Yanka (Ivan Andreevich) Filistovich, a Cold War Belorussian tragic Hero, Part Two

Yanka (Ivan Andreevich) Filistovich was born on January 14, 1926, in the village of Panyatichi, Maladzyechna volost, Vileyka district, Vilna voivodeship (now Vileyka district, Minsk region), Byelorussia. In his own words:

 

In 1943, while living in the German-occupied territory of Western Byelorussia, I was mobilized to serve in a German military formation in the so-called thirteenth battalion, which I did until the retreat of the Germans, i.e., before July 1944, as an ordinary soldier. 

 

Together with the battalion, I retreated to the territory of Poland and then was soon transferred to Italy, where, as part of the battalion, I took part in battles against the Anglo-American troops in the Forli region. 

 

As part of one company of the battalion mentioned above, from Italy, on January 6-7, 1945, I arrived in Czechoslovakia, where I did not participate in hostilities. Soon I, among three colleagues, was arrested by the Germans and imprisoned in the city of Pardubice - Czechoslovakia. I was released from prison on May 8, 1945, by Soviet troops. Soon I moved to the territory of Poland and got a job there as a secretary of the commune in the town of Staraya Kamenica. 

 

By September 1945, I returned to Czechoslovakia, and soon, around October of the same year, I moved to the American zone of occupation of Germany. I first ended up in a Polish refugee camp near the city of Nuremberg. Here I managed to enter a school that allowed me to get a matriculation certificate, but soon I was unlucky. The camp began to be disbanded, the Poles were oppressed, and I was forced to leave for Paris. I entered a Polish theological seminary in Paris, which I soon had to leave to because of the difference in religion and national origin. Continuing my stay in Paris by 1947, I completed a six-month course for electricians and a course for tool-makers.

 

In 1947, I managed to enter Sorbonne University at the Faculty of History while working in the library, earning a living. In 1948, on the initiative of several students from among Byelorussians, including myself, a Byelorussian youth nationalist organization was created in Paris under the name “Byelorussian Independent Youth Organization” (“BNAM”), whose chairman I was elected. At the same time, I was appointed editor of the Youth magazine, the organ of the above organization. Living in Paris since 1945, I had the opportunity to meet with prominent Byelorussian nationalists. 

 

In 1951, due to some deterioration in my financial situation, I left for Belgium to continue my studies. I was then recruited to work for American intelligence.

 

He was taken from Belgium to Munich in the middle of August 1951. He was then trained in for approximately one month.

 

Filistovich lived approximately 10 miles from the training area outside Munich and received as much of his training away from the main training area as possible. The only exception to this was the parachute and jump training. For this, he was taken blindfolded to and from the training area, and while there, he was exposed to a minimum of Americans. He was told to refrain from fraternizing with local residents, not to use local restaurants and cafes, and in general from becoming known in any way to those in the surrounding area of his residence. His recreation took place on a designated day each week in an area removed from both the Munich training area and his home. During this recreation period, he was always be accompanied by the CIA case officer. When on field training, Filistovich wore US Army clothing and was always accompanied by the CIA ease officer, who was also wearing US Army clothes. 

Filistovich’s Tasks as seen by CIA: 

• Filistovich will endeavor to establish contact with Byelorussian partisan groups in the area mentioned above and with their aid, to establish support bases for us for future operations. 
• Besides knowing the area in which he is to operate as well as knowing the people and the alleged partisans there, Filistovich will be provided with leads as well as photographs and documents from the BNR with which to establish his bonafide with those he is to contact. 
• In the event Filistovich is unable to make contact with the Byelorussian partisans, he will attempt to set up his own support base, relying in this case on aid from relatives) friends, and those he may be able to bribe with token gifts such as wristwatches, money, etc. 
• Filistovich feels certain that he will be able to contact the partisans, but in the event, he fails, feels certain that he can fulfill his mission of setting up a support base and remaining in the area indefinitely. (The area in which he will operate is a sparsely settled wood and swamp country, ideal for concealment over a long period of time.) In the event, 
• Filistovich succeeds in tither contacting the partisans and/or independently establishing himself safely in the area, he will make periodic visits to larger cities such as Minsk, Ablodechno, Vilna, and Vileka, to gather any intelligence information requested by us, or to merely report on the general conditions, etc. For this task, Filistovich will travel at night and remain in any large city for only a short time. If possible will also make photographs of military and industrial installations as well as of any other interesting intelligence objects. 
• A sub-task, which will also be carried out by Filistovich, is that of gathering document intelligence. Here, he will gather and report on existing or current passports, dates of issue, printing dates, etc. 
• Filistovich will also pave the way for his later return in either the later part of September 1951 or the ear]y part of October 1951. This will consist of organizing a reception committee, ground to air signals, etc., and possibly training one of his friends in secret writing to communicate with us during his absence. 

