CIA's Landsberg Project: covert military and paramilitary specialist's training program in the early Cold War, Part Two

The first group of trainees arrived in the area on July 19, 1951. The remainder reported for training on July 29, 1951— the total number was twenty-one.

Secrecy of the site was paramount. A twenty-four-hour guard in a U.S. Army fatigue uniform and armed with a U.S. rifle was posted at the main entrance to the area. No Germans were permitted to enter the area without the guard first notifying one of the American staff personnel on duty. Americans, likewise, were not allowed to enter the site if they were not known to the guards as American staff personnel authorized to enter the area. In case of doubt, one of the American staff personnel was notified. At least one member of CIA staff in Munich was on call on the base 24 hours daily, seven days per week. Incoming calls to the base were taken by the guard in the guard room at the entrance to the area. The guard either answered it directly and asked the calling party to hold the line, or he summoned one of the American staff.

CIA liaison was established with the Landsberg Air Base Provost Marshall to handle minor offenses perpetrated by Germans (i.e., entering the area through holes in the wire fence to gather berries and wood. In some instances, offenders cut holes in the wire fence to gain entrance.) On a number of occasions, apprehended offenders were taken into custody by the guards and turned over to the Provost Marshall for disciplinary action. As a result, trespassing or breaking into the area was minimal. 

Training during the period August 27 - September 30, 1951, included these subjects:

(a) Map Reading

(b) Scouting and Patrolling

(c) Planning Patrols (classroom work) - combining fieldwork and class work of subjects (a) and (b) above.

(d) Demolitions - classroom work and practical work in the field. Included calculation of charges and planning.

(e) Weapons familiarization and familiarization firing, detailed field stripping, and cleaning weapons.

(f) Judo - unarmed defense.

(g) Guerilla exercises and calisthenics.

(h) Organized athletics - volleyball and soccer.

(i) Classroom instruction in Mathematics and English.

(j) Training films on Demolitions, Scouting and Patrolling, and Judo.

(k) Documentary films shown in the evening (at least three times weekly) - training and entertainment.

Recreation included - three miniature chess boards, two checkerboards, a mandolin, a guitar, a piano, German newspapers and periodicals, a radio/phonograph combination with a generous supply of Ukrainian and American records, an occasional Ukrainian newspaper, a volleyball, a soccer ball, a punching bag, and two bottles of beer a day. Training and a limited number of documentary films were also used for entertainment.

Until approximately September 20, 1951, a guard was posted in an observation tower (the highest point in the area) of one of the area buildings during the daytime to observe and report trespassers. Field telephones in the observation tower and the guard room at the main gate were used to report on activities in the area. Training in field demolitions, the numerous posting of signs to that effect, and the occasional apprehension of trespassers eventually made this post unnecessary. 

On September 24, 1951, six trainees were removed from the area. Their release was either requested by the trainees themselves or they were selected by ZP UHVR personnel for release. The reasons for this 'selection' were unknown. All six trainees released were paid their due salaries plus a 'goodwill' bonus of DM 200. Security oaths in Ukrainian and English were signed by the six before their release: “I pledge on my word of honor to maintain in strict secrecy the place and purpose of my stay at the camp, and everything relating to it from the time of my entry to the time of my release from the camp. I know the consequences that would befall me should I fail to keep my pledge."

None of the trainees volunteered for dispatching to Ukraine: each said he had had his share of the discomforts and dangers of partisan life and would like to wait until war before returning to Ukraine.

Project Landsberg ended in the summer of 1952 and was considered by one CIA officer to be a fiasco.

CIA's Landsberg Project: covert military and paramilitary specialist's training program in the Early Cold War, Part One

In 1951, several Soviet nationality groups were organized by CIA according to their ethnic components into "guard companies." In July 1951, the CIA established a secret training facility  (“Area B”) at the Displaced Persons camp in Landsberg, am Lech Bavaria, West Germany, about 65 kilometers from Munich. The primary installations at Landsberg consisted of two buildings: an office building, a combination barrack building and mess hall.

The purpose of the CIA-organized groups was purely Paramilitary or Political Action activities during hostilities with the Soviet Union.

Here is the protocol between CIA and the Ukrainian ZP UHVR in December 1951:

1. The fundamental policy of the United States towards all peoples is self-determination.

2. The United States will encourage the anti-Stalin struggle on the part of all peoples of the territories now controlled by the Soviet Union.

3. The United States will not coerce any national group to change their political views nor interfere with their freedom to propagate their own concepts.

