, names.

 

The instructor of the intelligence school was under the nickname "Vsevolod", posing as a former Soviet intelligence officer. The head of the school was an American major named "Andrey ."The radio business was conducted by the American "Jan." An American intelligence officer taught parachuting with the rank of captain. His assistant was a lieutenant, and he also conducted training sessions with us on sabotage. Under the name "Alexey," an American lieutenant was assigned to the agents as an observer.

 

Simultaneously with him, five more spies were trained at the American intelligence school, who was known to him only by nicknames: "Peter," "Boris," "George," "Leonid," and "Ivan. He showed about the external signs and the personality of these agents at the previous interrogations. He didn't know any other information about them. He gave correct testimony on this issue during the investigation. Three American agents, nicknamed "George," "Boris," and "Peter," dropped out of school in March 1951, but he didn’t know where they went or what happened to them.

 

The Americans did everything they could to cover up their actions related to the infiltration of spies into the territory of the USSR. For example, the three agents left Bad Worishofen in a passenger car in an unknown direction and arrived in a city, which, as they later learned, was located about 40 kilometers from Frankfurt am Main (presumable Wiesbaden). Before reaching the airfield, they were dressed in American military-style working uniforms, which they removed only in the plane that was in the hangar. At 7 pm on May 1, 1952, the aircraft took off. It flew through Poland at a speed of about 300 kilometers per hour. At 02:30, they were parachuted.

 

In clarifying the testimony he had given earlier, he admitted that, at the direction of American intelligence, he had to collect:

 

·      various espionage information about the deployment of military units of the Soviet Army; 

·      on the political mood and economic situation of the population; and

·      acquire Soviet documents, including passports, military tickets, travel, and vacation certificates.

    

The Americans also attached importance to collecting information that made it possible to better know Soviet reality. They, for example, were interested in the regime on railway transport, the fare on the train, tram, bus, taxi and other modes of transportation; prices for food and manufactured goods, the characteristics of a particular city, etc. The collection of this kind of information was also part of his espionage duties.

    

Along with this, on the instructions of the Americans, he had to find two or three people with anti-Soviet views or a criminal record and persuade them to flee abroad. These are the tasks of American intelligence that he must complete during his three-month stay on the territory of the Soviet Union.

 

Although the Americans trained us not only as radio operators but also as demolition agents and conducted practical exercises with us on committing various kinds of sabotage, including blowing up bridges, railway tracks, and other objects, however, he did not do any sabotage or terrorist acts.

 

He did not know about the nature of the assignments received by the agents "Leonid" and "Ivan."

 

The Americans supplied him with 

 

·      a submachine gun, 

·      two pistols, 

·      a radio transmitter,

·      a camera, 

·      a pistol in the form of a pen, a special compound for masking traces from service dogs, 

·      Soviet money of 34,000 rubles and various kinds of food concentrates and medicines.

·      In addition, he was given two sets of fictitious documents in the name of Nikolai Kuzmich PLATONOV and one KOPYTOV for the electric welder of the Krasny Oktyabr artel from the mountains. Kamenka, Kirovograd region

 

On May 3, he radioed the American radio center and reported a safe landing. Since he had to carry out the espionage work himself, on the same day in the evening, he left the agents "Leonid" and "Ivan," burying the radio transmitter and other equipment not far from the landing site.

 

Being at the station in the mountains of Odessa, on May 6, 1952, he met an unknown person who turned out to be (FNU) Arestov, according to his passport. He said that he had recently been released from the forced labor camp where he was serving his sentence. He was not working anywhere and was in a difficult financial situation. Taking advantage of the favorable condition, Kurochkin suggested to Arestov that he sell his passport. At first, he hesitated, then agreed. Kurochkin paid him 200 rubles for the passport. He bought another passport for 350 rubles around May 11 in a train car going to Odessa. 

    

He stole the third passport: in Kharkov in the city market, he met a certain Masliy, then invited him to a tea room, got him drunk, then put him in a taxi car and, using Masliy's strong intoxication, stole his passport from his pocket, and left him on one of the streets city ​​and fled.

 

He did not let any of these people know about his criminal plans and had no intentions to use them in espionage work.

He met some relatives: his wife, her mother, and others. Kurochkin told them that while serving in the Soviet occupation forces in Austria, He fled the army to the West, where he had contacted the Americans, who transferred him by plane with espionage missions to the Soviet Union.

