CIA lClandestine Radio Broadcasts to Eastern Europe and Soviet Union: Success or Failure? ©

 

 

The CIA's Clandestine radio broadcasts were not only a tool, but also a strategic weapon in the United State's psychological and political warfare operations. They played a crucial role in the 'battle for men's minds' of those who found themselves in the borderlands in the immediate post–World War II years. In July 1956, NSC 5608 officially scaled backed the objectives of America’s covert operations: “U.S. policy should be directed toward the weakening and the eventual elimination of dominant Soviet power over these peoples, although the accomplishment of this goal in the near future cannot be expected. The more im- mediate criteria for judging the desirability of any particular measures would be their effectiveness in promoting and encouraging evolutionary change toward the weakening of Soviet controls and the attainment of national independence by the countries concerned”. 

 

Who listened to the clandestine broadcasts? There were no organized audience research mechanisms in the early Cold War to answer the question. One method the CIA used to measure the effectiveness of the clandestine radio broadcasts was to look at how the East Bloc regimes reacted to them. 

 

For example, at the 21^st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in January 1959 Politburo member and Minister of Culture Yekaterina Furtseva spoke about strengthening Marxist-Lenin ideology and Communist consciousness of the peoples of the USSR: “At the service of the organizers of the Cold War are all sorts of private committees, funds, and unions, and numerous radio stations with provocative names like Bajkal, Kavkaz (Caucasus), Nova Ukraina, Nasha Rossiya, Osvobodoshdenie (Radio Liberation), Svobodnaya Evropa (Radio Free Europe) and so forth.” The author of this information added, “The fact that Furtseva found it necessary to mention the ‘diversionary’ work of our black radios, thus publicizing them before the great masses of listeners and readers of her speech is proof of the significance the ruling clique of the USSR-CPSU attaches to the role of these radios in the overall Psychological War effort of the Free World against Communism.” 

 

In Washington on 15 September 1959, there was a meeting between Yuri Zhukov, Soviet Chairman of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and George Allen, Director of the United States Information Agency (USIA). Zhukov began the meeting by telling Allen that the Voice of America's broadcasts were no longer jammed. He added, "This was an experiment—whether the Voice of America would cease pursuing the Cold War and be the real voice of America." They then spoke briefly about Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Zhukov said, "All these were established for the purpose of overthrowing Soviet power." Zhukov then again spoke about Radio Baikal and Radio Caucasus: Radio Baikal emanated from Okinawa and Radio Caucasus from a ship near Rhodes. Mr. Zhukov read some excerpts from Radio Caucasus broadcasts in the ensuing discussion. 

 

Mr. Allen noted that these stations were not under his control and said he was not certain that the United States had anything to do with these stations. He questioned whether any of them emanated from a ship near Rhodes, as the only ship of that kind was a USIA ship, which transmitted only VOA broadcasts.

During a KGB and East German Stasi intelligence officers meeting on 13 November 1969, KGB First Deputy S. K. Zvigun mentioned CIA-sponsored clandestine radio stations: “A particularly important role in the struggle against the Soviet Union is played by radio propaganda. In addition to legal radio stations like the BBC, RFE, and “Voice of America,” there are also illegal stations directly run by intelligence services like “Radio Baikal,” “Radio Caucasus,” “Free Russia,” and “Free Ukraine.” They broadcast daily for many hours the vilest slander in Russian and the different languages of the Soviet people. They exploit certain negative phenomena from Soviet life based on the central and local press. Also, they receive information from the émigré circles. It is difficult to rebuke this slanderous propaganda. Usually, the broadcasts are shrewdly embedded in music. Wavering people, youths in particular, are getting softened up by this, and individual people are led in the wrong direction.”   

   

There was no way of polling the listening audience in the respective counties. In some cases, the CIA's foreign intelligence operations, i.e., penetration of agents into the target countries, were also used to gather information about the audibility of these clandestine radio broadcasts. 

Did the radio broadcasts have the intended effect on the listeners? Did they make a difference? The questions go beyond the scope of this overview. The short answer is no. The detailed answers lie in further research on the effect on the indigenous listeners who remained behind the Iron Curtain, especially Communist Party apparatchiks. Researchers could use this overview as a stepping stone for further research and analysis in media studies and Cold War historiography. For example, the CIA has released millions of classified documents, but millions remain classified and closed to researchers. In many cases in Eastern Europe, inculpatory files were destroyed. In the case of the former East German Stasi files, for example, it will be years before the shredded documents are readable. 

