The USSR-led military operation using cryptonym “Danube” began at 23:00, August 20, 1968, when hundreds of thousands of soldiers using thousands of tanks, trucks, and other vehicles, plus airplanes, invaded Czechoslovakia putting an end to the short-lived freedoms known as “Prague Spring.”
Almost immediately, the battle for men’s minds using radio began. Radio Free Europe went on an emergency broadcast basis in the early morning hours of August 21, 1968, that lasted to September 5, 1968. The emergency contingency planning sessions that took place in July foresaw twenty-four-hour continuous news, commentary, and extraordinary American management tight control of program content. They had used the events surrounding the 1956 Hungarian Revolution as a “lessons learned exercise.
Almost immediately, the battle for men’s minds using radio began. Radio Free Europe went on an emergency broadcast basis in the early morning hours of August 21, 1968, that lasted to September 5, 1968. The emergency contingency planning sessions that took place in July foresaw twenty-four-hour continuous news, commentary, and extraordinary American management tight control of program content. They had used the events surrounding the 1956 Hungarian Revolution as a “lessons learned exercise.
The actual date and time of the Soviet-led invasion caught Radio Free Europe off-guard as many of its top managers were on vacation and had to be recalled. Even the Free Europe Committee President, William Durkee, was in Spain and had to fly back to New York, where he was based. A policy task force was set up in the RFE Central News Room, with a 24-hour management presence for control and guidance. All information fed to programming departments (BD) was screened for content, any of which was objectionable, and/or alarmist information was either eliminated on identified as “Background Information Only” (BIO). All program scripts devoted to Czechoslovakia were reviewed for approval, or not, by the American policy staff.
“Background Information Only” material i.e., not for broadcasting, included:
- All names of traitors and collaborators
- Alarmist reports of upcoming KGB arrests or Czechoslovak intellectuals. All mentions of the names of those arrested or about to be arrested.
- All Czechoslovak clandestine radio reports (and subsequent Western media pick-up of these reports) of the rejections of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Moscow agreement
- All references to calls for a neutralist policy of Czechoslovakia.
- Alarmist reports of possible Soviet invasion of Romania or Yugoslavia.
- Alarmist reports of the current danger of World nuclear war.
- Reports on, or anything, which might be interpreted as encouraging resistance by Czechoslovaks, unless this clearly qualified as a passive resistance.
- Any material which, by any stretch of the imagination, could have been interpreted or understood by RFE’s listeners as a hint that the U.S. or the West would intervene militarily to alter the situation in Czechoslovakia or to prevent Soviet action against Romania.
- All but moderate, factual, and limited reports on the presence and fate of Czechoslovak refugees in the West. While reporting official western government statements, we were are careful as we could be in order to avoid giving the impression of encouraging defections.
Normal broadcasting was altered by all Broadcast Departments; popular music was eliminated and services consisted primarily of serious music, news, and information, plus whatever commentaries were believed essential. The commentaries were reviewed in English translation prior to their being broadcast.
Arrangements were made to keep all the language services on the air 24 hours a day. This meant a reduction in normal transmitter strength to Poland and Hungary, giving allowing for full coverage to Bulgaria and Romania.
No news items on Czechoslovak subjects were issued prior to clearance by top management. The intention was to keep tight control, even if from time to time clearance procedures might have caused slight delays in news programming.
In the afternoon of August 21, 1968, RFE sent two teams of journalists to the border points Germany-Czechoslovakia and Austria-Czechoslovakia. The teams were under “rigid instructions” not to enter Czechoslovakia under any circumstances – teams of RFE personnel had entered Hungary in 1956 and some were even detained by Soviet troops. The teams also were under instruction, “To find out what is going on, behave as normal journalists and in no way push themselves off as representatives of RFE.” After their arrivals, the teams announced that there was no evidence of mass flights of refugees across the borders.
On August 23, 1968, RFE sent a mobile monitoring and recording team to the German-Czech border to monitor the low-powered local radio stations that sprang up after the invasion. This team augmented the large RFE monitoring station outside Munich at Schleissheim. The purpose of the team, which was told to be inconspicuous, was, “To get the best possible coverage of remaining Czechoslovak radio stations and any new clandestine broadcasting, which develops.” Although RFE also had monitoring stations in then West Berlin, Vienna, and Thessaloniki to monitor RFE transmitter strength and quality, they also could have been used to monitor Czechoslovak radio broadcasts, but there is no record that they were used that way.
RFE saw its role in the crisis as a watchful observer, commentator, and cross-reporter. Soon after the invasion, Soviet and other East European communist media began to develop a pattern of attack similar to that mounted around the 1956 Hungarian events. A major effort in this connection was the attempt to link RFE directly with the clandestine or free Czechoslovak radios still operating. It was claimed that RFE directed the activities of these stations, counter-revolutionaries, etc.
On August 23, 1968, RFE withdrew the news team from the Austrian-Czech border, as refugee flow simply did not occur. The German border team under Bill Marsh remained a few days, in case the flow of refugees increased. It did not; eventually, this team returned to Munich.
Although the Bavarian government set up a fund to financially help Czechoslovaks who were unable to return to their county, RFE set up its own “carefully administered” fund to help those in need and wanted to contact Bavarian government officials.
Radio Free Europe’s Audience in Czechoslovakia prior to and including the invasion in percent of adults as listeners:
1966 1967 – Late Spring Aug 1 – 21 Post
Early 1968 1968 1968 Invasion
46% 51% 45% 34% 71%
As Radio Prague’s freedom further increased, RFE’s audience went down. This was clearly demonstrated by the downward trend in listenership size between 1967 and August 1968. Since RFE’s aimed to contribute to the development of free communications media in its broadcasting area, RFE had come close to fulfilling its mission in Czechoslovakia. Therefore, the drop in RFE’s Czech and Slovak audience was expected and constituted success rather than failure.
The careful planning and execution of RFE’S crisis response activities paid off: famed Czech writer Milan Kundera, for example, said at the time that he was, “Very impressed by the programs because of their restraint, accuracy, and objectivity, and because of the wise and ‘statesmanlike’ tone and standpoint expressed in some of its commentaries… this appreciation is shared by other writers, as well as by television and radio workers.”
Photographs courtesy of RFE/RL