 

He managed to persuade one KLIMOV, whom he met at the Martsevo station, Rostov Region, to cross the border. Believing him to be a vagabond, he invited him to travel with him, promising that he could supply him with money and clothes. KLIMOV agreed and became my companion.

 

From conversations with him, it turned out that he did not work anywhere and was engaged in theft. This allowed Kurochkin to establish a trusting relationship with him, after which he directly suggested that Klimov flee abroad. Klimov accepted my proposal without hesitation. Kurochkin believed that Klimov intended to go overseas with him, but his calculations were not justified. 

On May 26, 1952, while in the forest, Kurochkin was watching the area to outline his further path to the border, at that time, Klimov hit him on the head with a stone and disappeared; the next day Kurochkin was detained.

He did not hide the fact that, on the instructions of the Americans, a number of Soviet citizens should be persuaded to go abroad illegally. He did not set such a goal. His relatives only helped him to hide for two days and did not give him up to the Soviet authorities, which is why he opened up to them as an American spy.

 

Despite the fact that he was equipped with a powerful radio to communicate with the Americans, however, his attempt to establish contact with them by radio on May 17, 1952, due to the lack of audibility, was not successful. Subsequently, he did not make any attempts to contact by radio.

Kurochkin tried to send two radiograms. One of which indicated that he had lost the password for communicating with the Americans in Turkey, in connection with which he asked to be told a different password. He indicated that he had acquired three Soviet passports in the same radiogram. The content of the second radiogram was reduced to a description of one of the passports.

 

If he managed to exfiltrate, then in the future, according to the plans of the Americans, he would be transferred a second time to the Soviet Union. Based on this, he was asked to bury the radio station and other equipment and to illegally sneak into Turkey himself. For this purpose, He was supplied by American intelligence with a topographic map on which the route of crossing the Soviet-Turkish border was indicated. Once in Turkey, he had to address the Turks in their language. Kurochkin remembered the three necessary words and asked them to take to Erzerum, to the head of counterintelligence, who would put him in touch with the American intelligence officers using a predetermined password. Parts of a comb and a photo card served as his password. Other parts of these objects are in Erzurum. If, when added together, they coincide along the lines, it will be apparent to the Americans who he was and for what purpose he came. In addition, as the Americans stated, there was my photograph in Erzurum.

The above summary is taken from his interrogation report.

On June 29, 1952, the other two parachutists were arrested in Rostov-on-Don. All three were intensely interrogated, refused to play in any radio games, were tried, convicted, and executed as American spies.

There was no intelligence developed and the long hours of training were naught.  

 

The Cold War Misadventures of Ukrainian Parachutist Alexei Pavlovich Kurochkin, Part One ©

On May 2, 1952, American penetration agents VOLOSHANOVSKY, KOSHELEV, and KUROCCHKIN, parachuted out of an airplane on May 2, 1952, west of Kyiv in the Tsuman district Volyn region of Ukraine.

 

This post will focus on the misadventures of one of them: Alexi Pavlovich Kurochin, born in 1927, a native of the village—Dyakovo, Susaninsky district, Kostroma region, a citizen of the USSR, with lower education. 

   

In 1941, he dropped out of elementary school and got a job at the Kostroma industrial complex. After three months, he got in touch with a criminal group and stopped doing socially beneficial work. He was arrested four times by the police for systematic thefts and was tried twice. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment. He served his sentenced was released in early 1945.

 

He worked as a driver's apprentice in the regional office "Gossortfond" in the mountains of Kostroma. In December of the same year, Kuochkin was called up for military service and sent to the 177th Rifle Division, where he took the military oath. However, his criminal past, promiscuity, and indiscipline took over, and after a few days, he deserted from the Soviet Army. Having bought a birth certificate for 60 rubles in the name of Roman Pavlovich Zakharov, born in 1930, he managed to get a passport, too.

    

Living under other people's documents, until 1950, he worked in the cities Novorossiysk, Odessa, and Taganrog as an electric welder at various enterprises, and at the end of 1950, he was drafted into the army under the name Zakharov. Still, this time he did not serve in it for long.

 

While serving in the occupation units of the Soviet Army in Austria, on September 10, 1951, he fled to the French sector of Vienna, where, with the help of the French authorities, he contacted the Americans.

