Who Killed the Wanderer?: The Unsolved Murder of Georgi Markov ©

  

“In her wildest dreams Agatha Christie couldn't have conjured a more bizarre murder and a more bizarre murder weapon than the one that killed a Bulgaria writer named Georgi Markov who, while living in exile in London, wrote commentaries for Radio Free Europe.”

 

(Ed Bradley, 60 Minutes, CBS Television News Program, October 20, 1991)

 

On September 7, 1978, Georgi Markov, a Bulgarian émigré, who lived and worked in London, was assaulted in broad daylight on London’s Waterloo Bridge. His life and death show evidence of how far a regime will go to silence its opposition. 

 

Time magazine, in February 2010, ranked the murder of Georgi Markov at number 5 of the “top 10 assassination plots”, just below the murder of Leon Trotsky in 1940 and the attempt on Adolph Hitler in World War Two.

 

On June 15, 1969, Georgi Markov's play "The Man Who Was Me" was previewed before a general audience and party officials in Sofia, Bulgaria. While the audience enthusiastically responded to the play, the party members did not. The play was stopped. A close friend warned him to leave Bulgaria. As part of his preparations to leave, he burned his diaries of fifteen years. Using a passport and visa issued three months earlier, Georgi Markov defected to the West, crossing into Yugoslavia. He saw Bulgaria for the last time.

 

He settled in England and became a broadcast journalist for Radio Free Europe, the British Broadcasting Company (BBC), and Deutsche Welle, the German international broadcast service.  

 

Markov's large audience in Bulgaria listened to his prime-time Sunday-night broadcasts over Radio Free Europe. He dared to tell his audience that Bulgarian President and Communist Party chief Todor Zhivkov wore no clothes.

 

In June 1977, Communist Party Chairman Zhivkov chaired a Politburo meeting and stated he wanted the activities of Markov stopped. The Interior Minister reacted and requested KGB assistance in the killing of Markov. Though he wanted Markov killed, he wanted no trace to Bulgaria. The Chairman of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, agreed to the assassination as long as there would be no trace back to the Soviets.  Thus, the Bulgarians and Soviets were operating under a double case of “plausible denial. “

 

Former KGB general Oleg Kalugin has publicly admitted his role and the role of the KGB in supplying the Bulgarian intelligence service with both the weapon and the poison. Purportedly, the highly secret KGB laboratory known as the "Chamber" developed both the weapon, concealed in a US-manufactured umbrella, and biotoxin ricin impregnated in a wax-coated pellet the size of a pinhead.

 

Markov received various warnings and anonymous threats to stop broadcasting his inside knowledge of Zhivkov and the obsequious circles of Bulgarian intellectuals and government officials. Markov persisted until his death and peeled away the artichoke leaves of lies and corruption in Bulgaria.

 

A grotesque black comedy followed with three attempts to kill Markov in 1978.  The first attempt was in Munich in the spring, when Markov visited friends and colleagues at Radio Free Europe. An agent failed in an attempt to put a toxin in Markov's drink at a dinner party held in his honor. The second failed attempt was on the Italian island Sardinia while Markov enjoyed a summer vacation with his wife Annabel and daughter Sasha. The final and successful attempt was in London on President Zhivkov‘s birthday, September 7, 1978.

 

On that day, Markov worked a double shift at the BBC. After finishing the early morning shift, reportedly, he went home for rest and lunch. Afterward, he drove to a parking lot on the south side of Waterloo Bridge to take a bus to his office at the BBC. As he neared the waiting bus queue, he experienced a sudden stinging pain in the back of his right thigh. He turned and saw a man bending to pick up a dropped umbrella. The man, facing away from Markov, apologized in a foreign accent, hailed a taxi, and departed. He has never been identified.