 

Questions and Answers concerning Carlos and the bombing of Radio Free Europe in 1981©

1 / On 21 February 1981, a bomb exploded at Radio Free Europe. How do you learn the news? What are you doing at the time?

It was Saturday night, and I was at home, a few kilometers from RFE, when I heard a very loud explosion. At first, I thought it was a sonic boom, but that seemed unlikely for Munich at around 10 PM on a Saturday. Shortly after, one of my security staff at RFE called to inform me about the explosion. My security supervisor also phoned and then came to pick me up, driving me to RFE. On arrival, I had to identify myself to the Munich police, who had set up a cordon around the building, before they allowed me inside. When I saw all the broken windows and damage, my first thought was that it had been a gas explosion. The building had never been attacked before in over 30 years, and there had been no warning, so I did not suspect a bomb.

2 / What exactly happened? What were the material and human consequences of the attack?

Police later found the bomb was 15 kilograms of nitropenta, set off electronically. The building suffered about 4 million DM in damage, and part of the roof was blown away. Many RFE windows shattered, as did those in the nearby apartment complex. Four RFE employees were seriously injured, and four other people had minor injuries.

3 / What was the reaction of the employees? At the time, did you know who ordered the attack?

Employees and management reacted with disbelief, outrage, and fear. Some feared it could happen again. I did not know who was responsible, but I thought it could be the KGB or an Eastern European service.

4 / When did you learn the truth? What did you know about Carlos at the time? Were you surprised when you heard it was Carlos and his band?

I first learned that Carlos was behind the attack in the summer of 1990, when the chief prosecutor in Budapest issued a press release to the Hungarian news agency identifying Carlos as the attacker. A few days later, Hungarian state television broadcast a film showing Carlos and Weinrich in Budapest, meeting with Hungarian intelligence officers. In September 1990, a Czech magazine published an article claiming Carlos received one million dollars to bomb RFE and carry out attacks on RFE emigres in Paris and Cologne, Germany. These attacks involved book bombs concealed in the Khrushchev memoirs and mailed from Spain. 

In 1991, a former Stasi officer offered to provide a 50-page report about Carlos, which proved he was behind the attack.  The Stasi officer wanted 4,000DM for the copy. I negotiated the figure down to 1,500 DM and received the report, which included photographs and drawings of the RFE and the RFE transmitter sites in Germany. Included in the package was a copy of the plan used to bomb RFE, along with a drawing of the building showing the exact location from which the photographs were taken.

5 / Who prepared the attack, provided the weapons? The vehicles ?

Carlos and Weinrich planned and prepared the attack in Budapest. The Romanian intelligence service supplied explosives and weapons. ETA members stole the vehicles in France and drove them to Munich.

In Munich, Johannes Weinrich (code name Steve) from Revolutionary Cells; Bruno Breguet (code name Luca) from Swiss group Primea Linea; Jose Maria Larretxea (code name Schep) from ETA; and an unidentified woman (code name Secretary) from ETA, were present..

6 / What was the interest of Carlos in carrying out this attack? Was it a militant or purely financial act? Was Carlos paid for this attack?

Reportedly, Carlos was paid $1 million. Otherwise, he had no interest in Radio Free Europe out of ideological or political reasons. In November 1998, Prosecutor Dan Voinea stated that a Romanian bank account existed for Carlos and Kopp under the names Michael Mallios and Anna Louise Toto-Kramer. Later that month, in an interview with Deutsche Welle, he said Carlos received one million dollars for the attack. 

Voinea also announced that Carlos's Romanian contacts were former Securitate chief General Iulian Vlad, ex-foreign intelligence chief General Nicolae Plesita, and former Interior Minister Tudor Postelnicu. 

7 / Who was targeted? What represented Radio Free Europe for Ceaușescu?

RFE and its staff were targeted. Before the bombing, three prominent Romanian freelancers for RFE received book bombs—one in Cologne, two in Paris. In 1991, TV reported Carlos was invited to Ceaușescu's bedroom to listen to Radio Free Europe. Ceaușescu then allegedly asked Carlos to deal with RFE and the emigres.

8 / Did the attack proceed as planned?