Operational

1. Training for current operations shall continue separately from other activities. Personnel for current operations will include those men already in the Kaufbeuren training area, any Landsberg trainees willing to return to the homeland, and approximately six to eight new recruits to be spotted in or outside of Germany by members of the ZP UHVR. In addition to partisan warfare, the recruits for current operations shall be thoroughly trained in every aspect of current Soviet life and clandestine underground tactics so that they will be able to maneuver and operate on their own should that prove necessary. The main purpose for this training will be to provide support and reinforcements for the underground movement in the homeland. One responsible member of the ZP UHVR (UHVR) will be assigned to the training area to assist in the successful completion of the program.

2. A Ukrainian Guard Company composed of two hundred men will be formed and given general military training to prepare them as wartime reserve units. The ZP UHVR (UHVR) may place qualified officers and men to the extent of its ability to recruit them. Should the ZP UHVR not be able to recruit the entire guard complement, the remainder will be recruited from among other Ukrainian groups and from the memberships of the various Ukrainian emigre parties. Emphasis will be placed on paramilitary training, and the cadres will be made available to the ZP UHVR (UHVR) for the spotting of qualified men for current operations. If this first attempt at establishing a Ukrainian guard company proves successful and desirable, it is conceivable that other Ukrainian guard companies will be established later.

3. Those trainees at Landsberg who have qualified for political action training will be sent to the United States as soon as their clearances have been received.

4. Those trainees at Landsberg who are not qualified either for P/A or current operations and who do not wish to become members of the guard company will be released from Landsberg and returned to civilian life immediately.

5. The primary concern of American-ZP UHVR (UHVB) collaboration is the continued existence of the Ukrainian underground movement. However, the gathering of intelligence information by the Ukrainian underground and its transmittal to us by any feasible means is regarded as a most desirable aspect of United States ZP UHVR (UHVR) cooperation,

Trainees at Landsberg had to sign the following pledge before a witness:

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that I will under no circumstances reveal anything having to do with my recruitment for or my period of stay at the US Government Camp in Landsberg. I solemnly swear that I will reveal to no one the location of the U.S. Camp at which I stayed nor discuss with anyone the Americans whom I met before or during my period of stay at Landsberg.

Further, I hereby declare that I have no claims whatsoever against the U.S. Government or any of its organs as a result of my stay at the U.S. Camp in Landsberg, and I declare that I have been fully compensated for all services I have rendered before and during my entire stay at Landsberg.

I hereby declare that I am aware that should I break my oath to maintain the strict secrecy that I pledged above, I will be liable to any executive action that the U. S. Government may deem appropriate in my case.

 

The Secret Life and Mysterious Death of Radio Liberation’s Leonid Karas ©

Leonid Karas

The post–World War II Byelorussian emigration in Western Europe was split into two organizations: 

•       BZR/BCR (Beloruska Zentralna Radaor Byelorussian Central Council)

•       BNR (Beloruska Nationalna Rada, Byelorussian National Council or Council of the Byelorussian Peoples Republic) based in Paris, France. 

From 1951 to 1962, CIA financially supported and used the BNR émigré/exile group in the United States and Europe. 

CIA operations against the BSSR began in the summer of 1951 when CIA initiated a joint Office of Special Operations (OSO)-Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) Foreign Intelligence project (cryptonym AEQUOR). The project included agent infiltration operations in Byelorussia to establish contact with partisan groups and set up support bases for future operations. CIA’s Munich Combined Soviet Operations Base was the responsible field unit. OSO and OPC shared equally in all expenses related to recruitment, training, compensation, equipment, dispatch, and exfiltration of agents into and out of Byelorussia. 

CIA’s Principal Agent for spotting and recruiting agents for the Byelorussian operations was Boris Ragula (cryptonym CAMBISTA 2), a medical doctor in Belgium.

The first penetration agent was Yanka Filistovich (CAMPOSANTO 1), dispatched on September 21, 1951. He was captured almost immediately, interrogated, later imprisoned, and executed.

A four-man team (AEQUOR II) was dispatched on the night of 26/27 August 1952. One was killed, three captured. All three cooperated and participated in radio games with CIA for three years. It was then decided to send another team, AEQUOR III, in 1954.

Leonid Karas (Лявон Леанід Карась) was born on 20 November 1923. He had been a teacher during World War II and reportedly was one of the leaders of the “Union of Belarussian Youth” (based on the German Hitler Youth). In 1944, he left Belarus with about 3,000 persons with the retreating German army. 

Registration Card

Karas registered in the Displaced Persons (DP) Camp in Michelsdorf on August 16, 1945. On his Registration Card, it was written: “I am a White Ruthenian of Polish citizenship, and I don’t wish to become a Soviet citizen.”