 

Though in pain, Markov continued on his way to the BBC building. He then noticed a small blood spot on his pants, told colleagues what happened, and showed one friend a pimple-like red swelling on his thigh. Afterward, at home, Markov developed a high fever. His wife called a colleague at BBC, who took Markov to St. James hospital, where he was treated for an undetermined form of blood poisoning. He did not respond to doctors’ efforts, went into shock, and after days of delirium, pain, and suffering, Georgi Markov died in London at age 49 on September 11, 1978. 

 

British authorities later ruled that Markov had been “unlawfully killed” and died of "septicemia, a form of blood poisoning caused by bacterial toxins, possibly a result of kidney failure."

 

An investigative reporter in Bulgaria, Hristo Hristov, published two books in English based on his years of research into Bulgarian intelligence files. His books include a copy of the passport and photographs of an Italian art dealer and small time-criminal, code name “Piccadilly,” seemingly used by Bulgarian intelligence service in the murder. In August 2021, the Austrian news agency APA reported that an Italian with a Danish passport Francesco Gulino, known as "Agent Piccadilly," was found dead in his home in the Austrian city of Wales. He lived in abject poverty. A doctor confirmed the death of the 75-year-old former secret agent. Police said that there was no evidence of violent death.

 

A copy of an umbrella that was adapted into a “pistol” and believed by many to have been used to deliver the ricin that killed Markov is on display at the International Spy Museum in Washington D.C. Former KGB General Oleg Kalugin, however, stated to a Bulgarian newspaper interview in 1998: “The umbrella was only a cover. Georgi Markov was killed with a small special instrument. A weapon like a pen manufactured in the Soviet laboratories.”

 

The minute pellet that contained the poison is on display today in the Crime Museum at New Scotland Yard in London. It has been estimated that one ounce of ricin could kill as many as 90,000 persons. British scientists later estimated that only about 450 micrograms were used to kill Markov.

 

One Bulgarian general committed suicide rather than face trial for destroying thousands of pages of information about Georgi Markov. Another general was found guilty, spent a few months in jail, and reportedly now lives quietly in a villa in Bulgaria. The case has been investigated by generations of Scotland Yard policemen and remains open in England.  In Bulgaria, the case should have been closed in 2008 due to a thirty-year statute of limitations, but authorities decided to keep it open another five years.

 

In 2006, WNET of the television public broadcast service (PBS) network in New York aired a program on Georgi Markov’s death called Secrets of the Dead: Case File Umbrella Assassin. The producers have made their findings available on the Internet, including a re-enactment of the murder, a photograph of the pellet, video clips, and an interactive “Teacher’s Toolbox” for educators and students to “examine the evidence.” 

 

Also included in the program was an interview with American Dr. Christopher Green, who had assisted in the forensic investigation in 1978.  Dr. Green said:

 

We had pretty much all of the story from a forensic point of view. We had the body, the thing in the body that he was hit with -- the pellet -- and the stuff from the pellet. We knew that the material used to kill him, ricin, had been under development by a foreign service linked to the incident. We also knew that he had been a target of assassination attempts in the past. The story of him being a target was very well known. Therefore, we had information on the means, motive, and opportunity.

 

And yet, with all the public information and years of official investigation, no one has been charged with the crime. The dots have not been completely connected. The final piece of the puzzle to complete the picture remains to be found. Georgi Markov’s death proved how far a totalitarian regime would go to protect itself from the truth. The murder of Georgi Markov seems destined to be another footnote in the history of the Cold War. Georgi Markov deserves a better fate.

 

Georgi Markov was buried in Saint Candida and Holy Cross Churchyard cemetery in Whitchurch Canonicorum, Dorset, England. The epitaph on his gravestone is reads in Bulgarian on one side and English on the other side:

 

In Memory of Georgi Ivanov Markov

Novelist & Playwright

Most dearly beloved

By his wife Annabel

His Daughter Sasha

His Family & his Friends

Born Sofia 1. 3. 39

Died London 11 .9. 78

In the Cause of Freedom

Further Information:

 

To listen to Georgi Markov speak over the BBC in 1976 about his favorite music, visit http://mycentury.tv/bulgaria/181-georgi-markov-qmy-kind-of-musicq.html

 

Chapter 3 in my book Cold War Radio: the Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe, 1950 – 1989 (McFarland & Co, 2009).

