Cold War CIA Sponsored Russian Language Propaganda Leaflets/Balloons into East Germany ©

 Cold War CIA Sponsored Russian Language Propaganda Leaflets/Balloons into East Germany

 

The CIA created and controlled Russian émigré organization "Central Association of Post-War Émigrés" (TsOPE – transliteration of ЦОПЭ - Центральное Объединение Послевоенных Эмигрантов) was founded in November 1952. CIA cryptonyms for TsOPE included HBDUCKPIN, AEPAWN, and AEVIRGIL-1. According to one declassified CIA document: "TsOPE was created, supported, and controlled by CIA in order to develop and utilize some of the human resources in the Russian anti-Soviet emigration in support of CIA's political and psychological objective of accelerating evolutionary changes in the character and policy of the Soviet regime." 

 

According to one CIA report, “Experience argues that, by and large, attribution to a real organization lends propaganda a legitimate authenticity which notional attribution cannot achieve. Indigenous press and radio coverage of TsOPE's activities help, along this line, to reinforce the basic leaflet campaign. TsOPE staff members write the leaflets under the close supervision of a contract agent, who transmits policy guidelines and related directions of the case officers.” TsOPE’s headquarters was set up in Munich, Germany, with chapters in Brussels, Paris, and Vienna.

It was proposed to continue financial support of TsOPE, to “enable consolidation of present achievements and to provide for sound expansion of its anti-Soviet psychological warfare program. Specifically, it was proposed in Fiscal Year 1955:

a.     to undertake long-range balloon dispatch of leaflets aimed at our primary target, the peoples of the USSR; 

b.     to carry out short-range balloon dispatch of leaflets aimed at Soviet occupation personnel in Germany; 

c.     to increase both the quantity and quality of defection and disaffection leaflets, pamphlets and ideological materials; 

d.     to provide the group with printing facilities to enable production by the organization itself of leaflets in sufficient quantity for the expanded distribution program; 

The American zone of Germany centering on the Coburg-Hof area, was one base of operations used to launch balloons. In the initial phase, the objective was to launch balloons carrying anti-Soviet propaganda leaflets in the Russian language within the Soviet zone of Germany. Balloons were launched with fuses for targets within a one-hundred kilometer radius of the Coburg-Hof area. Bursting methods was used for targets above one hundred kilometers away but less than the maximum accurate range of five hundred kilometers. The project was a short-range balloon operation, In the initial phase, Soviet installations within a five-hundred kilometer radius of the Coburg-Hof area and inside the Soviet zone of Germany were the targets. 

Personnel employed did not require any special cover. They operated as representatives of TSIOPOE engaged in carrying out an anti-Communist action. Permits were obtained from the Border police for this purpose and the actual launching operations took place in the forest at a safe distance from cities and towns. A camouflaged truck possibly one employed in the transport of just such gas cylinders was needed for the dispatch. These cylinders were used commercially and customarily transported by truck to supply points.

The estimate of costs was based on an average monthly launching of forty balloons carrying 13,500 leaflets each, or a total of 540,000 leaflets per month. Special operations with two three-man enabled the teams to release 3,000,000 leaflets in any given three-day period, weather conditions permitting, or 6,000,000 over a period of one week, The balloon team in Bavaria launched a total of 1,576,250 leaflets in six actions during the month of December 1956. The balloon team in Berlin launched a record total of leaflets during December. A total of 14,993,361 leaflet units were launched in the DDR through the use of 3474 balloons.

The TsOPE shop in Munich printed a total of 530,000 leaflet units during December 1956.The balloon team in Bavaria launched a total of 1,576,250 leaflets in six actions during the month of December 1956. The balloon team in Berlin launched a record total of leaflets during December. A total of 14,993,361 leaflet units were launched in the DDR through the use of 3474 balloons. 

TsOPE operations were terminated in the summer of 1963 for the following reason: “Events have superseded TsOPE’s usefulness and because the CIA personnel and resources allotted to its support could now be used more effectively in other forms of CA (Covert Action) activity.“

 

Code Name "Krüger" ©

Code Name “Krüger”

 

“Krüger” was a source for KGB information from 1972 to 1986, but he did not report to or

work for the KGB. His story has an interesting twist.

 

“Krüger” was born in 1922 to Russian émigrés in Belgrade. He graduated from Belgrade

High School. During World War II, he went to Berlin in 1941 and studied at the Film Technical

School for two years. In 1943, he became an officer of the Russian anti–Soviet army of General

Vlasov in Germany. He spoke fluent Russian, Serbian, German, and good English. Because of a

war injury, his left leg was amputated at the knee in 1944, and he remained in a military hospital

until February 1946. Afterwards while living in various displaced persons’ camps in Austria, he

was able to get various jobs with the U.S. Army occupation forces as a film projectionist until he

successfully got a job as a monitor with Radio Liberty in 1955, because of his language abilities.

 

He was known to have continuous and serious financial problems in the fifties and sixties

until sometime in 1972. While employed in the Russian Monitoring Section, he was also

controlled and paid by the former DDR (East Germany) intelligence service (MfS). The MfS

was, apparently, operating in behalf of the KGB, since the MfS normally would have had little,

if any, interest in RFE/RL. “Krüger” was paid 1,000 DM on the average per month. In return he

was to supply personal information about RFE/RL’s employees and provide documents

especially from his own department, which monitored and transcribed Russian language radio

broadcasts.