 

He was afraid that the case of desertion from the army would sooner or later come to the surface and that he would not escape trial. In addition, it so happened that he refused to comply with the order to go to the squad on the eve of the flight. Realizing that this case would not go unpunished, he decided to run away. At that time, he had no anti-Soviet views.

 

He fled to the western sector of Vienna from Baden, where his military unit was stationed, in which he served as a driver.

 

On September 10, 1951, having deceived the administration of the garage, he left in a car attached to him and headed along the Baden-Vienna road. About half an hour later, he was in the French sector of Vienna, where he reported to the commandant's office. At the same time, no one exerted a negative influence on him and did not assist in his flight to the west.

 

He did not set himself the goal of defecting specifically to the French sector. For him, it was indifferent. He fled in the hope of placing himself at the disposal of the authorities of one of the bourgeois states. While at the commandant's office, he told the French about the circumstances of my escape from the unit. He gave them his real name, after which they took away his documents: a Red Army book, a pass to the Headquarters of the Central Group of Forces, a driver's license, and a passport for a car.

 

On the same day, he was taken to some military unit stationed in Vienna, where he was interrogated in detail about his personality and the circumstances connected with the flight from the Soviet Army. And on the third day, he was handed over to the Americans.

 

He told the French about his desire to go to America during the interrogations. On September 12, 1951, two Americans came to the location of the French military unit where he was, offered him to sit in a car with them, and took him to their sector. Within four days after that, he arrived in Vienna; he was taken by plane to Munich.

 

He told the Americans everything he knew about the Soviet military unit in which he served, the field mail number, and where it is located. He gave the Americans information about the company's strength, named its officers, and provided characterizing data on some of them.

    

Despite this, the Americans persistently and thoroughly interrogated him in Munich until September 27. At the same time, they intimidated him in every possible way and emphasized that he was allegedly an agent of Soviet intelligence.

 

Convinced that he was a traitor to the Motherland and, in his criminal past, an utterly suitable candidate for espionage tasks, the Americans offered him the chance to become an agent of the US intelligence agencies and carry out espionage work against the Soviet Union on their instructions. They let him know that there was no other way out for him.

 

He agreed to become an American spy, although he had not previously thought of establishing a connection with foreign intelligence. They offered him to become an agent of the US intelligence agencies and carry out espionage work against the Soviet Union on their instructions. 

 

He attempted to evade espionage work, citing his lack of education, but the Americans said they would train him specially.

 

No written obligation was taken away from him at the time of recruitment. For the Americans, his testimony was enough that he had twice deserted from the Soviet Army, and having contacted them, he gave out information about the military unit known to him. All this was possible and related to the means of his recruitment. 

 

After he agreed to cooperate with American intelligence, the Americans gave him the nickname "Vladimir" and sent him to an intelligence school, where they photographed him and took his fingerprints. After graduating from the intelligence school, on the eve of being thrown into the USSR, he signed an obligation stating that the Americans would monthly deposit 700 dollars in his name to the Munich Bank for subversive work in the Soviet Union. He was warned that he would be sentenced to eight years in prison for disclosing this money deal with the Americans.

    

Yanka (Ivan Andreevich) Filistovich, a Cold War Belorussian Tragic Hero, Part Three ©

As we have seen, during the night of September 24-25, 1951,  Filistovich was parachuted into Belarus and landed near the village of Panyatichi (see map). He buried his parachute, hid most of the other materials, and spent the night in the forest. On the third day, he went to the village. He met his uncle, told him about his mission, and slept in the barn. A week later, they went to retrieve the parachute and other materials. 

Filistovich wanted to meet some local anti-Soviet partisans, but they did not know or trust him. He decided to go to Vilnius, Lithuania, and did not approach the partisans until Spring 1952. He went to Vilnius as a first step to go to Grodno and eventually cross the border as part of the exfiltration plan. 

He stayed with another uncle in Vilnius for a while. Both of them went to Grodno to meet someone who could guide him across the border. He stayed there for two days and gave up the idea of crossing the border due to increased security. He returned to Vilnius and again stayed with his uncle. Using the blood/water method, he wrote his first secret-writing letter from Vilnius. He used the Paris address he had. Filistovich's twelve-year-old nephew wrote the clear text, but Soviet authorities intercepted the letter. 

Filistovich would write five more letters, the last one on July 15, 1952. But all of them were intercepted and not sent to Paris. CIA never had contact with him. He signed all letters with "Long Live Belarus!"

