The objective of CIA’s Project AEQUOR The objective of this project was to mount clandestine operations in the Byelorussian SSR for the following purposes:
a. Contact with and support of any existing resistance movement with the Byelorussian SSR, or development of such a movement for the purpose of carrying out CIA activities.
b. Utilizing the facilities provided by the underground for further collection of positive and operational intelligence in the USSR.
The first CIA penetration agent was Yanka (Ivan Andreevich) Filistovich, who was parachuted into Belorussia 24-25 September 1951. He had CIA cryptonym CAMPOSANTO 1 (later AECAMPOSANTO 1).
The following has been extracted from CIA's Munich Combined Services Operation Base (CSOB) Semi-Monthly Report No. 8, dated 28 January 1952. If we change out some of it, e.g., Russia for USSR, it could have been written today.
In terms of internal USSR operations, we infiltrated Filistovich into the USSR in September 1951. He was to communicate by letter drop and had instructions to attempt exfiltration via Poland before November 1951 with a situation report, but if this were not feasible, to remain until the spring, meanwhile communicating through the drops. To date, we have had no word from Filistovich. His mission was to determine the extent, if any, of underground activity in Belorussia and to advise us of the best method of continuing operations in the area if no organization did exist.
If Filistovich exfiltrates, this team will be ready to act on whatever operational instructions or advice he brings them. If he does not, it is planned to use the team to establish a series of underground units similar to that mentioned above for Ukraine.
This combination of a "controlled black base," which resembles the post-war partisan bunker set-up, and a few agents trained to attempt to move and operate at least semi-legally, will be the pattern for future Belorussian operations. Under this scheme, the team would require air infiltration, probably no later than April 1952. Air infiltration is necessary in order that the team, with a relatively large amount of supplies, can be dropped to the densely forested area from which it will operate.
In terms of long-range aims, it is probably accepted by European Command, and according to a briefing by the Pentagon made available at the recent REDSOX Conference, also by the Defense Department, that the Belorussian area is the one spot where full-time tactical coverage would be the best possible guaranty of adequate advance warning if the Soviets decide to launch an all-out attack on Western Europe. In addition, it is here that carefully planned retardation might be successful and particularly effective.
Also, nationalist fervor can be counted onto rear support area partisan action, which will be simpler to organize if support points already exist. We must find a way to make the thing work since having the warning we desire could considerably alter the expectations of success the Soviets might anticipate. The only way to do this is to get the "man on the ground," and the BNR organization has the men and the desire to collaborate fully.
Due to the favorable terrain afforded by the BSSR, i.e., thickly wooded, swampy areas, sparsely populated, we feel that the establishment of "black bases" will present few difficulties. However, the flow of information needed must be passed by us by more effective means than radio, just as we cannot rely on airdrops every time we desire to send in a few thousand rubles to a "black base" or a resident. Therefore if the operation is to be a success we must have adequate lines through Poland and detailed information on the Polish USSR frontier.
Probably no other groups, except perhaps the Galician Ukrainians, are so well equipped in terms of language and background to work well and effectively in a Polish-based courier service. If we have this channel, the chances for the success of the operation would be immeasurably increased.
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