 

He was not trained in radio or morse code communication.

For the operation, he received a German machine gun, a Belgian four-shot pistol of 6.35 mm caliber, forty thousand in Soviet rubles, ten thousand Polish zlotys, more than one thousand German marks of the Soviet occupation zone of Germany, one thousand American dollars, four wristwatches, and a small alarm clock. He was also supplied with a large number of topographic maps of the western regions of Byelorussia, a Leica camera, binoculars, compass, and a pocket flashlight. 

 

In addition, he received

 

• Secret writing instruction and equipment.
• Radio Communication apparatus for burial and later retrieval
• Documents showing him to be a member of the Soviet Army on leave in Byelorussia from East Germany. If it is possible for a Red Army officer to be in civilian clothes when on leave, then a Soviet Army uniform will not be needed. 
• As an alternative, documents showing him to be a resident of a town or city of his choice. 
• Dog repellant chemicals to ward off dogs reportedly used by the Soviet police in tracking down partisans and border crossers. 
• Money to be used in Byelorussia for living expenses and bribery purposes and to aid him in exfiltrating across either Poland or Czechoslovakia into Germany. 
• Current situation report on Byelorussia including travel controls, border controls, restricted or forbidden zones, personalities, prices, etc. 

 

On the night of September 24-25,  1951 Ivan (Yanka) Filistovich was parachuted into Byelorussia from an unmarked plane flown by Polish pilots. The plan was to have Filistovich remain in Byelorussia for one month or less, exfiltrate via Poland to Germany, and then be dispatched again.

 

 

Yanka (Ivan Filistovich, a Cold War Belorussian tragic Hero, Part One ©

The objective of CIA’s Project AEQUOR The objective of this project was to mount clandestine operations in the Byelorussian SSR for the following purposes: 

a. Contact with and support of any existing resistance movement with the Byelorussian SSR, or development of such a movement for the purpose of carrying out CIA activities.
b. Utilizing the facilities provided by the underground for further collection of positive and operational intelligence in the USSR. 

The first CIA penetration agent was Yanka (Ivan Andreevich) Filistovich, who was parachuted into Belorussia 24-25 September 1951. He had CIA cryptonym CAMPOSANTO 1 (later AECAMPOSANTO 1).

The following has been extracted from CIA's Munich Combined Services Operation Base (CSOB) Semi-Monthly Report No. 8, dated 28 January 1952. If we change out some of it, e.g., Russia for USSR, it could have been written today. 

 

In terms of internal USSR operations, we infiltrated Filistovich into the USSR in September 1951. He was to communicate by letter drop and had instructions to attempt exfiltration via Poland before November 1951 with a situation report, but if this were not feasible, to remain until the spring, meanwhile communicating through the drops. To date, we have had no word from Filistovich. His mission was to determine the extent, if any, of underground activity in Belorussia and to advise us of the best method of continuing operations in the area if no organization did exist.  

If Filistovich exfiltrates, this team will be ready to act on whatever operational instructions or advice he brings them. If he does not, it is planned to use the team to establish a series of underground units similar to that mentioned above for Ukraine. 

 

This combination of a "controlled black base," which resembles the post-war partisan bunker set-up, and a few agents trained to attempt to move and operate at least semi-legally, will be the pattern for future Belorussian operations. Under this scheme, the team would require air infiltration, probably no later than April 1952. Air infiltration is necessary in order that the team, with a relatively large amount of supplies, can be dropped to the densely forested area from which it will operate. 

 

In terms of long-range aims, it is probably accepted by European Command, and according to a briefing by the Pentagon made available at the recent REDSOX Conference, also by the Defense Department, that the Belorussian area is the one spot where full-time tactical coverage would be the best possible guaranty of adequate advance warning if the Soviets decide to launch an all-out attack on Western Europe. In addition, it is here that carefully planned retardation might be successful and particularly effective. 