On or about November 20, 1951, he left his uncle and went to an aunt in Perslov. He stayed with her for about one-and-a-half months. There he met his sister, who had come to visit the family. He gave her 700 rubles before they said goodbye.

In January 1952, he again went to Lithuania before returning to his uncle in Panyatichi in March.

On May 3, 1952, he finally met up with a local partisan group and successfully convinced them he was not a Communist agent provocateur. There were only four partisans. He gave them some rubles, one of his two pistols, and two Belorussian newspapers published abroad. In July, he finally joined the partisans as an accepted member.

The partisans decided to publish appeals, newspapers, etc. but they had no printing equipment. So on June 25, 1952, they broke into a local printing house and stole some equipment, ink, and newsprint. They then burned down the printing house. 

Eventually, Filistovich ran out of money. At the end of August 1952, the partisans robbed two financial agents for five thousand rubles and one thousand rubles, respectively.

Again on the move, Filistovich went to the village of Yamolichi. He found a house that he had visited before. He was sick, and the house owner arranged to get him medicine. He also notified the local security authorities about Filistovich. Over dinner on September 9, 1952, Filistovich was given a cup of tea, but It turned out not to be with medicine but sleeping powder. He fell asleep. About thirteen MGB officers had surrounded the house in anticipation of using force to capture him. He was then transported to prison.

Filistovich was interrogated in Minsk almost daily from September 10, 1952, until January 14. 1953.

The trial against him began on October 17, 1953, and lasted three weeks. He was found guilty and sentenced to death on November 4-5, 1953. He appealed the decision, but the verdict was not overturned. The exact date of his execution is unknown—some believe it took place on November 22, 1953; others believe he was executed on March 19, 1954. 

In March 1958, a CIA review of the Byelorussian National Council included these comments:  

The somewhat over-burdened Filistovich was presumed to have sent one S/W communication, and then all trace of him was lost. He was declared dead after a two-year waiting period. 

In May 1957, a series of articles entitled Along the Wolve's Path" appeared in the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. The narrative revealed, for the first time, that the Soviets had apprehended Filistovich The articles, written with the usual anti-capitalistic tirades, employing vehement references to Fascist attempts to disrupt the unparalleled harmony of the Soviet Union through subterfuge, ended with the thought that the eternal vigilance of the Soviet citizen in his quest for the Socialist State will prevail. 

It was almost impossible to determine the time Filistovich was apprehended. The tenor of the articles was more fiction than fact. The extensive use of poetic bromides as copy fillers indicated that the Soviets were unsure about the details of the Filistovich dispatch, how long he had operated, or whom he had contacted. To cloud the authenticity of any intelligence the Agency may have received from Filistovich. The articles created the image that Filistovich had been apprehended almost immediately after dispatch.

 

 

 

 

 

Yanka (Ivan Andreevich) Filistovich, a Cold War Belorussian tragic Hero, Part Two

Yanka (Ivan Andreevich) Filistovich was born on January 14, 1926, in the village of Panyatichi, Maladzyechna volost, Vileyka district, Vilna voivodeship (now Vileyka district, Minsk region), Byelorussia. In his own words:

 

In 1943, while living in the German-occupied territory of Western Byelorussia, I was mobilized to serve in a German military formation in the so-called thirteenth battalion, which I did until the retreat of the Germans, i.e., before July 1944, as an ordinary soldier. 

 

Together with the battalion, I retreated to the territory of Poland and then was soon transferred to Italy, where, as part of the battalion, I took part in battles against the Anglo-American troops in the Forli region. 

 

As part of one company of the battalion mentioned above, from Italy, on January 6-7, 1945, I arrived in Czechoslovakia, where I did not participate in hostilities. Soon I, among three colleagues, was arrested by the Germans and imprisoned in the city of Pardubice - Czechoslovakia. I was released from prison on May 8, 1945, by Soviet troops. Soon I moved to the territory of Poland and got a job there as a secretary of the commune in the town of Staraya Kamenica. 

 

By September 1945, I returned to Czechoslovakia, and soon, around October of the same year, I moved to the American zone of occupation of Germany. I first ended up in a Polish refugee camp near the city of Nuremberg. Here I managed to enter a school that allowed me to get a matriculation certificate, but soon I was unlucky. The camp began to be disbanded, the Poles were oppressed, and I was forced to leave for Paris. I entered a Polish theological seminary in Paris, which I soon had to leave to because of the difference in religion and national origin. Continuing my stay in Paris by 1947, I completed a six-month course for electricians and a course for tool-makers.

