"A Penchant for Cloak-and-Daggerism"
Cloak-and-Dagger: Marked by melodramatic intrigue and often by espionage
American Heritage Dictionary
Hungarian-born Ladislas Faragó (1906 – 1980) was a journalist, historian, and the author of popular history books, including Burn After Reading, The Game of Foxes, and Spymaster. During World War II, he was associated with the U.S. Navy in psychological warfare and authored reports on German and Japanese psychological warfare.
Below we will briefly look at his relationship with Radio Free Europe in the early Cold War.
Radio Free Europe’s Desk X
In his book, War of Wits: The Anatomy of Espionage and Intelligence, Ladislas Faragó wrote: "After the war, I had a share in an adventure in propaganda known as Radio Free Europe; there I headed a clandestine 'Desk X,' combatting Communism behind the Iron Curtain."
Faragó was employed as a consultant to Radio Free Europe's Hungarian Desk from October 1, 1950, to January 31, 1952. He used John L. Carver, as RFE did not want his connection known to the outside world. He worked out of two hotel rooms, not at the RFE office, thus the name “Desk X.” He was let go, or perhaps he was allowed to get out of his contract because RFE in New York could not control "his penchant for cloak- and-daggerism," and "his activities were not in FE/RFE's interests." He had been paid 700 dollars a month for his consultancy.
Faragó’s “penchant for cloak-and-daggerism” presumably became known to RFE from the CIA is illustrated by his relationship with András Zákó, former head of Hungarian military intelligence who was then living in Salzburg, Austria.
In April 1951, two CIA officers using the cover of the U.S. Air Force representatives, traveled to Munich, met Faragó in the Excelsior hotel, and later wrote a report of their conversation. Faragó told them he was “in charge of the Hungarian Desk of Radio Free Europe.” He explained the operation of RFE to them that “an amazing response has come out of Hungary.” Faragó told them of one RFE program, "Post Office Box 6220," that resulted in approximately 700 letters from Hungary to RFE per month. Another RFE program, "Doctor's Program" (actually "Radio Doctor"), gave medical advice to Hungarians and listeners in RFE’s other broadcast countries. A third program was the "Historian Program," which was popular among Hungarian amateur historians.
Faragó was then asked for details of his contact with Zákó in Austria. He told them that Nicholas Lazar of the Hungarian National Council (supported by the National Committee for Free Europe) had contacted him in New York. Farago then wrote a letter to Zákó and told him that RFE was interested in his organization MHBK. Zákó replied and invited Farago to meet him the next time that Farago was in Europe.
Faragó then contacted U.S. Air Force Vandenberg in Washington about Zákó’s proposal. He was then put in touch with U.S. Air Force General John B. Ackerman, then Chief Collection Division, Directorate of Intelligence. In February 1951, General Ackerman then met Farago, who told him that Zákó authorized him to offer services from an underground organization having “high subversive potential and trained in intelligence collection. Ackerman told Faragó that the U.S. was, “generally in favor of genuine underground movements, whose probity could be demonstrated, and he would “undertake to investigate what could be done.”
Encouraged by the positive response from the U.S. Air Force, Faragó traveled to Munich and Invited Zákó to meet him there. They met for two days, during which time Zákó offered RFE “400 couriers, who would travel to Hungary at various times getting information.” According to Faragó, Zákó also offered to “kidnap any individual suggested by RFE," including the daughter of a Hungarian secret police officer, and deliver her to Salzburg.
Faragó went on to explain that he wanted to take over Zákó’s resources in Hungary to run an intelligence organization, which "should be capable of getting up-to-the-minute news of events within Hungary, of doing small acts of sabotage and of creating unrest within Hungary including even the kidnapping of prominent individuals."
He told the Air Force representatives that "RFE and the Air Force should cooperate in running this outfit," adding, "It was quite possible that technical parts of airplanes and engines could be brought out of Hungary by this network."
Faragó's activities and statements were not known or sanctioned by Radio Free Europe, but the Air Force representatives believed that they were, and their report of their meeting with Farago ended with,
From this discussion, a jurisdictional intelligence flap is about to happen. It might be well for USFA to determine the conditions of RFE's charter in Europe and determine the extent to which they are authorized to dip into the intelligence-gathering business. They seem to have unlimited funds but a limited number of capable personnel, and many of the mistakes made by USFA and CIC throughout the past years are about to be repeated. It looks as if the business will soon become good for the intelligence factories of Austria.
As for Genera Zákó, the author of a detailed CIA February 1952 declassified internal staff study, “Paper Mills and Fabrication,” concluded:
Zákó’s intelligence chief stated recently that the MHBK now had no regular channels of communications or organized sources of information in Hungary…Zákó admitted that there were at most nine persons in Hungary on whom he could reasonably depend… MHBK reports as based entirely on refugee debriefings’ or clever rewriting of overt publications garnished with out-and-out fabrication.
For more information about MHBK and Zákó , see the recent article:
Katalin Kádár Lynn & Mark Stout (2024) Early Cold War intelligence paper mills: the case of the Association of Hungarian Veterans, Cold War History, 24:1, 23-44, DOI: 10.1080/14682745.2023.2191948
ABSTRACT
During the early Cold War, it was difficult for American intelligence to penetrate the Iron Curtain but a potential solution soon arose: émigré intelligence groups such as the Magyar Harcosok Bajtársi Közössége (MHBK) or ‘Association of Hungarian Veterans’. This group, however, turned out to be an intelligence ‘paper mill’. Attempts at trans-Atlantic cooperation with the MHBK and similar groups failed as they lost most of their good sources and were penetrated by communist security services. By the mid-1950s, US intelligence cut these groups off, took over their good sources, and established a source registry to prevent recurrence of the problem.