 

Markov’s Radio Free Europe programs posthumously were collected and translated into English as The Truth That Killed (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, 1983).

 

For information from former Soviet KGB officers about the Markov murder, see Oleg Kalugin, Spymaster; My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West (New York: Basic Books, 2009). And, Oleg Gordievsky and Christopher Andrew, KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (New York: Harper Collins, 1990).

 

The interactive television program Secrets of the Dead: Case File Umbrella Assassin on the murder of Georgi Markov, including the interview with Dr. Christopher Green, can be viewed at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/secrets/previous_seasons/case_umbrella/index.html

 

For full details of “Piccadilly”, including photographs, see Hristo Hristov’s books, The Double Life of Agent Piccadilly and Kill the Wanderer at http://hristo-hristov.com/

 

Radio Free Europe's "Voice of Free Albania" ©

 

It is not generally known that Radio Free Europe (RFE) broadcast to Albania, as the "Voice of Free Albania," from June 1, 1951, to September 30, 1953. If at all mentioned in the histories of RFE, Albanian broadcasts are usually mentioned in the footnotes. Below is a short look into RFE and Albania in the 1950s.

At the regular monthly meeting of the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE) board of directors on July 20, 1950, it was resolved to increase the 1950-1951 budget of the National Councils Division by $60,000 for "support of the National Committee for Free Albania."

 

In announcing the inaugural broadcast on June 1, 1953, RFE's press release said, "It will warn Albanians of new 'security' measures planned by the Kremlin's MVD police and further advise: 'Be cautious, my friends, be patient.'"

 

By 1953, Radio Free Europe had 20 short-wave transmitters and one medium-wave transmitter. Three transmitters were used to broadcast to Romania (3 hours per day), Bulgaria (3 hours), and Albania (1 1/2 hours).

 

Albania was included in Crusade for Freedom campaigns for Radio Free Europe. For example, the 1952 Crusade opened on November 11, 1952, with a national goal of $4,000,000 and signatures of millions of Americans on "Freedom-Grams" in the shape of a normal telegram that would be sent over the Iron Curtain. On the backside of the "Freedom-Gram," this message was translated into Albanian, Czech, Slovak, Polish, Hungarian, Romanian, and Bulgarian:

 

Do you listen to Radio Free Europe?  I hope you do, for I am one of the millions of American citizens who have voluntarily contributed to building these stations, which bring Truth to you who are deprived of it.

 

In America, millions voluntarily pray for an understanding between our peoples. Please add your prayers to ours. Surely our common faith in God is the place where hope for freedom begins.

 

I am a (occupation)

Name

Address

 

Note to Contributors: Replies to this Freedom-Gram may be

received in a foreign language. If you should be unable to

translate them, free translations may be obtained by forwarding the 

letters to Crusade for Freedom c/o your local Postmaster

 

Eventually, six million Americans signed the "Freedom-Grams," which were then sent to West Germany for inclusion in the balloons provided by the Free European Press.

RFE's Albanian language broadcasts ceased on September 30, 1953, primarily because it was not cost-effective broadcasting to a country that reportedly only had an estimated nine-thousand radio in a population of one-and-a-half million. 

Book of Interest: A Frontline of Espionage. Studies in Hungarian Cold War Intelligence in Austria

The book featured below makes a valuable contribution to Cold War histography and is highly recommended:

Magdolna Barath, Dieter Bacher (eds.) A Frontline of Espionage. Studies in Hungarian Cold War Intelligence in Austria, Budapest – Pecs 2021.