 

In 1947, I managed to enter Sorbonne University at the Faculty of History while working in the library, earning a living. In 1948, on the initiative of several students from among Byelorussians, including myself, a Byelorussian youth nationalist organization was created in Paris under the name “Byelorussian Independent Youth Organization” (“BNAM”), whose chairman I was elected. At the same time, I was appointed editor of the Youth magazine, the organ of the above organization. Living in Paris since 1945, I had the opportunity to meet with prominent Byelorussian nationalists. 

 

In 1951, due to some deterioration in my financial situation, I left for Belgium to continue my studies. I was then recruited to work for American intelligence.

 

He was taken from Belgium to Munich in the middle of August 1951. He was then trained in for approximately one month.

 

Filistovich lived approximately 10 miles from the training area outside Munich and received as much of his training away from the main training area as possible. The only exception to this was the parachute and jump training. For this, he was taken blindfolded to and from the training area, and while there, he was exposed to a minimum of Americans. He was told to refrain from fraternizing with local residents, not to use local restaurants and cafes, and in general from becoming known in any way to those in the surrounding area of his residence. His recreation took place on a designated day each week in an area removed from both the Munich training area and his home. During this recreation period, he was always be accompanied by the CIA case officer. When on field training, Filistovich wore US Army clothing and was always accompanied by the CIA ease officer, who was also wearing US Army clothes. 

Filistovich’s Tasks as seen by CIA: 

• Filistovich will endeavor to establish contact with Byelorussian partisan groups in the area mentioned above and with their aid, to establish support bases for us for future operations. 
• Besides knowing the area in which he is to operate as well as knowing the people and the alleged partisans there, Filistovich will be provided with leads as well as photographs and documents from the BNR with which to establish his bonafide with those he is to contact. 
• In the event Filistovich is unable to make contact with the Byelorussian partisans, he will attempt to set up his own support base, relying in this case on aid from relatives) friends, and those he may be able to bribe with token gifts such as wristwatches, money, etc. 
• Filistovich feels certain that he will be able to contact the partisans, but in the event, he fails, feels certain that he can fulfill his mission of setting up a support base and remaining in the area indefinitely. (The area in which he will operate is a sparsely settled wood and swamp country, ideal for concealment over a long period of time.) In the event, 
• Filistovich succeeds in tither contacting the partisans and/or independently establishing himself safely in the area, he will make periodic visits to larger cities such as Minsk, Ablodechno, Vilna, and Vileka, to gather any intelligence information requested by us, or to merely report on the general conditions, etc. For this task, Filistovich will travel at night and remain in any large city for only a short time. If possible will also make photographs of military and industrial installations as well as of any other interesting intelligence objects. 
• A sub-task, which will also be carried out by Filistovich, is that of gathering document intelligence. Here, he will gather and report on existing or current passports, dates of issue, printing dates, etc. 
• Filistovich will also pave the way for his later return in either the later part of September 1951 or the ear]y part of October 1951. This will consist of organizing a reception committee, ground to air signals, etc., and possibly training one of his friends in secret writing to communicate with us during his absence. 

 

He was not trained in radio or morse code communication.

For the operation, he received a German machine gun, a Belgian four-shot pistol of 6.35 mm caliber, forty thousand in Soviet rubles, ten thousand Polish zlotys, more than one thousand German marks of the Soviet occupation zone of Germany, one thousand American dollars, four wristwatches, and a small alarm clock. He was also supplied with a large number of topographic maps of the western regions of Byelorussia, a Leica camera, binoculars, compass, and a pocket flashlight. 

 

In addition, he received

 

• Secret writing instruction and equipment.
• Radio Communication apparatus for burial and later retrieval
• Documents showing him to be a member of the Soviet Army on leave in Byelorussia from East Germany. If it is possible for a Red Army officer to be in civilian clothes when on leave, then a Soviet Army uniform will not be needed. 
• As an alternative, documents showing him to be a resident of a town or city of his choice. 
• Dog repellant chemicals to ward off dogs reportedly used by the Soviet police in tracking down partisans and border crossers. 
• Money to be used in Byelorussia for living expenses and bribery purposes and to aid him in exfiltrating across either Poland or Czechoslovakia into Germany. 
• Current situation report on Byelorussia including travel controls, border controls, restricted or forbidden zones, personalities, prices, etc. 

