In Memory of Early Cold War Resistance Fighters in Bulgaria: The Goryani ©

Stoyanov-Tarpana

In September 1944, the Soviet Red Army invaded Bulgaria, and a reign of terror began under the Sovietization of the country. Thousands of Bulgarians who took up armed resistance to Communism were known as the Goryani (Горяни), or “Man of the Forests” or “Ones of the Forest.” At one point, the number of armed Goryani was estimated at 2000 in 28 Bands (Chetas), with another 8000 illicit helpers supplying them with food, shelter, arms, and intelligence. The Bulgarian authorities effectively eliminated the Goryani movement by the mid-1950s.

The CIA created a clandestine radio station operating in Greece called Radio Goryanin (Радио Горянин): “The Voice of Bulgarian Resistance” that began broadcasting in 1951. 

In 1951, CIA began infiltrating agents in Bulgaria: six teams of 17 men between 16 and 28 May 1951. This number included 15 agents trained in Germany during March and April, plus two others recruited in Greece for specific one-shot missions. Contacting Goryani was one objective of the infiltrations. One such team established contact with a large Goryani group in the mountains near the city of Sliven. This team made plans to fulfill their objectives of contacting resistance elements in the Teteven area through the Sliven Goryani. One agent was killed in a clash with Bulgarian troops.

The largest resistance group, the Second Sliven Band, was led by Georgi Stoyanov-Tarpana, also known as Georgi Benkovski, after a 19th-century Bulgarian popular hero. 6000 Bulgarian troops encircled the band. A battle was fought on 1 and 2 June 1951. Some 40 Goryani were killed, but the band commander fled along with his men, including the wounded. The Bulgarian secret police later captured Stoyanov. He was later tried, found guilty, and executed by firing squad on 12 December 1951, in Stara Zagora, along with ten others.

Here is the memorial to the Goryani of Silven, including Stoyanov-Tarpan.

 

The inscription on the left reads:

"In Memory of the Goryani from Sliven who died 1950-51

For them, life was a fight under the flag of freedom. Death—a worthy victory.“

 

After the collapse of Communism in Bulgaria in 1989, other memorials were created for the Goryani martyrs in the towns and villages of 

 

• Manolsko Konare, 
• Zlatosel, 
• Parvenets, 
• Trilistnik, 
• Belozem,
• Shishmantsi 

Memorials for the Goryani are marked with a four-leaf clover and chaff of wheat (emblem of the Bulgarian Agrarian Party BZNS “Nikola Petkov“), which is used to suggest that those who died were part of an idea that is shared by contemporary members of agrarian political parties as well. Nikola Petkov was executed in 1947.

 

Six CIA infiltration agents were captured and tried in Sofia in September 1951. Three were sentenced to death, and three to long-term imprisonment. The last known infiltation/exfiltation took place in October 1952. There are no monuments or memorials for the CIA agents dispatched into Bulgaria.

For more information on the Bulgarian memorials, see Valentin Voskresenski, “Monumental Memorialization of Political Violence in Bulgaria (1944 – 1989): beyond Traumatization, Contestation and Dangerization of Memory.”

For more information on Radio Goryanin, see

 

 

 

To charge or not to charge, that is the question ©

One of the "pressing" problems facing CIA in October 1953 was to “determine the feasibility and desirability of providing meals eaten at Domestic Operations Base Safe Houses free of charge to personnel assigned to duties thereat by proper authority.” 

These safe houses were used for various reasons: dealing with defectors and others who arrived in the United States under the foreign intelligence program with the cryptonym REDSOX;

• The Domestic Operations Base has been assigned the responsibility of operating a network of safe houses for REDSOX agents. These houses are located within an 85-mile radius of DOB Headquarters. 
• Government regulations provide that REDSOX agents brought to the United States under "Special Procedure Entry" must be held under twenty-four-hour per day surveillance. 

• Safehouse duties assigned to DOB Case Officers are tedious, monotonous, and demanding. Safehouse resident case officers work under conditions of tensions, and are required to put in many long hours of overtime.