“After World War II it was widely known in Europe that the redefined and democratic Austria became a crossroad of the intelligence services of the previously allied forces, now gradually confronting each other, a meeting point for intelligence and counterintelligence networks and a continuous source of recruitment of new agents. The vast number of Hungarian refugees and their political composition provided excellent opportunities to build intelligence network on both sides. In this volume Austrian, Danish and Hungarian outstanding researchers of Cold War espionage present their findings on the activity of the Hungarian communist state security intelligence officers in Austria, Germany and Denmark, the actions of Soviet counterintelligence against Hungarians in Austria, and many more topical issues. On the whole the volume gives an insight into a world, which still has numerous blurred details.”

 

From the introduction:

 

The contributions to the present volume focus on the many diverse aspects of Hungarian Intelligence in Austria, which shows how diverse how this research field really is, for this reason, we have divided the studies into three major categories

 

·      The first major category centers on the structural and organizational issues of the secret services and their agent network, as this forms the basis for all further research, and relevant resources are usually available in abundance.

 

·      The second major category pertains to certain intelligence operations and their goals…these studies give insight into the planning, preparation, and implementation of intelligence practices and also enable us to draw general conclusions on intelligence strategies.

 

·      The third and last category attempts to reconstruct the structures and activities of certain bodies of intelligence. During the early phase of the Cold War, “human intelligence” (HUMINT) or information collected by agents was one of the most important sources of information, and the present volume contains a variety of contributions on this operative method.

Table of Contents:

 

 

 

The Golden Years of Intelligence Entrepreneurship in Austria and Germany, Part Two: Ladislas Faragó and András Zákó ©

 

"A Penchant for Cloak-and-Daggerism" 

 

Cloak-and-Dagger: Marked by melodramatic intrigue and often by espionage

 

American Heritage Dictionary

 

 

Hungarian-born Ladislas Faragó (1906 – 1980) was a journalist, historian, and the author of popular history books, including Burn After Reading, The Game of Foxes, and Spymaster. During World War II, he was associated with the U.S. Navy in psychological warfare and authored reports on German and Japanese psychological warfare. 

 

Below we will briefly look at his relationship with Radio Free Europe in the early Cold War.

 

Radio Free Europe’s Desk X

 

In his book, War of Wits: The Anatomy of Espionage and Intelligence, Ladislas Faragó wrote: "After the war, I had a share in an adventure in propaganda known as Radio Free Europe; there I headed a clandestine 'Desk X,' combatting Communism behind the Iron Curtain."

 

Faragó was employed as a consultant to Radio Free Europe's Hungarian Desk from October 1, 1950, to January 31, 1952. He used John L. Carver, as RFE did not want his connection known to the outside world. He worked out of two hotel rooms, not at the RFE office, thus the name “Desk X.”  He was let go, or perhaps he was allowed to get out of his contract because RFE in New York could not control "his penchant for cloak- and-daggerism," and "his activities were not in FE/RFE's interests." He had been paid 700 dollars a month for his consultancy.

 

Faragó’s “penchant for cloak-and-daggerism” presumably became known to RFE from the CIA is illustrated by his relationship with András Zákó, former head of Hungarian military intelligence who was then living in Salzburg, Austria.

 

In April 1951, two CIA officers using the cover of the U.S. Air Force representatives, traveled to Munich, met Faragó in the Excelsior hotel, and later wrote a report of their conversation. Faragó told them he was  “in charge of the Hungarian Desk of Radio Free Europe.” He explained the operation of RFE to them that “an amazing response has come out of Hungary.” Faragó told them of one RFE program, "Post Office Box 6220," that resulted in approximately 700 letters from Hungary to RFE per month. Another RFE program, "Doctor's Program" (actually "Radio Doctor"), gave medical advice to Hungarians and listeners in RFE’s other broadcast countries. A third program was the "Historian Program," which was popular among Hungarian amateur historians.

 

Faragó was then asked for details of his contact with Zákó in Austria. He told them that Nicholas Lazar of the Hungarian National Council (supported by the National Committee for Free Europe) had contacted him in New York. Farago then wrote a letter to Zákó and told him that RFE was interested in his organization MHBK.  Zákó replied and invited Farago to meet him the next time that Farago was in Europe.