Karas worked as a camp guard in the Belarusian camp in Michelsdorf and studied at a Belarusian school. By 1948, Karas was a member of the Belarus youth organization "Twelve," along with other friends. In that year, he left the DP Camp for the United Kingdom, where he worked in coal mines in Scotland. 

The BNR needed more suitable agent candidate material for CIA operations. Because there was no 1953 dispatch under Project AEQUOR, it became necessary for a third AEQUOR team to be prepared for dispatch in 1954, to be utilized in support of Team II, or undertake an independent mission to ensure CIA coverage of the Belorussian SSR.

 

One of the agents associated with Ragula in 1954 was Leonid Karas, whom friends nicknamed Fish (Riba). He was given CIA cryptonym AECAMPOSANTO 11 and invited to Munich. The cover devised for him was that of attending university either in Heidelberg or Karlsruhe. The Leuven term had already begun, and he had to leave Belgium soon or the interest of his friends there would be unduly aroused. 

 

In December 1953, an assessment of Karas was completed, and medical and lie detector examinations were given. At the beginning of the training, Karas showed excessive knowledge of the BNR Council's cooperation with the CIA. For example, Karas knew detailed information about previous landings, landing sites, and more. Because of this, CIA dropped him as a potential agent.

 

On March 14, 1954, CIA’s Principal Agent Boris Ragula wrote:

 

“You said that Fish knows the whereabouts of the four. There is no basis for this statement; it is doubtful because even the President does not know this, and neither do his colleagues. Fish allegedly knows where the poison is hidden. However, I don't know anything about this. I have to come to the only possible conclusion that all of these arguments have been invented for the purpose of asking about an actual danger which probably does not threaten from our side.”

 

Karas returned to Munich on December 6, 1953, to complete his assessment, and physical and lie detector examinations. Karas lived in a local pension and paid per diem rather than placed in a CIA safe-house requiring considerable logistic support. Because of his favorable lie detector examination and medical, Karas was permitted to return to Louvain for the Christmas holidays. He established his cover story as a student and cut ties with the group then. 

 

Faced with the issue of not being able to prepare a team for support purposes or otherwise, CIA decided to use a two-person team, providing both candidates were equally qualified to undertake either a support or independent type mission. Discussions with and assessment of Karas indicated, qualifications-wise, that he would be able to undertake either mission equally well but only as a team member. 

 

After the assessment concluded, Karas lacked the desirable leadership qualities to permit the launching of an independent two-man team into the Byelorussian SSR. Furthermore, because of his partial knowledge of Team II operations and team members, CIA decided that Karas would be a security risk even if sent in as a team member of an independent type mission.

 

After receipt of the Headquarters decision that the preparation of Team III be postponed, CIA’s case office told Karas that certain security issues precluded his utilization at that time and “Particular exigencies necessitated the postponement of any mission at this time. 

 

Although Ragula admitted that Karas and two others were almost wholly witting in all aspects of CIA collaboration, it was felt that a lot of loose conversation inconsistent with the best security interests was extant in the student home in Belgium. The use of the student home for routing candidates in conjunction with the above loose talk has undoubtedly blown the home completely.

 

Karas was then completely unoccupied and unemployed:

 

We have not been so fortunate in disposing of Karas. There was some indication that he could obtain a job with Radio Liberation, but apparently, there are no openings for him. He has very little qualifications for a job here in Germany. He could have obtained employment as a chauffeur if he knew how to drive. Lacking this ability, the door was closed even for a menial task such as this. Since Karas’s visa expires in April, we have no alternative but to return him, with a payoff, to Louvain. It is doubtful whether security will suffer significantly because of his seemingly premature return to his friends in Louvain. Nobody believed him when he said he was coming to Munich to attend the university. The collapse of CIA-BNR relations in Europe is undoubtedly reasonably common knowledge amongst his friends in Louvain. 

Karas was given 10,000 Belgian Francs as a disposal allowance and permitted to return to Louvain. He planned to study typing and eventually return to Munich to work as a temporary translator for Radio Liberation. He was successful. On May 20, 1954, Belarusian programs aired for the first time. The main "speaker" was Leonid Karas.  

On or about September 1, 1954, Leonid Karas did not appear for work, and Radio Liberty notified the Munich police that Karas was missing. On September 7, 1954, his body and Belgian passport were found on the banks of the Isar River in Munich. Leonid Karas was buried in Munich’s North Cemetery. The crime remains unsolved, but his friends and colleagues had no doubt it was murder.