• Case Officers assigned to REDSOX projects by DOB are required to spend long periods of time at isolated safe house installations without relief. 

• The only practical way to keep an account of meals served was for the safehouse cook to note the names of each person served. This was bad security practice since the agent was pointed out as the only one who did not have to pay.

• Security considerations require safe house resident Case Officers to eat their meals at the safe house.
  

Differences between the Voice of America and the original Radio Free Asia as seen by the CIA in 1951 ©

 

On September 4, 1951, at 6:30 a.m. local time, the CIA-sponsored station Radio Free Asia began live broadcasting on a test basis from a rented studio in the commercial radio station KNBC, downtown San Francisco (it was 10:30 p.m. in China). After the sound of a bronze gong being struck three times and music from Mahler’s “Song of the Earth,” the first broadcast began with these words in Mandarin Chinese, “This is Radio Free Asia...the voice of free men speaking to the people of Asia.” 

The initial news and commentary programs were 90 minutes long and divided into three Mandarin, Cantonese, and English segments. The programs were broadcast via a leased wire RCA short-wave to Manila, Philippines, and from there to China via a directional short-wave antenna.

A September 27, 1951, internal CIA document gave details of the differences between the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia.

There are set forth below certain points of differentiation between the purpose and capabilities of the Voice of America and the purpose and capabilities of Radio Free Asia (RFA). It is believed that these points, while not all suited for inclusion in a formal memorandum to the Department of State, are pertinent to the problem…

Voice of America is the recognized voice abroad of the American Government. Its essential function is to interpret, support, rationalize, and defend American foreign policy. In seeking this objective, it conducts a "Campaign of Truth", a program of worldwide news reporting and analysis which, by presenting world events in their "true" perspective, seeks to influence its audience in support of American foreign policy objectives and the objectives of the Free World. For the same basic purpose, it endeavors also to establish friendship abroad for the American people and appreciation of the democratic and American "way of life." 

The point of this paper is, however, that, even at its maximum effectiveness, VOA cannot, as an organ of the American government, contribute all that it is possible for radio to contribute to the psychological warfare mission in the Far East. 

The limitations imposed by policy considerations are most clearly exemplified in the attached excerpt relating to the content of South Korean programs. Until the declaration of the U.N. that Communist China had committed aggression in Korea, policy considerations made it impossible for VOA to charge the CCP with aggression. A very potent weapon of propaganda was thus denied to this country while the CCP made headway in laying responsibility on this country for the Korean conflict. 

RFA may supplement VOA’S support of American foreign policy objectives in the following ways: 

a. It can lend hearing to honest expression of Asian views without tainting them with the stamp of official U.S.. approval, thereby increasing the free exchange of ideas and opinions necessary to healthful sell-government. 

b. It can increase Asian acceptance of the "Campaign of Truth" by corroborating the "Truth" through indigenous speakers more readily believed because they are Asian and have a reputation in Asia. 

c. It can disseminate news without the strict demands of reliability required by the "Campaign of Truth". (On the whole, it must gain acceptance as a truthful organ, but it can carry "plants" for PW purposes, whereas VOA cannot). 

d. Because it is not answerable to the American public and Congress, it can lend hearing to views and opinions which, although in the long-range interest of U.S. policy, are momentarily unpopular at home, which VOA might therefore not be able to air. 

e. Because it claims a motivation founded in Asian self-interest, it can appropriately "slant" news commentary in a manner not always appropriate to VOA 

f. By giving expression to varied sentiments of varied Asians, it may play on a variety of emotions and attitudes without regard to the consistency expected of an official voice. 

g. It may secure outlets, such as government-controlled Radio National Indonesia, now denied VOA by the Indonesian Government, and the innumerable outlets of Formosa, now unused by VOA for U.S. policy reasons. 

h. It may engage to a much freer extent than VOA in political warfare 

It is believed that the only legitimate objection to RFA would stem from a belief in its impracticality in light of the present Asian listening audience. It may be VOA's view that the current audience in Asia is too small to warrant the effort required of two major radio organizations and that VOA can successfully take care of the small audience that exists.VOA‘s attitude toward the enlargement of its own program, to a very great extent, answers such an objection. It may also be pointed out that VOA is engaged in an effort to expand the listening audience through the development of cheap radios and "drop" radios. RFA may well give effective assistance as the "cover" for the distribution of these devices, particularly in areas behind the Iron Curtain, where they may expand the listening audience of both VOA and RFA. 