 

Also, nationalist fervor can be counted onto rear support area partisan action, which will be simpler to organize if support points already exist. We must find a way to make the thing work since having the warning we desire could considerably alter the expectations of success the Soviets might anticipate. The only way to do this is to get the "man on the ground," and the BNR organization has the men and the desire to collaborate fully. 

 

Due to the favorable terrain afforded by the BSSR, i.e., thickly wooded, swampy areas, sparsely populated, we feel that the establishment of "black bases" will present few difficulties. However, the flow of information needed must be passed by us by more effective means than radio, just as we cannot rely on airdrops every time we desire to send in a few thousand rubles to a "black base" or a resident. Therefore if the operation is to be a success we must have adequate lines through Poland and detailed information on the Polish USSR frontier. 

Probably no other groups, except perhaps the Galician Ukrainians, are so well equipped in terms of language and background to work well and effectively in a Polish-based courier service. If we have this channel, the chances for the success of the operation would be immeasurably increased. 

 

 

 

 

 

Latvian Born Freds Ziedonids Launags: A Cold War Tragic Hero, Part Two ©

After repeated employment losses, Launags began to consider repatriating back to Latvia. CIA sought to prevent this by persuading him to seek mental help domestically. This action was most likely due to the possible exposure of past clandestine plots and the negative publicity should they be revealed. A draft memorandum dated January 18, 1959, prepared for CIA's Deputy Director for Plans, with the Subject: Freds Z. LAUNAGS' Possible Repatriation to Latvia, contained this comment: 

Should subject decide to return to Latvia, the damage of revelations to the Soviets would be extensive: not only is he knowledgeable in great detail of Latvian REDSOX activities during 1951-1954, but he is also well-informed of our involvement with black radio broadcasts beamed to Latvia over the Spanish Government-owned Radio Madrid. Our role in those broadcasts is not known. The Spanish Government and Soviet revelations to that effect could prove to be very embarrassing. 

 

The draft memorandum was re-worked, and on January 29, 1965, David E. Murphy, Chief, SR Division, sent a memorandum to ADDP, in which this summary paragraph was included:

 

The Latvian REDSOX operations in which Subject was involved in 1952-54 were fully exposed to the Soviets when all of the agents were either killed or captured, and the Soviets later made propaganda use of some of the facts. Thus, Subject would provide primarily confirmatory information on these operations if he were to repatriate to Latvia. He knew a number of SR case officers, but as far as we can determine, only one of them was in his true name. He assisted in anti-Soviet Latvian broadcasts from Radio Madrid as a CIA agent could be somewhat embarrassing if the Soviets were to publicize this facet of his activities. While the extent of potential damage involved in Subject's repatriation is not excessive, we believe it appropriate nevertheless to take reasonable measures to prevent or at least delay his repatriation.  

 

For years afterward, Launags traveled around the United States searching for permanent employment but was unsuccessful in his attempts. In 1967, one internal CIA memorandum included this comment: 

 

At first, we attempted to monitor and control Subject's activities indirectly through his former friend, who is still employed by the Agency on contract. We also furnished Subject modest amounts of money, which ostensibly were hand-outs given him by his friend. 

 

Despite the efforts of the CIA and many of his friends to assist him financially and help him find suitable employment, he has not been able to hold a job for more than a few weeks. He has turned most of his former friends against him for his irrational behavior.

 

In 1965, Launags wrote a threatening letter to President Johnson if he did not liberate Latvia. CIA contacted the U.S: Secret Service: "[W[e notified the Secret Service and other appropriate agencies at the end of 1965 that we considered Subject a possible threat to the President. The Secret Service interviewed Subject shortly after that and found him rational at that time. Since then, we have kept the Service and the other appropriate agencies advised of any outstanding incidents concerning Subject." 

 

Launags visited the Soviet Mission at the United Nations in New York at least three times, seeking a visa to visit Latvia as a journalist to report on conditions in Latvia for émigré publications in the West. These visits resulted in a Riga Radio broadcast on June 26, 1967, about Launags. This was followed up in an article in the official newspaper of Latvia "Cina" on July 1, 1967, "Why a Visa was not issued to him." This article was republished in newspapers in the Latvia SSR and in the West. CIA determined the original article was accurate in Launags's biography. He was accused of being a Nazi war criminal and CIA agent involved in sending other CIA agents into Latvia. 

 

The CIA was not concerned about these articles because, "If he discussed his CIA activities with the Soviets or should disclose them in the future, he could provide no current operational information. The only historical item he could provide which still retains some degree of sensitivity is that CIA was behind the black broadcasts to Latvia which were made by the Spanish Government Radio from 1957-1961."