 

On the night of September 24-25,  1951 Ivan (Yanka) Filistovich was parachuted into Byelorussia from an unmarked plane flown by Polish pilots. The plan was to have Filistovich remain in Byelorussia for one month or less, exfiltrate via Poland to Germany, and then be dispatched again.

 

 

Yanka (Ivan Filistovich, a Cold War Belorussian tragic Hero, Part One ©

The objective of CIA’s Project AEQUOR The objective of this project was to mount clandestine operations in the Byelorussian SSR for the following purposes: 

a. Contact with and support of any existing resistance movement with the Byelorussian SSR, or development of such a movement for the purpose of carrying out CIA activities.
b. Utilizing the facilities provided by the underground for further collection of positive and operational intelligence in the USSR. 

The first CIA penetration agent was Yanka (Ivan Andreevich) Filistovich, who was parachuted into Belorussia 24-25 September 1951. He had CIA cryptonym CAMPOSANTO 1 (later AECAMPOSANTO 1).

The following has been extracted from CIA's Munich Combined Services Operation Base (CSOB) Semi-Monthly Report No. 8, dated 28 January 1952. If we change out some of it, e.g., Russia for USSR, it could have been written today. 

 

In terms of internal USSR operations, we infiltrated Filistovich into the USSR in September 1951. He was to communicate by letter drop and had instructions to attempt exfiltration via Poland before November 1951 with a situation report, but if this were not feasible, to remain until the spring, meanwhile communicating through the drops. To date, we have had no word from Filistovich. His mission was to determine the extent, if any, of underground activity in Belorussia and to advise us of the best method of continuing operations in the area if no organization did exist.  

If Filistovich exfiltrates, this team will be ready to act on whatever operational instructions or advice he brings them. If he does not, it is planned to use the team to establish a series of underground units similar to that mentioned above for Ukraine. 

 

This combination of a "controlled black base," which resembles the post-war partisan bunker set-up, and a few agents trained to attempt to move and operate at least semi-legally, will be the pattern for future Belorussian operations. Under this scheme, the team would require air infiltration, probably no later than April 1952. Air infiltration is necessary in order that the team, with a relatively large amount of supplies, can be dropped to the densely forested area from which it will operate. 

 

In terms of long-range aims, it is probably accepted by European Command, and according to a briefing by the Pentagon made available at the recent REDSOX Conference, also by the Defense Department, that the Belorussian area is the one spot where full-time tactical coverage would be the best possible guaranty of adequate advance warning if the Soviets decide to launch an all-out attack on Western Europe. In addition, it is here that carefully planned retardation might be successful and particularly effective. 

 

Also, nationalist fervor can be counted onto rear support area partisan action, which will be simpler to organize if support points already exist. We must find a way to make the thing work since having the warning we desire could considerably alter the expectations of success the Soviets might anticipate. The only way to do this is to get the "man on the ground," and the BNR organization has the men and the desire to collaborate fully. 

 

Due to the favorable terrain afforded by the BSSR, i.e., thickly wooded, swampy areas, sparsely populated, we feel that the establishment of "black bases" will present few difficulties. However, the flow of information needed must be passed by us by more effective means than radio, just as we cannot rely on airdrops every time we desire to send in a few thousand rubles to a "black base" or a resident. Therefore if the operation is to be a success we must have adequate lines through Poland and detailed information on the Polish USSR frontier. 

Probably no other groups, except perhaps the Galician Ukrainians, are so well equipped in terms of language and background to work well and effectively in a Polish-based courier service. If we have this channel, the chances for the success of the operation would be immeasurably increased. 

 

 

 

 

 

Latvian Born Freds Ziedonids Launags: A Cold War Tragic Hero, Part Two ©

After repeated employment losses, Launags began to consider repatriating back to Latvia. CIA sought to prevent this by persuading him to seek mental help domestically. This action was most likely due to the possible exposure of past clandestine plots and the negative publicity should they be revealed. A draft memorandum dated January 18, 1959, prepared for CIA's Deputy Director for Plans, with the Subject: Freds Z. LAUNAGS' Possible Repatriation to Latvia, contained this comment: 

Should subject decide to return to Latvia, the damage of revelations to the Soviets would be extensive: not only is he knowledgeable in great detail of Latvian REDSOX activities during 1951-1954, but he is also well-informed of our involvement with black radio broadcasts beamed to Latvia over the Spanish Government-owned Radio Madrid. Our role in those broadcasts is not known. The Spanish Government and Soviet revelations to that effect could prove to be very embarrassing. 