Over-all Content 

In describing events in the Far East, the VOA broadcast to that area pointed out the almost unanimous support given by the U.N. to the action in Korea and the advantages of a free democracy over the regimented body-and-soul controls practiced across the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. The VOA also presented news on the life of Oriental Americans, using editorials and commentaries from the Chinese press in the U.S. as an illustration of the freedom of thought and expression enjoyed by the population in the free world. In general, the picture of life in America and the free democracies has been portrayed in VOA Far Eastern language broadcasts in much the same manner as in broadcasts to Iron Curtain countries. 

 

From a Sack of Flour to a Silver Brick ©

 

In 1864, Reuel C. Gridley, owner of the Gridley General Merchandise Store in Austin, Nevada, lost an election bet and had to carry a 50-pound sack of flour the length of the town to the tune of the song “John Brown’s Body.”

The famous American writer Mark Twain wrote about this episode in his 1870 book Roughing It:

 

A former schoolmate of mine, by the name of Reuel Gridley, was living in the little city of Austin, in the Reese River country, at this time and was the Democratic candidate for mayor. He and the Republican candidate made an agreement that the successful one should carry it home on his shoulder.

 

Gridley was defeated. The new mayor gave him the sack of flour, and he shouldered it and carried it a mile or two from Lower Austin to his home in Upper Austin, attended by a band of music and the whole population. Arrived there, he said he did not need the flour and asked what the people thought he had better do with it. A voice said: 

 

"Sell it to the highest bidder, for the benefit of the Sanitary fund." 

 

The suggestion was greeted with a round of applause, and Gridley mounted a dry-goods box and assumed the role of auctioneer. The bids went higher and higher, as the sympathies of the pioneers awoke and expanded, till at last the sack was knocked down to a mill man at two hundred and fifty dollars, and his check taken. He was asked where he would have the flour delivered, and he said: "Nowhere--sell it again." 

 

Now the cheers went up royally, and the multitude were fairly in the spirit of the thing. So Gridley stood there and shouted and perspired till the sun went down, and when the crowd dispersed, he had sold the sack to three hundred different people, and had taken in eight thousand dollars in gold. And still the flour sack was in his possession.

 

Gridley afterward traveled from coast to coast, auctioning off the flour sack. The proceeds of the auctions went to the Sanitary Fund, a forerunner to the Red Cross, to help relieve suffering created by the Civil War. The last auction was at the St. Louis Sanitary Fair when the flour was turned into small cakes and sold at one dollar each. By then, Gridley’s sack, which had originally cost $10.00, had raised over $275,000 – over seven million dollars in 2023.

 

The year of traveling around the country took a toll on Gridley's health. When he returned to Austin, he found that the silver mine had closed, and his store was close to bankruptcy. He and his family moved to California. Gridley, his wife, and four children lived in poverty in Stockton two years later. Newspaper editors in California and Nevada reacted by raising $1,400 to buy a house and a small farm for them. Gridley's health continued to decline, and he died in 1870 -- he was 41 years old. In 1876, Stockton Civil War veterans sold thousands of miniature sacks of flour to raise money for a monument to Gridley built a few years later. “The Soldiers Friend Monument” Reuel Colt Gridley" in Stockton's cemetery has this inscription:

 

Erected by

RAWLINS POST No. 23

Grand Army of the Republic

and the Citizens of Stockton

September 19, 1887, in gratitude

for services rendered Union

Soldiers during the War of

the Rebellion in collecting

275,000 dollars for the

Sanitary Commission by

selling and reselling a

sack of flour

 

Gridley’s original store in Austin, Nevada, was restored and is now on the United States National Register of Historic Places. 