 

Another relevant episode in his troubled life took place in December 1968, when Launags was arrested in Olympia, Washington, on the charges of vagrancy/ trespassing. 

 

He called CIA's Portland Resident Agent (name unknown) collect and told him about the arrest and was in the Thurston County jail. The FBI was notified and sent an agent to arrange Launags' release from jail and give him travel expenses. The FBI agent gave the police $13.05 ($3.05 for a bus ticket to Portland and $10.00 for living expenses) to give Launags upon his release from jail; he was released on December 18, 1968. Although the County Deputy Prosecutor wanted to press trespassing charges against Launags, the Sheriff requested that he did not do so, and the charge was dropped. Launags then worked in Oregon in various low-skilled jobs; the last known ones were in tree reforestation projects in 1969. 

 

During subsequent years, Launags apparently received some of the necessary medical and/or psychological treatment or gained stability in his life because he was later positively referred to as a writer, poet, and member of the Latvian resistance in Latvian émigré and other publications. In 1986, Launags was the editor of the weekly newspaper Brīvā Latvija (Free Latvia), published in Münster, Germany. 

 

Freds Launags eventually returned to the United States. Still, it is unknown when and what he did afterward, except he visited Latvia in 1991, sometime before his death in Los Angeles on November 22, 1991.

Latvian Born Freds Ziedonids Launags: A Cold War Tragic Hero, Part One ©

Freds Ziedonids Launags was born on June 7, 1919, in Latvia. CIA’s Soviet Russia Division used him Launags as a contract agent from 1951 through 1959. CIA Pseudonyms and cryptonyms used for him included: 
 
CHURGIN,Raymond S. 
LAUNAGS, Alfredo

VANAGS, Alfreds (penname in 1950) 
GANGIS, Alfreds 
JANSON, Arnold (alias) 
GOLTEDOE, Louis G.

TAURENS, P. (penname in 1952) 
CAMBARO/1 (AECAMBARO 1)
LAGZDINS, Alfreds (during the mission in Spain1955/56) 
HAHN, Cleveland O. 
AEHAWKEYE / 1 
 
Immediately after World War Two, anti-Soviet partisans known as the “Brothers of the Forest” were active in Latvia, but by the end of the 1940s, their activity was limited due to the success of the government forces. Launags was one of the anti-Soviet partisans known as “The Forest Brothers.” and killed a Soviet officer in June 1945. On October 31, 1945, he and seventeen others managed to escape Latvia on a small fishing boat. After a 20-hour trip they arrived in Sweden.
 
In Sweden he was very active with Latvian refugees and the Swedish government. Also, Captain Jurgen HVID of the Danish intelligence service in 1950 went to Sweden and requested Launags' assistance in locating agents for dispatch to Latvia, offering the recruits 400 kr. monthly while in training for about one year and additional compensations while on missions. Hvids claimed the Danish intelilligence service had specially built speed boat and training school for qualified recruits. Launags did not accept the offer.
 
CIA recruited Launags in Sweden in 1951 under Project ZRLYNCH and transported him to Germany to participate in training of REDSOX agents, who were dispatched in Latvia in 1952. REDSOX operations included, “Illegal actions directed at Soviet targets that included but was not limited to intelligence gathering, recruitment of sources, and using agents for spot targets for sabotage” However, all agents used in these operations were exposed and eventualy the Latvian security forces  "either killed or captured" all of them. 
 
Launags was utilized two years for general support purposes. In 1955 he indicated on an official medical history that he had been nervous since the end of WWII and attemtped suicide in 1951. After examination by official medical staff, he was "found to have had a brief psychotic episode in 1951 and always had a schizoid type of relationship with people with many obsessive-compulsive defenses." His coworkers referred to Launags as a "character" and he was assigned temporary duties in 1955. 
 
CIA subsequently sent him in Spain on a six-month assignment for propaganda broadcasts to Latvia via Radio Nacional de España: 
 
    Louis C. GOLTEDGE, who is a covert associate under contract with Project AEMARSH, is being sent             to Madrid, Spain, for 3-4 months on a temporary assignment involving a PP activity. A PP project covering this activity is being formulated and will be submitted for approval upon completion. However, since it is anticipated that there will be some delay involved before a fully qualified PP expert can be recruited for the new project, GOLTEDGE has been assigned to Madrid temporarily to provide the required assistance, so that the necessary work may be started immediately. 
 