 

The draft memorandum was re-worked, and on January 29, 1965, David E. Murphy, Chief, SR Division, sent a memorandum to ADDP, in which this summary paragraph was included:

 

The Latvian REDSOX operations in which Subject was involved in 1952-54 were fully exposed to the Soviets when all of the agents were either killed or captured, and the Soviets later made propaganda use of some of the facts. Thus, Subject would provide primarily confirmatory information on these operations if he were to repatriate to Latvia. He knew a number of SR case officers, but as far as we can determine, only one of them was in his true name. He assisted in anti-Soviet Latvian broadcasts from Radio Madrid as a CIA agent could be somewhat embarrassing if the Soviets were to publicize this facet of his activities. While the extent of potential damage involved in Subject's repatriation is not excessive, we believe it appropriate nevertheless to take reasonable measures to prevent or at least delay his repatriation.  

 

For years afterward, Launags traveled around the United States searching for permanent employment but was unsuccessful in his attempts. In 1967, one internal CIA memorandum included this comment: 

 

At first, we attempted to monitor and control Subject's activities indirectly through his former friend, who is still employed by the Agency on contract. We also furnished Subject modest amounts of money, which ostensibly were hand-outs given him by his friend. 

 

Despite the efforts of the CIA and many of his friends to assist him financially and help him find suitable employment, he has not been able to hold a job for more than a few weeks. He has turned most of his former friends against him for his irrational behavior.

 

In 1965, Launags wrote a threatening letter to President Johnson if he did not liberate Latvia. CIA contacted the U.S: Secret Service: "[W[e notified the Secret Service and other appropriate agencies at the end of 1965 that we considered Subject a possible threat to the President. The Secret Service interviewed Subject shortly after that and found him rational at that time. Since then, we have kept the Service and the other appropriate agencies advised of any outstanding incidents concerning Subject." 

 

Launags visited the Soviet Mission at the United Nations in New York at least three times, seeking a visa to visit Latvia as a journalist to report on conditions in Latvia for émigré publications in the West. These visits resulted in a Riga Radio broadcast on June 26, 1967, about Launags. This was followed up in an article in the official newspaper of Latvia "Cina" on July 1, 1967, "Why a Visa was not issued to him." This article was republished in newspapers in the Latvia SSR and in the West. CIA determined the original article was accurate in Launags's biography. He was accused of being a Nazi war criminal and CIA agent involved in sending other CIA agents into Latvia. 

 

The CIA was not concerned about these articles because, "If he discussed his CIA activities with the Soviets or should disclose them in the future, he could provide no current operational information. The only historical item he could provide which still retains some degree of sensitivity is that CIA was behind the black broadcasts to Latvia which were made by the Spanish Government Radio from 1957-1961."

 

Another relevant episode in his troubled life took place in December 1968, when Launags was arrested in Olympia, Washington, on the charges of vagrancy/ trespassing. 

 

He called CIA's Portland Resident Agent (name unknown) collect and told him about the arrest and was in the Thurston County jail. The FBI was notified and sent an agent to arrange Launags' release from jail and give him travel expenses. The FBI agent gave the police $13.05 ($3.05 for a bus ticket to Portland and $10.00 for living expenses) to give Launags upon his release from jail; he was released on December 18, 1968. Although the County Deputy Prosecutor wanted to press trespassing charges against Launags, the Sheriff requested that he did not do so, and the charge was dropped. Launags then worked in Oregon in various low-skilled jobs; the last known ones were in tree reforestation projects in 1969. 

 

During subsequent years, Launags apparently received some of the necessary medical and/or psychological treatment or gained stability in his life because he was later positively referred to as a writer, poet, and member of the Latvian resistance in Latvian émigré and other publications. In 1986, Launags was the editor of the weekly newspaper Brīvā Latvija (Free Latvia), published in Münster, Germany. 

 

Freds Launags eventually returned to the United States. Still, it is unknown when and what he did afterward, except he visited Latvia in 1991, sometime before his death in Los Angeles on November 22, 1991.