 

Below is a little-known story of when Clark Gable auctioned off a "silver brick" to raise money for Radio Free Europe (RFE).

 

Nevada, the “Silver State,” had the highest percentage of signatures on the Freedom Scrolls in 1950, when 70,000 persons signed up for the first  Crusade for Freedom. The nationwide goal for the second Crusade campaign, which officially began on Labor Day, September 3, 1951, was 25,000,000 signatures, with a goal in Nevada of 73,000.

 

On Sunday night, September 30, 1951, C.D.Jackson, Radio Free Europe President, spoke in Reno, Nevada, at a large rally for the Crusade for Freedom and RFE. There were 1,500 persons in the new Reno High School gymnasium.  

 

That evening, during the three-hour entertainment show in Reno, Clark Gable acted as an auctioneer. The item to be auctioned was a "silver brick" with the inscription “Nevada 1951.” It was considered to be part of the cornerstone of the new Radio Free Europe headquarters building in Munich, Germany. It was auctioned off for $800, and film actress Ida Lupino presented the silver brick to the happy auction winner, Charles W. Mapes, Jr. In keeping with the good spirit of the evening, Mapes returned the "silver brick," which was taken the next day to Las Vegas.  

 

After the auction and evening's entertainment, Clark Gable and Ida Lupino launched two balloons and leaflets similar to those launched in Germany by the Free Europe Press. 

 

At the Las Vegas rally for the Crusade for Freedom, the "silver brick" garnered $1,000 at another auction. The winning bidder also returned the brick to the Crusade organizers. The "silver brick" was then transported by the Crusade for Freedom statewide motorcade that would tally up 7,500 miles by the time it was over in November 1951. The Ford truck of the motorcade also carried a replica of the Freedom Bell in Berlin, a Radio Free Europe transmitter tower, and the Iron Curtain.

 

By the middle of October, the "silver brick" had been auctioned off for a total of $2,500, including a winning bid of $21.75 from the Smith Valley Rotary Club in Wellington, Nevada.

 

There is no record of the "silver brick" ever being laid in the cornerstone of Radio Free Europe’s headquarters building in Munich, Germany. Nor is there any record of what happened to the "silver brick" after the Crusade for Freedom campaign ended in Nevada.

 

CIA's Landsberg Project: covert military and paramilitary specialist's training program in the early Cold War, Part Two

The first group of trainees arrived in the area on July 19, 1951. The remainder reported for training on July 29, 1951— the total number was twenty-one.

Secrecy of the site was paramount. A twenty-four-hour guard in a U.S. Army fatigue uniform and armed with a U.S. rifle was posted at the main entrance to the area. No Germans were permitted to enter the area without the guard first notifying one of the American staff personnel on duty. Americans, likewise, were not allowed to enter the site if they were not known to the guards as American staff personnel authorized to enter the area. In case of doubt, one of the American staff personnel was notified. At least one member of CIA staff in Munich was on call on the base 24 hours daily, seven days per week. Incoming calls to the base were taken by the guard in the guard room at the entrance to the area. The guard either answered it directly and asked the calling party to hold the line, or he summoned one of the American staff.

CIA liaison was established with the Landsberg Air Base Provost Marshall to handle minor offenses perpetrated by Germans (i.e., entering the area through holes in the wire fence to gather berries and wood. In some instances, offenders cut holes in the wire fence to gain entrance.) On a number of occasions, apprehended offenders were taken into custody by the guards and turned over to the Provost Marshall for disciplinary action. As a result, trespassing or breaking into the area was minimal. 

Training during the period August 27 - September 30, 1951, included these subjects:

(a) Map Reading

(b) Scouting and Patrolling

(c) Planning Patrols (classroom work) - combining fieldwork and class work of subjects (a) and (b) above.

(d) Demolitions - classroom work and practical work in the field. Included calculation of charges and planning.

(e) Weapons familiarization and familiarization firing, detailed field stripping, and cleaning weapons.