During his assignment in Madrid, Launags, “[H]ad many paranoid projections and felt that he was under constant surveillance and that even his colleagues hated him.” Moreover, “He got involved in an argument and broke off relations with the local Latvian diplomat, felt that Spanish officials were suspicious of him. Because of his acid criticism of the Spanish way of life and the Franco regime.”  After three months, he returned to the United States
 
Launags wrote an undated report entitled “Review of my activities in 1956/57” that included the following passage:
 
    Briefing of K.VIDENIEKS for his work in Madrid as well as interviewing him during his stay here (February - May, 1957) on many persons of interest in Latvia as well as abroad discussions about the broadcasts from Madrid. However, I have got no instructions whether I should participate at these broadcasts (by writing features, for instance) or not; in Oct./Nov., 1956, I prepared only four features though in the previous six month (April to September ) I had prepared 27 features for the broadcasts from Madrid. Since nobody has told me whether I am supposed to participate in this project or not, I have stayed out of it almost completely mainly because 1 don't want to disturb my colleague, Mr. SINGER, who is in charge of this project. I am not sure whether my attitude is right or wrong. 
 
CIA returned Launags to the United States because, “His behavior became erratic, he began to imagine he was being followed and then, less than one year after his arrival, he had to be returned to the U.S. because he had come to the attention of the local authorities and began to cause a series of embarrassing problems.” Although Launags was seen as a possible danger to CIA operations and himself,  the Agency continued to use him for years. For example, CIA reassigned Launags in 1958 to Germany, where he performed foreign intelligence operations in the Baltic under the direction of CIA's Frankfurt Station, including recruiting and debriefing.  One documents states, "The same pattern of paranoid projection, loss of contact with reality, and a constant delusional framework of reference occurred in his recent PCS to Germany." 
 
After nine months Launags was forced to return from his German assignment in 1959, after he displayed evidence of mental instability: “An acute paranoid schizophrenic reaction with depressive features.” Agency mental health experts diagnosed him as "a paranoid schizophrenic" and placed him in a hospital. 
 
A related document using Launags’ pseudonym Raymond S. Churgin stated, " This same pattern of paranoid projection, loss of contact with reality, and a constant delusional framework of reference occurred in his recent PCS to Germany. The Subject apparently again experienced an acute paranoid schizophrenic reaction from which he recovered during the time that he was under examination by the Psychiatric Staff"  Moreover, “He feels inferior and markedly inadequate because of his incomplete education and because of his futile efforts to effect the freedom of his homeland. He feels guilty for having deserted ‘the real battleground’ which is it the area of his own homeland.” 
 
CIA dismissed Launags effective December 31, 1959, once they had repeated confirmation of his psychological instability:
 
    Subject is considered unsuitable for further operational usage and will very likely never be cleared for any overseas activity in the future. He presents a management problem in regard to further assignment or termination of employment. It is unlikely that he will give up the dream of freeing his homeland by clandestine means despite the fact that he may no longer be employed as a contract agent of CIA. As such, he presents a security problem. 
 
A month following his dismissal CIA staff met with Launags to take back a 7.6 5mm German made Walther automatic pistol that he had retained and to gather information about his current activities.  CIA used the false pretense of wanting to give Launags another assignment. CIA had multiple employees from the Medical Staff and Office of Security present for the meeting as he turned over the weapon to them.. 
 

Early CIA Cold War Foreign Intelligence Operations in Lithuania, Part Three ©

On April 18-19, 1951, for the second infiltration, a CIA doubleton team of Julijonas Būtėnas  (“Steve”) and Jonas Kukauskas-Kukis (“Jack”) were dropped into the Kaunas area of Lithuania. Juozas Luksa was informed on March 1, 1951, by a wireless message from CIA that Kukauskas and Butenas were going to be dispatched: "Be prepared receive Steve and Jack in period 14-27 March." On a blind broadcast to Luksa on March 12, 1951: "March operation delayed until May. Await instructions." Even if Luksa was not informed of the exact time of arrival of Kukauskas and Butenas, he did know the approximate time of arrival. 

Their mission was:

• Establishment of contact with the underground resistance forces in Lithuania.

• Reorganization of the underground resistance forces along more practical lines.

• Establishment of reliable wireless transmission and secret writing communication between Lithuania and the American Zone of Germany.