 

Faragó then contacted U.S. Air Force Vandenberg in Washington about Zákó’s proposal. He was then put in touch with U.S. Air Force General John B. Ackerman, then Chief Collection Division, Directorate of Intelligence. In February 1951, General Ackerman then met Farago, who told him that Zákó authorized him to offer services from an underground organization having “high subversive potential and trained in intelligence collection. Ackerman told Faragó that the U.S. was, “generally in favor of genuine underground movements, whose probity could be demonstrated, and he would “undertake to investigate what could be done.”

 

Encouraged by the positive response from the U.S. Air Force, Faragó traveled to Munich and Invited Zákó to meet him there. They met for two days, during which time Zákó offered RFE “400 couriers, who would travel to Hungary at various times getting information.” According to Faragó, Zákó also offered to “kidnap any individual suggested by RFE," including the daughter of a Hungarian secret police officer, and deliver her to Salzburg.

 

Faragó went on to explain that he wanted to take over Zákó’s resources in Hungary to run an intelligence organization, which "should be capable of getting up-to-the-minute news of events within Hungary, of doing small acts of sabotage and of creating unrest within Hungary including even the kidnapping of prominent individuals."

 

He told the Air Force representatives that "RFE and the Air Force should cooperate in running this outfit," adding, "It was quite possible that technical parts of airplanes and engines could be brought out of Hungary by this network." 

 

Faragó's activities and statements were not known or sanctioned by Radio Free Europe, but the Air Force representatives believed that they were, and their report of their meeting with Farago ended with,

 

From this discussion, a jurisdictional intelligence flap is about to happen. It might be well for USFA to determine the conditions of RFE's charter in Europe and determine the extent to which they are authorized to dip into the intelligence-gathering business. They seem to have unlimited funds but a limited number of capable personnel, and many of the mistakes made by USFA and CIC throughout the past years are about to be repeated. It looks as if the business will soon become good for the intelligence factories of Austria.

 

As for Genera Zákó, the author of a detailed CIA February 1952 declassified internal staff study, “Paper Mills and Fabrication,” concluded:

 

Zákó’s intelligence chief stated recently that the MHBK now had no regular channels of communications or organized sources of information in Hungary…Zákó admitted that there were at most nine persons in Hungary on whom he could reasonably depend… MHBK reports as based entirely on refugee debriefings’ or clever rewriting of overt publications garnished with out-and-out fabrication. 

For more information about MHBK and Zákó , see the recent article: 

 

Katalin Kádár Lynn & Mark Stout (2024) Early Cold War intelligence paper mills: the case of the Association of Hungarian Veterans, Cold War History, 24:1, 23-44, DOI: 10.1080/14682745.2023.2191948

ABSTRACT

During the early Cold War, it was difficult for American intelligence to penetrate the Iron Curtain but a potential solution soon arose: émigré intelligence groups such as the Magyar Harcosok Bajtársi Közössége (MHBK) or ‘Association of Hungarian Veterans’. This group, however, turned out to be an intelligence ‘paper mill’. Attempts at trans-Atlantic cooperation with the MHBK and similar groups failed as they lost most of their good sources and were penetrated by communist security services. By the mid-1950s, US intelligence cut these groups off, took over their good sources, and established a source registry to prevent recurrence of the problem.

 

 

 

The Golden Years of Intelligence Entrepreneurship in Austria and Germany: 1947-1952, Part One, András Zákó ©

Background 

Paper mills have been defined as “intelligence sources whose chief aim is the maximum dissemination of their product Their purpose is usually to promote special emigre-political causes while incidentally financing emigre-political organizations.” Fabricators were defined as “individuals or groups who, without genuine agent resources, invent their information or inflate it on the basis of overt news for personal gain or a political purpose.”

 

Richard Helms, one-time Director of Central Intelligence, has written in his memoirs: “The proliferation of reports ostensibly from widely different sources but presenting roughly similar fabricated data made false confirmations a constant threat. At one point it was estimated that some 50 percent of the information on file in the West on the USSR and Eastern Europe had come from such sources.” In addition, it was estimated that one-third of the CIA's intelligence officers in Austria were committed during June 1951 to the detection and neutralization of fabricators and paper mills. 