(f) Judo - unarmed defense.

(g) Guerilla exercises and calisthenics.

(h) Organized athletics - volleyball and soccer.

(i) Classroom instruction in Mathematics and English.

(j) Training films on Demolitions, Scouting and Patrolling, and Judo.

(k) Documentary films shown in the evening (at least three times weekly) - training and entertainment.

Recreation included - three miniature chess boards, two checkerboards, a mandolin, a guitar, a piano, German newspapers and periodicals, a radio/phonograph combination with a generous supply of Ukrainian and American records, an occasional Ukrainian newspaper, a volleyball, a soccer ball, a punching bag, and two bottles of beer a day. Training and a limited number of documentary films were also used for entertainment.

Until approximately September 20, 1951, a guard was posted in an observation tower (the highest point in the area) of one of the area buildings during the daytime to observe and report trespassers. Field telephones in the observation tower and the guard room at the main gate were used to report on activities in the area. Training in field demolitions, the numerous posting of signs to that effect, and the occasional apprehension of trespassers eventually made this post unnecessary. 

On September 24, 1951, six trainees were removed from the area. Their release was either requested by the trainees themselves or they were selected by ZP UHVR personnel for release. The reasons for this 'selection' were unknown. All six trainees released were paid their due salaries plus a 'goodwill' bonus of DM 200. Security oaths in Ukrainian and English were signed by the six before their release: “I pledge on my word of honor to maintain in strict secrecy the place and purpose of my stay at the camp, and everything relating to it from the time of my entry to the time of my release from the camp. I know the consequences that would befall me should I fail to keep my pledge."

None of the trainees volunteered for dispatching to Ukraine: each said he had had his share of the discomforts and dangers of partisan life and would like to wait until war before returning to Ukraine.

Project Landsberg ended in the summer of 1952 and was considered by one CIA officer to be a fiasco.

CIA's Landsberg Project: covert military and paramilitary specialist's training program in the Early Cold War, Part One

In 1951, several Soviet nationality groups were organized by CIA according to their ethnic components into "guard companies." In July 1951, the CIA established a secret training facility  (“Area B”) at the Displaced Persons camp in Landsberg, am Lech Bavaria, West Germany, about 65 kilometers from Munich. The primary installations at Landsberg consisted of two buildings: an office building, a combination barrack building and mess hall.

The purpose of the CIA-organized groups was purely Paramilitary or Political Action activities during hostilities with the Soviet Union.

Here is the protocol between CIA and the Ukrainian ZP UHVR in December 1951:

1. The fundamental policy of the United States towards all peoples is self-determination.

2. The United States will encourage the anti-Stalin struggle on the part of all peoples of the territories now controlled by the Soviet Union.

3. The United States will not coerce any national group to change their political views nor interfere with their freedom to propagate their own concepts.

Operational

1. Training for current operations shall continue separately from other activities. Personnel for current operations will include those men already in the Kaufbeuren training area, any Landsberg trainees willing to return to the homeland, and approximately six to eight new recruits to be spotted in or outside of Germany by members of the ZP UHVR. In addition to partisan warfare, the recruits for current operations shall be thoroughly trained in every aspect of current Soviet life and clandestine underground tactics so that they will be able to maneuver and operate on their own should that prove necessary. The main purpose for this training will be to provide support and reinforcements for the underground movement in the homeland. One responsible member of the ZP UHVR (UHVR) will be assigned to the training area to assist in the successful completion of the program.

2. A Ukrainian Guard Company composed of two hundred men will be formed and given general military training to prepare them as wartime reserve units. The ZP UHVR (UHVR) may place qualified officers and men to the extent of its ability to recruit them. Should the ZP UHVR not be able to recruit the entire guard complement, the remainder will be recruited from among other Ukrainian groups and from the memberships of the various Ukrainian emigre parties. Emphasis will be placed on paramilitary training, and the cadres will be made available to the ZP UHVR (UHVR) for the spotting of qualified men for current operations. If this first attempt at establishing a Ukrainian guard company proves successful and desirable, it is conceivable that other Ukrainian guard companies will be established later.