Probably not. The actual bombing itself was successful as planned by Carlos and Weinrich, but the Romanians had expected more, perhaps destroying the capability to broadcast programs to Romania. According to Carlos's girlfriend/wife, Magdalena Kopp, after the bombing on 6 March 1981, Carlos flew to Bucharest, where Colonel Sergiu Nica and others of the Romanian intelligence service reluctantly toasted him with champagne for his performance, even though, according to their wishes, he was not successful. Nica was visibly upset, but Carlos did not seem to notice it.  Nica raised a glass of champagne and ironically toasted Carlos, “Usually I kill for money, but this time I kill for nothing. Narok!” (Cheers!)”  

9 / Why did Ceaușescu decide to use Carlos? What was the opinion of the Romanian authorities about Carlos and his group?

A top-secret summary report dated October 3, 1980, by Department III/II-8 of the Hungarian Interior Ministry, based on monitored phone calls between "Carlos the Jackal" in Budapest and his Romanian contact Sergiu Nica in Bucharest, identified RFE/RL Romanian Service employee Emil Georgescu, King-in-Exile Michael, Paul Goma, and other émigrés as Carlos's targets. The planned attack on Georgescu was to happen during an assault on the Romanian Section of RFE, after which the terrorists planned to seize secret documents. Georgescu was stabbed 28 times as he left his apartment for RFE. Although two minor French criminals committed the attack, there was no direct link to Carlos or his group.

In addition to the bombing of RFE headquarters, Carlos received the task of breaking into or destroying the monitoring station outside Munich in Schleissheim and obtaining “secret” documents that were stored there.

10 / Was Carlos in contact with government officials, relatives of Ceaușescu, or only with some people from the security services?

In 1992, the then-Czech Republic Minister of Interior, Jan Ruml, confirmed that a meeting had taken place between two Romanian Intelligence Officers and Carlos in  Prague in August 1979.  They had traveled with Romanian diplomatic passports in the names Andrej Nitescu and Ive Dobascu. Their real names were Sergiu Nica and Ion Deaconescu, respectively. Their goal was to request that Carlos kill former Romanian Intelligence General Ion Pacepa, who had defected to the West the previous year.

Sergiu Nica, for yet unexplained reasons, wrote a handwritten report in February 1990 detailing his contact with Carlos. He wrote: 

In 1978, when PACEPA betrayed us, I was working in Bucharest in military unit U.M 0620. I was in charge of the intelligence service and, among other duties, was personally focused on the action against the international terrorist “CARLOS.” Thanks to a foreign source (Arafat’s brother), I learned in 1979 that “Carlos” was living in socialist countries. "Carlos" was interested in contacting the Romanian authorities. In August 1979, I went to Prague with Lieutenant Colonel DEACONESCU, Ion, and had my first meeting with “Carlos” and his organization. In 1980, after General PLESITA, Nicolae took over leadership of the external service, he asked me to re-establish contact with "Carlos" to set up a meeting between them. Between 1981 and June 1982, General PLESITA, N. met “Carlos” and his group several times. With these meetings, he intended to:

·      have “Carlos” refrain from taking terrorist actions against Romania

·      support him in a certain way (meetings in Bucharest with his mother, as well as with terrorist elements active in South America), get “Carlos” to support us with the neutralization of the traitor PACEPA.

Nica died in August 1995.

Plesita died in September 2009

11 / When did you start investigating Carlos and keeping records and documents?

Only after the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe was I able to investigate the circumstances around the bombing of RFE and obtain documents and othe rinformation. I wrote letters to the General Prosecutors in Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Romania – all of whom denied my request. I even traveled to Romania in 1992 to meet with intelligence officers there concerning not only the bombing of RFE but also other hostile acts against emigres associated with RFE.

12 / In your opinion, why has this case never been tried?

In March 2003, the trial of Johannes Weinrich for his role in the bombing of RFE/RL began in Berlin. Magdalena Kopp, called as a state witness refused to testify. However, in her various sworn statements to German prosecutors before the trial, she clearly identified Romanian intelligence involvement in the bombing of RFE/RL and confirmed that Carlos was praised in Bucharest after the bombing. She said she was tasked with going to Bucharest in January 1980 to establish relations between the Romanian “secret police” and Carlos. She added that the Group received weapons and explosives, part of which went to the ETA. Because of her apparent cooperation with the German Prosecutor's Office, her legal status changed from "suspect" to "witness" in the bombing of RFE/RL. The presiding judge decided not to continue the trial for the bombing, as Weinrich was already serving a life sentence.