 

András Zákó was born on March 23, 1898, in Brasso, Hungary. He was one of the leaders of the “KOPJAS” military organization created at the end of World War II as a special Hungarian combat intelligence group, whose mission was to “infiltrate the Russian front to gather information and to commit acts of sabotage against the advancing Soviet army.” As the story goes, in 1945 he went to Germany with the retreating German army and was apprehended by the US Army and extradited to Hungary as a war criminal. He escaped and went to Austria, where he first worked as an agricultural worker under an assumed name in the British Zone. In 1947 he moved to Innsbruck, in the French Zone, and was used by French Intelligence to come up with information about Hungary. He approached both the American Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) and the CIA's Office of Special Operations (OSO) to provide the same intelligence as he said he preferred to work for the Americans. 

 

András Zákó’s group Magyar Harcosok Bajtársi Közssége (MHBK) in Austria in 1949 was a World War II veterans association (World Federation of Hungarian Veterans). There were eventually networks in 22 countries; the MHBK had five branches in Austria alone. MHBK was known in the USA as “Comradeship of Hungarian Veterans” or “Collegial Society of Hungarian Veterans” (CHV).

 

All Western intelligence agencies were under extreme pressure to develop and prepare up-to-date information on the Soviet Union and East European countries believed to be preparing for war. András Zákó was one of the major intelligence entrepreneurs.  Under the guise of current intelligence information, MHBK prepared reports in multiple versions and sold them to the various Western military and intelligence agencies, including the CIA. 

 

The next post will examine the rise and fall of András Zákó and the MHBK in peddling intelligence information to Western intelligence agencies in Austria and Germany. Besides looking at the role of András Zákó, other leading personalities of MHBKwill be identified. 

Early Cold War Swedish Agent Infiltrations into the Baltics, Part Two: The Tilestone Project ©

The end of the 1940s witnessed the completion of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, the Berlin airlift, the Marshall Plan, and the Iron Curtain. Eastern, Central, and Western Europe were physically divided by barbed wire, armed patrols, land mines, and guard towers. The Communist Party's monopoly and censorship of the domestic media effectively cut off and prevented the free flow of information to the peoples of Eastern Europe and the USSR. There was also a widespread fear of war between the two blocs. America's CIA was tasked with intelligence gathering to learn when the Soviet Union was about to attack the West. 

There was a significant problem: the CIA had no intelligence agents behind the Iron Curtain in a position to fulfill the CIA's tasks. But there were thousands of men who had escaped from the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, at the end of World War Two and who might be willing to work for the CIA and the British. The British Intelligence Service (SIS) started Operation "Jungle," and the CIA began Operation "Tilestone," both using recruited agents in Sweden.

CIA and SIS found an unlikely ally in this quest for intelligence: historically neutral Sweden (CIA cryptonym CF-Land). For example, the Swedish Defense Staff (CIA cryptonym TIEBARS) allowed the boat traffic between Sweden and the Baltics from Löfthammar and Bornholm island. Sweden also maintained a radio listening post in Gotland to send and receive wireless traffic between agents in the Baltics and Sweden. Additionally, prospective agents were trained for the infiltration operations in Sweden. 

In the early Cold War, British, the US, and Swedish agencies infiltrated at least forty-two Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians into their homelands. Here is one example of the planned use of an agent infiltration into Lithuania: The Tilestone Project. Here are excerpts from a declassified CIA file.

 

DATE: 19 January 1948 

SUBJECT: Tilestone Project

 

Tilestone will leave Stockholm on 19 or 20 January for the south of Sweden. He will be accompanied by (redacted) or one of his assistants. He has been furnished the papers of a Swedish seaman and will board a Swedish vessel at some Southern port. He will be taken to Gdynia where he expects to be able to land without difficulty. He plans to travel to Warsaw and from there to the neighborhood of the Lithuanian frontier. He expects to meet several members of the Lithuanian resistance who have been awaiting his arrival on the Polish side of the border for some two weeks. He hopes to be able to return to Sweden within a month, coming back on another Swedish vessel. 