3. Those trainees at Landsberg who have qualified for political action training will be sent to the United States as soon as their clearances have been received.

4. Those trainees at Landsberg who are not qualified either for P/A or current operations and who do not wish to become members of the guard company will be released from Landsberg and returned to civilian life immediately.

5. The primary concern of American-ZP UHVR (UHVB) collaboration is the continued existence of the Ukrainian underground movement. However, the gathering of intelligence information by the Ukrainian underground and its transmittal to us by any feasible means is regarded as a most desirable aspect of United States ZP UHVR (UHVR) cooperation,

Trainees at Landsberg had to sign the following pledge before a witness:

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that I will under no circumstances reveal anything having to do with my recruitment for or my period of stay at the US Government Camp in Landsberg. I solemnly swear that I will reveal to no one the location of the U.S. Camp at which I stayed nor discuss with anyone the Americans whom I met before or during my period of stay at Landsberg.

Further, I hereby declare that I have no claims whatsoever against the U.S. Government or any of its organs as a result of my stay at the U.S. Camp in Landsberg, and I declare that I have been fully compensated for all services I have rendered before and during my entire stay at Landsberg.

I hereby declare that I am aware that should I break my oath to maintain the strict secrecy that I pledged above, I will be liable to any executive action that the U. S. Government may deem appropriate in my case.

 

The Secret Life and Mysterious Death of Radio Liberation’s Leonid Karas ©

Leonid Karas

The post–World War II Byelorussian emigration in Western Europe was split into two organizations: 

•       BZR/BCR (Beloruska Zentralna Radaor Byelorussian Central Council)

•       BNR (Beloruska Nationalna Rada, Byelorussian National Council or Council of the Byelorussian Peoples Republic) based in Paris, France. 

From 1951 to 1962, CIA financially supported and used the BNR émigré/exile group in the United States and Europe. 

CIA operations against the BSSR began in the summer of 1951 when CIA initiated a joint Office of Special Operations (OSO)-Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) Foreign Intelligence project (cryptonym AEQUOR). The project included agent infiltration operations in Byelorussia to establish contact with partisan groups and set up support bases for future operations. CIA’s Munich Combined Soviet Operations Base was the responsible field unit. OSO and OPC shared equally in all expenses related to recruitment, training, compensation, equipment, dispatch, and exfiltration of agents into and out of Byelorussia. 

CIA’s Principal Agent for spotting and recruiting agents for the Byelorussian operations was Boris Ragula (cryptonym CAMBISTA 2), a medical doctor in Belgium.

The first penetration agent was Yanka Filistovich (CAMPOSANTO 1), dispatched on September 21, 1951. He was captured almost immediately, interrogated, later imprisoned, and executed.

A four-man team (AEQUOR II) was dispatched on the night of 26/27 August 1952. One was killed, three captured. All three cooperated and participated in radio games with CIA for three years. It was then decided to send another team, AEQUOR III, in 1954.

Leonid Karas (Лявон Леанід Карась) was born on 20 November 1923. He had been a teacher during World War II and reportedly was one of the leaders of the “Union of Belarussian Youth” (based on the German Hitler Youth). In 1944, he left Belarus with about 3,000 persons with the retreating German army. 

Registration Card

Karas registered in the Displaced Persons (DP) Camp in Michelsdorf on August 16, 1945. On his Registration Card, it was written: “I am a White Ruthenian of Polish citizenship, and I don’t wish to become a Soviet citizen.”

Karas worked as a camp guard in the Belarusian camp in Michelsdorf and studied at a Belarusian school. By 1948, Karas was a member of the Belarus youth organization "Twelve," along with other friends. In that year, he left the DP Camp for the United Kingdom, where he worked in coal mines in Scotland. 

The BNR needed more suitable agent candidate material for CIA operations. Because there was no 1953 dispatch under Project AEQUOR, it became necessary for a third AEQUOR team to be prepared for dispatch in 1954, to be utilized in support of Team II, or undertake an independent mission to ensure CIA coverage of the Belorussian SSR.