 

Also part of his task was reporting on the large and active Ukrainian exile community in

Munich. He used his RFE/RL employment to maintain contact with them. “Krüger” met his

handler in various locations in Munich and Bavaria. The initial information given to the RFE/RL

security office in 1991 did not give concise details of what “Krüger” was to have allegedly done,

or what information he might have provided to the MfS, or if he acted alone in the MfS tasking.

 

The MfS was directly involved in various activities with non–German émigré groups in the

West (presumably for the KGB), including employees of RFE/RL. In January 1992, the RFE/RL

Bavarian counterintelligence contact finally had the opportunity to meet with the former MfS

intelligence officer, Karl-Hermann Mueller, responsible for “Krüger.” He said the KGB had

originally recruited “Krüger,” but in 1972 they turned over the operation to the MfS. The MfS

was tasked with gathering information about the CIA, and they wanted to use “Krüger” to gather

information about presumed CIA involvement and personnel at RFE/RL. “Krüger” was then

given his code name. He was a member of the Works Council and one can assume that this was

his prime source of information on RFE/RL: hirings, firings, promotions, demotions,

disciplinary action, etc. He provided copies of internal RFE/RL memoranda, the telephonebooks, 

and any other written information. In total, the amount of information provided by “Krüger” was 

about forty inches thick.

 

The MfS used him to gather materials and information about RFE/RL until February 1986,

when Gundarev defected in Athens and was flown to the United States. At the same time, the

MfS sent a message to Moscow asking if Gundarev’s defection could jeopardize the “Krüger”

operation. The KGB answered yes, that Gundarev had knowledge of the KGB’s prior control of

“Krüger.” The MfS thereupon stopped the “Krüger” operation.

 

“Krüger” met his contacts on a monthly basis in a Wienerwald restaurant in the town where

he lived. The MfS and the KGB had conducted a “false flag” operation with “Krüger” as he

apparently thought all along that he was providing information to the British Intelligence

Agency MI5. Mueller later said that “Krüger” was never told his information was going to the

MfS or KGB. He thought that “Krüger” was possibly originally recruited by a KGB agent or

officer named Grynov, who also was at one time possibly controlled by the British intelligence

agency M15. Grynov had previously been an officer in “Krüger’s” detachment during World

War Two, and the two of them maintained contact after the war.

 

Over the years, “Krüger” was paid in excess of DM 100,000 for his information, which

totaled over 2,500 pages. “Krüger” was last known to have met with his MfS contacts in

February 1986. The statute of limitations in these cases was five years, thus there was no

prosecution possibility.

 

Cold War Radio; The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe, 1850-1980,

Chapter 7 

  

Kidnapping of Gottllieb Burghardt in Cold War Berlin ©

Cold War Frequencies: CIA’s Clandestine Radio Broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

 

Chapter Eight (excerpt)

 

Kidnapping of Gottlieb Burghardt 

 

On 15 December 15, 1956 at 7 p.m, Gottlieb Burghardt went to keep an operational contact meeting with DDR contact Waltraud RICHTER. The next day Ilse Burghardt reported that her husband was missing. CIA could not understand Burghardt’s failure to take the necessary precautions in going to a night meeting alone with a suspect contact.

A short second page article in the East Berlin Newspaper Berliner Zeitung on December 18, 1956, mentioned that Burghardt was reportedly seized on an East Berlin street by pedestrians, when he was molesting them. He also was alleged to be drunk and carrying a pistol. 

The story was viewed by CIA as an East Germany MFS or Soviet KGB effort to cover the kidnapping in event that Burghardt was to be used publicly later in which case his presence in East Berlin would have to be explained. 

Ilse Burghardt wrote a letter to famed Attorney Wolfgang Vogel on January 2, 1957, asking him for his help in the case. He agreed and they met for the first time on January 30, 1957. Subsequently, Wolfgang Vogel reportedly stated he had learned from DDR authorities that Burghardt was kidnapped and he was to be tried under Article 6 of the DDR Constitution which includes espionage activities.

The West Berlin police took an active part in the investigation and put four people in custody, who allegedly formed a MFS kidnap team that was originally given the assignment by the MFS to kidnap Burghardt. Another team was organized and given the assignment according to the testimony of one of the people in custody.  

CIA’s Berlin Operations Base tried to do all it could to aid Burghardt, e.g., “No psychological / propaganda activity was undertaken pending determination of the best tactics to be utilized in the case: a. a statement that Burghardt kidnapped made at time of incident and we in fact have nothing more to say now,
and b. on balance we feel strong play this stage would force DDR court to throw book at Burghardt in self-justification…[W]e are attempting via police keep lid on previous kidnap plot. plan use this as counter blast …this might catch them off balance and upset prearranged plans thus benefit.”

The trial of Gottlieb Burghardt began at the end of June 1957. He was charged with working for the American intelligence service from 1951-1953 and then for TsOPE against the DDR. The trial lasted three days and was not open to the public. He was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. Burghardt reportedly admitted that he had at least 35 active agents in the DDR. Vogel’s pro-forma appeals of the sentence were for naught. After the trial, Vogel again met with Ilse Burghardt. An unidentified TsOPE member was also there and ask Vogel if he could arrange for a prisoner exchange. Vogel did bring up the possibility with the DDR but in April 1958, this was declined. 

He was finally released from prison in August 1964, when he was among the first 70 prisoners released by the DDR in exchange for money from West Germany. Vogel personally drove Burghardt to West Berlin; the other ex-prisoners were taken in three buses to West Germany. Burghardt’s fate afterwards is not known.