 

The primary purpose of Tilestone's trip is to set up radio communication with the Lithuanian underground. He is carrying 16 American radio crystals and an elaborate cipher code furnished by the Swedes. 

 

The code is a numerical cipher similar to that used by the Russians in broadcasts from Lithuania to Moscow. It is based on a Lithuanian book, a copy of which Tilestone had in Stockholm. Tilestone has spent the last two weeks working with Swedish cryptographic experts setting up the code and arranging a series of questions in which his group and the Swedes are interested. Transmissions will be made from Sweden once a week, and it is expected that answers will be received twice a month from Lithuania. 

 

The agent was not dispatched at this time but at a later date in 1949. There is evidence, however, that he then became a Soviet double agent codenamed Petrauskas" until 1970.

Early Cold War Swedish Agent Infiltrations into the Baltics, Part One: Historical Background

It now appears certain that Sweden and Finland will join NATO. Below is a look at early Cold War agent infiltrations into the Soviet Union--in particular the Baltics:

By the middle of July 1945, 21,300 Estonian, 3,400 Latvian, and 300 Lithuanian refugees were in Sweden. Another 6,500 Swedish-speaking Estonians had been evacuated in different waves during the war.

Most of the refugees arrived in small boats that on a more or less commercial basis were trafficking the war-ridden sea, with peaks in August-October 1944 (Estonia and Latvia except Kurzeme) and February-May 1945 (Kurzeme). Some of them, probably about 1100-1500, came with boats that were financed by the Swedish Defence Command for intelligence tasks 

The Swedish Defense Command has largely burnt the archives that could have given a precise account of this, but from what we know of the intelligence traffic that between 1947-1957 was pursued for intelligence reasons by British, American, and Swedish authorities we can establish that both convinced Nazis and ardent democrats were among the Baltic volunteers.

In order to prepare their own program of infiltration into the Soviet Union, the intelligence corps of the Swedish Army renewed its contacts among the Balts in Sweden already in 1947. Seen from a national security perspective, the Soviet Baltic republics remained an area of specific interest especially for the military leadership in Sweden, as they hosted a large concentration of heavily armed Red Army units in considerable proximity to Swedish territorial waters. 

Thus, a secret training program was set up, whose aim it was to organise the selection, education and smuggling of potential infiltrators recruited among the Balts in Sweden. Inside the Soviet Union, they were supposed to establish a network of informants, who would organise the transmission of relevant information of particular political and military interest to Sweden via radio communication. These activities were conducted in close consultation with the British SIS, which was closely involved in the infiltration of Soviet territories by émigré spies.

The key figure among the Estonians in Sweden was the former officer Arkadi Valdin, who, as his Latvian and Lithuanian counterparts, was a direct subordinate of Thede Palm, the head of the secret intelligence unit of the Swedish military. Valdin had his own contacts among the agents of the SIS and, most probably, also the CIA, and was responsible for the educational training of the selected candidates in a Stockholm suburb as well as the coordination of their clandestine passage to Soviet Estonia.

The Baltic operatives that managed to land on the Soviet coastline were either immediately killed or imprisoned, while others were turned into double agents, who after their conversion actively engaged in the KGB’s misinforming operations.  After a failed evacuation effort, which resulted in the death of all involved agents that were supposed to leave Soviet Estonia for Sweden in September 1951, the Swedish intelligence service completely withdrew from the infiltration operations.

Text Source; Lars Fredrik Stöcker, Bridging the Baltic Sea. Networks of Resistance and Opposition during the Cold War Era. The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series, ed. Mark Kramer. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 2018.

Map Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/92/Baltic_Sea_map.png/800px-Baltic_Sea_map.png