 

One of the agents associated with Ragula in 1954 was Leonid Karas, whom friends nicknamed Fish (Riba). He was given CIA cryptonym AECAMPOSANTO 11 and invited to Munich. The cover devised for him was that of attending university either in Heidelberg or Karlsruhe. The Leuven term had already begun, and he had to leave Belgium soon or the interest of his friends there would be unduly aroused. 

 

In December 1953, an assessment of Karas was completed, and medical and lie detector examinations were given. At the beginning of the training, Karas showed excessive knowledge of the BNR Council's cooperation with the CIA. For example, Karas knew detailed information about previous landings, landing sites, and more. Because of this, CIA dropped him as a potential agent.

 

On March 14, 1954, CIA’s Principal Agent Boris Ragula wrote:

 

“You said that Fish knows the whereabouts of the four. There is no basis for this statement; it is doubtful because even the President does not know this, and neither do his colleagues. Fish allegedly knows where the poison is hidden. However, I don't know anything about this. I have to come to the only possible conclusion that all of these arguments have been invented for the purpose of asking about an actual danger which probably does not threaten from our side.”

 

Karas returned to Munich on December 6, 1953, to complete his assessment, and physical and lie detector examinations. Karas lived in a local pension and paid per diem rather than placed in a CIA safe-house requiring considerable logistic support. Because of his favorable lie detector examination and medical, Karas was permitted to return to Louvain for the Christmas holidays. He established his cover story as a student and cut ties with the group then. 

 

Faced with the issue of not being able to prepare a team for support purposes or otherwise, CIA decided to use a two-person team, providing both candidates were equally qualified to undertake either a support or independent type mission. Discussions with and assessment of Karas indicated, qualifications-wise, that he would be able to undertake either mission equally well but only as a team member. 

 

After the assessment concluded, Karas lacked the desirable leadership qualities to permit the launching of an independent two-man team into the Byelorussian SSR. Furthermore, because of his partial knowledge of Team II operations and team members, CIA decided that Karas would be a security risk even if sent in as a team member of an independent type mission.

 

After receipt of the Headquarters decision that the preparation of Team III be postponed, CIA’s case office told Karas that certain security issues precluded his utilization at that time and “Particular exigencies necessitated the postponement of any mission at this time. 

 

Although Ragula admitted that Karas and two others were almost wholly witting in all aspects of CIA collaboration, it was felt that a lot of loose conversation inconsistent with the best security interests was extant in the student home in Belgium. The use of the student home for routing candidates in conjunction with the above loose talk has undoubtedly blown the home completely.

 

Karas was then completely unoccupied and unemployed:

 

We have not been so fortunate in disposing of Karas. There was some indication that he could obtain a job with Radio Liberation, but apparently, there are no openings for him. He has very little qualifications for a job here in Germany. He could have obtained employment as a chauffeur if he knew how to drive. Lacking this ability, the door was closed even for a menial task such as this. Since Karas’s visa expires in April, we have no alternative but to return him, with a payoff, to Louvain. It is doubtful whether security will suffer significantly because of his seemingly premature return to his friends in Louvain. Nobody believed him when he said he was coming to Munich to attend the university. The collapse of CIA-BNR relations in Europe is undoubtedly reasonably common knowledge amongst his friends in Louvain. 

Karas was given 10,000 Belgian Francs as a disposal allowance and permitted to return to Louvain. He planned to study typing and eventually return to Munich to work as a temporary translator for Radio Liberation. He was successful. On May 20, 1954, Belarusian programs aired for the first time. The main "speaker" was Leonid Karas.  

On or about September 1, 1954, Leonid Karas did not appear for work, and Radio Liberty notified the Munich police that Karas was missing. On September 7, 1954, his body and Belgian passport were found on the banks of the Isar River in Munich. Leonid Karas was buried in Munich’s North Cemetery. The crime remains unsolved, but his friends and colleagues had no doubt it was murder.