• Procurement of positive and operational intelligence. 

Būtėnas was the “jumpmaster” for the first parachuting of the three agents in October 1950 (see Parts One and Two). He had been a journalist in Lithuania. In 1939 he was admitted to the Lithuanian Union of Journalists. He became the head of the VLIK information office and taught Lithuanian refugees English. After WWII, he was in a displaced persons camp in Würzburg, Germany, home of VLIK.

Būtėnas was recruited for intelligence work in September 1949 through officials of VLIK. He had been living in an International Refugee Organization (IRO) camp in Pfullingen, Germany. He was initially recruited to act as a translator and agent instructor. From 1949, Būtėnas lived in a safe house in Munich with Luksa. Later, from about May 1950, he lived with all the agents trained for CIA dispatches, including Jonas Kakauskas-Kukis. It was not until August 28, 1950, that he was assigned to a team for dispatch. 

After they landed in Lithuania, Būtėnas first separated from Kukauskas-Kukis and contacted the underground headquarters in the Tauras Region. As one story goes, Būtėnas and Petras Jurkšaitis (Beržas-"Birch"), the commander of a partisan unit, and Kukauskas were in a partisan forest bunker when they were surrounded by Lithuanian security forces (MGB) on May 22, 1951. Būtėnas and Jurkšaitis were killed in the fighting. Kukauskas surrendered. Another story is that the two were killed in a farmhouse in the village of Altoniskiai, by Lithuanian security forces. The farmer was supposedly drunk and gossiped with his neighbors, who informed the security forces. Yet another version of  death is that Būtėnas bit into the cyanide pill and killed himself. 

 

However, in April 1956, the Lithuanian language newspaper "Teviskes Ziburiai" (The Lights of Homeland), published in Toronto, Canada, reported that Butenas was alive and in a forced labor camp after being caught by security forces, put on trial, and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. 

 

In any event, he was buried in an unmarked grave. There is a memorial cross with a parachute in Kazlų Rūda, Lithuania. On May 19, 1999, Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus posthumously awarded Būtėnas the Order of the Vytis Cross, 3rd degree. 

Jonas Kukauskas 

In February 1938, Kukauskas a student in Vilnius, attempted to cross the Polish border into Lithuania to deliver information to the Lithuanian Intelligence Service. He was apprehended by the Polish counter-intelligence, interrogated, and brought to trial. He was released because his act was determined to have been that of an “irresponsible boy” rather than an agent of  an intelligence service.

In 1944 Kukauskas crossed Poland and arrived in Berlin. He later studied and the university in Frankfurt. In October 1946, he was recruited by the Operations Chief of Vlik for a mission organized by French intelligence. At Pfullingen, Germany, he was trained in communications until May 1947. 

In May 1948,  he was taken to Paris, where he was given intelligence training, including jump techniques by the French. There had been no contact with French representatives except for their instructors. In April 1950, after the French dispatch failed to materialize, Kukauskas was dismissed by the French case officer and were escorted by a French representative to Strasbourg. He was met by a representative of VLIK, who sent him on to Munich. Jonas Kukauskas was then recruited by CIA’s Office of Special Operations (OSO) and trained outside Munich.

Radio Game “Neman”

Afterr being captured by the Lithuanian security force, Kukauskas agreed to cooperate with them in a radio game “Neman” with CIA. A special ten-man department was created to direct this operation.

Kukauskas sent his first message on June 15, 1951. He reported that he and Būtėnas were separated and Būtėnas was killed without giving details. He continued sending messages with general information until November 29, 1951, when he stopped. He sent a message to CIA again in April 1952 with the excuse that his silence was due to a faulty generator.

Kukauskas contacted Luksa and got him to agree to a meeting in Pabartupis village forest near Kaunas. The meeting never occurred as Luksa was killed or committed suicide during an ambush by Lithuanian security forces. 

The Project Renewal request for Fiscal Year 1953-1954, included this comment:

The following represents an approximate analysis of reports received on Lithuania since May 1952 … 57 messages received from one Fl agent inside Lithuania giving an accurate picture of the present resistance situation in that country. 

Moreover, 

Since March 1953 three s/w letters received from our agent in Lithuania have established that he was probably-not under Soviet control as of December 1952. In the three letters received, he reported large round-ups of partisans resulting from treachery on the part of certain partisan leaders. In these encounters, his wit equipment was lost and most of his partisan unit destroyed. 

He was last known to have been in hiding; but in contact with an established mail-drop. Money was sent to assist this agent. Based on the letters received, there is some certainty in the assumption that this agent is not under Soviet control and that previous information on contacts in Lithuania sent by him may be used in future operations. 

In March 1953, Kukauskas sent a message: “Strong local security measures in December 1952 resulted in the destruction of a large segment of the Lithuanian resistance movement. The CIA agent himself was wounded in a skirmish with security troops and forced to go into hiding with friends.” 

In July 1953, CIA’s Chief of the Soviet Russia Division wrote:

In our last mission to Lithuania in April 1951 we dispatched two agents. One of the two agents was killed by MGB forces a. few weeks after arrival. The other agent succeeded in contacting the partisan forces, developing limited contact with legal living citizens, and maintaining continuous contact with CIA via W/T and S/W for the past 2 years. 

Kukauskas stopped sending W/T messages in 1953, but continued sending secret writing letters.  CIA believed that Kakauskas was under KGB control, but they continued the operational game:

The channels are used to obtain reactions to international events, to elicit information on its modus operandi, and to acquire intelligence information in instances when we believe that it would be unprofitable for the RIS to practice deception. 

CIA decided to exfiltrate Kakauskas, even though he was assumed to be under KGB control:

[B]ecause of the unusual length of time during which he allegedly managed to "live black" with little support, and also because of information obtained during debriefings …. However, correspondence with him is being maintained, and he is being played "straight" with the hope of eventual exfiltration. He has always indicated a desire to return to the West. . 

Agents were recruited and trained, but the exfiltration attempt was never made. Kukaukas’s last known contact with CIA was in the Spring 1956. 

 

 

Early CIA Cold War Foreign Intelligence Operations in Lithuania, Part Two ©

L-R, Sirvys, Luksa, Tumpys

Biographical sketches of the first three CIA penetration agents:

Juozas Lukša, (true name), aliases: Juozas Adomaitis, Adam Mickiewicz, and Skrajunas, the underground name assigned in October 1947, when he was about to depart to the west.

Lukša was born on August 10, 1921, in Veiveriai, Lithuania. On March 4, 1941, while an engineering student at the University of Kaunas, he was pledged into the Lithuanian Activist Front, an underground, clandestine anti- Soviet resistance movement. On May 6, 1941, he was arrested by the NKVD, but on June 23, 1941, he was set free by Lithuanian partisans as the Soviets retreated before the German advance. He allegedly was involved in a war-time atrocity in Kaunas on June 27, 1941.

In May 1945, the Lithuanian Partisan Movement was organized to unite all partisan activities in and south of Kaunas. He became Chief of the Documents Section. He was ordered to proceed south of Kaunas to contact independent partisan groups and unite them with the Lithuanian Partisan Movement (LPS). He failed in this mission since it was discovered that MKVD agents had penetrated the LPS. In September 1945, the LPS was reorganized and went underground. 

From January 1946-April 1947, Luksa commanded a partisan group and acted as Chief of Press and Information. In April 1947, he was sent to Poland to establish contact with Lithuanian organizations outside the Iron Curtain. Upon his return, he was appointed Chief Intelligence Officer for the underground in his district. In December 1947, Luksa left Lithuania on a mission through Poland and eventually arrived in Sweden.

Luksa wrote a memoir under the pseudonym Juozas Daumantas, with the original Lithuanian title Partizanai už geležinės uždangos, translated as "Partisans behind the Iron Curtain." It was first published in 1950 in the USA. The book was republished with "Fighters for Freedom, Lithuanian Partisans versus the USSR." 

Luksa was in communication with the CIA by wireless transmission between November 16, 1950, and the last message on December 8, 1950, and secret writing letters between November 1, 1950, and the last one on January 14, 1951. In September 1951, Luksa was betrayed by another CIA penetration agent and killed in an ambush by Lithuanian security forces.

Benediktas Trumpys (Rytis)

Trumpys (Trumpis) was born October 1, 1919, in Radoiliskis, Lithuania. He graduated from Siauliai high school in 1938. Subsequently, he was employed as a bookkeeper, railroad worker, and painter (in Pommern, Germany, from 1944 until Gcrany's capitulation). Until 1946, Trumpis was held in the Lubeck DP Camp. Between 1946 and 1949, he served with the 4204 Labor Service Company. Upon leaving the Labor Service Company, he was to inform his friends that clearance for his immigration to the US had come through, and he was taking free time before reporting to Bremerhaven. 

He was killed by Lithuanian security forces on May 20, 1951, in a bunker in the Altoniškės forest of Zapyškis area

Klemensas Sirvys (Sakalas, “Frank”)

Sirvys was born on February 4,  1926, in Kybartai, Lithuania. Until 1944 he was a high school student in Lithuania. Between 1944 and 1946 he was held in Hanau and Gunzen-Hausen DP camps. From 1946 until his recruitment by OSO, Sirvys served in the 4204 Labor Service Company in Bamberg, Germany. 

He was captured on July 24, 1952, put on trial, and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment and five years of exile. He returned to Lithuania in 1970 and died in 2003 in Kybartai.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Early CIA Cold War Foreign Intelligence Operations in Lithuania, Part One ©

AEGEAN was the cryptonym for a joint Office of Policy Coordination (OPC)-Office of Special Operations (OSO) project that began in November 1948. It was created to support the “Lithuanian Resistance Group” (The Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania –Vyriausiasis Lietuvos išlaisvinimo komitetas (VLIK). OPC supported VLIK for political and psychological warfare (PP); OSO was responsible for foreign intelligence (FI) activities: 

1. Procure information from Lithuania and the Baltic generally. 
2. Procure information from other parts of the USSR. 
3. Use the Lithuanian facilities as a channel for two-way movement of personnel in OSO service and, as necessary, for the movement of equipment, documentary data, and instructions. 
4. Use the Lithuanian facilities for such intelligence activities of OSO interest as may become necessary, to which the Lithuanian facilities, in the West or in the homeland, will lend themselves. 

The AEGEAN project was approved on June 21, 1949: "This project calls for the use at appropriate seasons (usually spring and autumn) of air and sea dispatch facilities. The necessary support equipment consists of wireless transmission equipment, secret writing supplies, personal arms, medical equipment, medical supplies, and negotiable items, such as watches, venereal drugs, and jewelry. Documentation needs will normally be taken care of by the project participants themselves. "

There were two objectives in the project plan that was under the control of the CIA's Munich Operational Base (MOB):  

 

1. Procurement of intelligence from the Baltic States and contiguous areas. 
2. Development of support base in the Lithuanian SSR as a transit point for agents to be dispatched into RSFR, Belorussian SSR, and Ukrainian SSR.

 

There were four targets: 

 

1.   Development of Special OSO-controlled morse code communications from the Lithuanian SSR to the American Zone in Germany and Sweden. 

2.   Development of sea, land, and/or air courier routes - between the American Zone in Germany and the Lithuanian SSR for the two-way movement of personnel, material, and information. 

3.   Development of safe areas, houses, and routes in the Lithuanian SSR to transit personnel, material, and information to and from RSFSR, Belorussian SSR, and Ukrainian SSR. 

 

The project operations were set to begin on July 1, 1949. The OPC project was approved by ADPC Frank Wisner. on July 23, 1949, under the cryptonym BGLAPIN. The project's first year was devoted primarily to the recruitment, training, and briefing of agent personnel. 

Lithuanian General Paulius Plechavicius then residing in the British zone of Germnay was to be the CIA contact person. Plechavicius was chief of the operating (military) section of VLIK. He had experiences in Lithuania during WWII in anti-Soviet activities. He was to move to Munich. The VLIK Operational Section personnel in Sweden was to be integrated into the project as were VLIK operational personnel assigned to the French intelligence service for the parachuting operations into Lithuania. 

 

On October 4, 1950, one team of three men was dropped by parachute into the area of Branischusen, Kaliningrad Oblast. The plane was an unmarked C-47 piloted by two Czech WWII veterans.

The first agents were Juozas Luksas, Benediktas Trumpys, and Klemensas Sirvys. French Intelligence had initially been selected for a mission in 1949, but the French decided to abandon the mission. CIA took it over. 

The mission of the first team was, "Establish wireless transmission as well as secret writing communications with the American Zone of Germany, and to reorganize the underground organization in LSSR into a support organization for American-controlled procurement activities." The three had been trained at a camp in Kaufbeurren, and learned Morse code, radio communications, and sabotage. For the operation, they were given weapons (Schmeisser MP-32 sub-machine gun), grenades, radios, cyanide tablets, ten watches, 3,000 rubles, 2,000 dollars, and food.