The Not-So-Neutral Sweden in the Early Cold War ©

The end of the 1940s witnessed the completion of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, Berlin airlift, Marshall Plan, and the Iron Curtain. Eastern, Central, and Western Europe were physically divided by barbed wire, armed patrols, land mines, and guard towers. The Communist Party monopoly and censorship of the domestic media effectively cut off and prevented the free flow of information to the peoples of Eastern Europe and the USSR. There was also a widespread fear of war between the two blocs. America’s CIA was charged with intelligence gathering to learn when the Soviet Union was about the attack the West. There was a major problem: CIA had no intelligence agents behind the Iron Curtain in a position to fulfill CIA’s tasks. 

But there were thousands of men (for they were mostly men), who had escaped from the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, at the end of World War Two to Sweden, Some were willing to work for CIA and the British intelligence services. The British Intelligence Service (SIS) started Operation “JUNGLE” and CIA began Operation “TILESTONE” using recruited agents in Sweden.

CIA and SIS found an unlikely ally in this quest for intelligence: historically neutral Sweden (CIA cryptonyms CF-Land and HBCHEST). For example, the Swedish Defense Staff (CIA cryptonym TIEBARS) allowed the boat traffic between Sweden and the Baltics from Löfthammar and Bornholm island. Sweden also maintained a radio listening post in Gotland to send and receive wireless traffic between agents in the Baltics and Sweden. Additionally, prospective agents were trained for the infiltration operations in Sweden.

In the early Cold War, British, the US, and Swedish agencies infiltrated at least forty-two Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians to their homelands. Most of them died in Soviet captivity and only a few survived and exfiltrated.

 

The Swedish intelligence service priority targets in the Baltics were: 

 

1) Information on the military aviation development and installations in the Baltics, 

2) Results of Russian Atomic research and guided missiles, 

3) Complete information re the underground organization and strength in the Baltics. 

From CIA Director's Log September 6, 1951:

Swedish Intelligence successfully dispatched three agents by sea to Estonia on 2 September 1951. The dispatch boat successfully evaded a Soviet patrol craft which followed it on the return trip. OSO has supported this operation and will receive the intelligence it produces. 

 

The major intelligence personalities included:

 

USA

 

William (Bill) Colby; WWII veteran in Norway, CIA Office of Special Operations (OSO) officer in Stockholm, and future CIA Director.

 

United Kingdom

 

Alexander ‘Sandy” McKibbin: British intelligence (SIS) officer in charge of Baltic operations.

Sweden

Kommendör Kaptain Ken Lilianberg: Deputy Director Swedish Intelligence (G-2 section) officer in charge of Baltic operations, CIA cryptonym A-356.

Lithuania (CIA cryptonym DF-LAND)

 

Jonas DEKSNYS, CIA Cryptonyms A-374, TILESTONE, Lithuanian Intelligence Sevice alias PETRAUSKAS.

 

One example of his activities in connection with Sweden

 

19 January 1948 

DEKSNYS will leave Stockholm on 19 or 20 January for the south of Sweden. He will be accompanied by (redacted) or one of his assistants. He has been furnished the papers of a 'Swedish seaman and will board a Swedish vessel at some southern port. He will b taken to Gdynia where he expects to be able to land without difficulty. He plans to travel to Warsaw and from there to the neighborhood of the Lithuanian frontier, he expects to meet several members of the Lithuanian resistance who have been awaiting his arrival on the Polish side of the frontier for some two weeks. He hopes to be able to return to Sweden within a month coming back on another Swedish vessel. 

The primary purpose of DEKSNYS's trip is to set up radio communication with the Lithuanian underground. He is carrying with him 16 American radio crystals and an elaborate cipher code furnished him by the Swedes. The code is a numerical cipher similar to that used by the Russians in broadcasts from Lithuania to Moscow. It is based on a Lithuanian book, a copy of which DEKSNYS had in Stockholm. Transmissions will be made from Sweden once a week and it is expected that answers will be received twice a month from Lithuania. DEKSNYS has spent the last two weeks working with Swedish cryptographic experts setting up the code and arranging a series of questions in which his group and the Swedes are interested. 

Sweden and SIGINT

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is intelligence-gathering by interception of signals, whether communications between people (communications intelligence—abbreviated to COMINT) or from electronic signals not directly used in communication (electronic intelligence—abbreviated to ELINT)

The Swedish signals intelligence program was in fact secret cooperation with Washington and London, which severely infringed on Sweden’s neutrality policy, and based on the exchange of technical equipment and data on the situation along the Soviet Baltic coastlines 

The Swedish intelligence and signal intelligence (SIGINT) services proved to be vitally important sources for hard-to-come-by information on Soviet military activities in the Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) and on Soviet naval activities in the Baltic Sea. A tacit arrangement was arrived at in 1946 whereby the Swedes passed to the U.S. intelligence community any data they developed on Soviet military activities in the Baltic region, including from SIGINT monitoring of Soviet fleet activities in the Baltic and human intelligence received from the agents the Swedish intelligence service was then infiltrating into the Baltic States. 

 

In November 1947, the U.S. Air Force signed a secret agreement to give the Swedish air force K-22 aerial cameras with 24- and 40-inch lenses, film, paper, and other equipment. In return, the Swedes gave the USAF military attaché in Stockholm two prints and one contact film copy of every photograph taken on the covert overflight missions of the USSR, Poland, and Finland conducted by the Swedish air force over the next three years. (Source: The Declassified History of American Intelligence Operations in Europe: 1945-2001 Matthew M. Aid, October 2014)

From a compilation by David Lednicer of aircraft shot down in the Cold War:

13 June 1952 Soviet MiG-15 Fagot pilot Captain Boris Osinsky, of the 483rd Fighter Aviation Regiment, shot down a Swedish SIGINT C-47 (Tp79 79001 Hugin) piloted by Alvar Almeberg, over the Baltic, near Ventspils Latvia. Everybody on board the C-47 was killed - the only wreckage found at the time was a life raft. The C- 47 was one of two, (the other being 79002 Munin, both named after Odin's ravens), together with a Ju 86 called Blondie, which supposedly belonged to the so-called 6 Transportflyggruppen at F 8, which at that time had a staff of twelve. In reality, they were used for SIGINT duties, the C-47s fitted out with five operator stations, the operators belonging to FRA (Försvarets Radioanstalt = the Radio Establishment of the Defense). In June 2003, Swedish searchers found the wreckage of the C-47 on the bottom of the Baltic in international waters near Gotska Sandoen island, about 120 kilometers (75 miles) east of the Swedish coastline. The wreckage was raised during the night of March 19/20 2004 and returned to Sweden. 

US Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) and Radio Free Europe in Occupied Austria ©

 

Austria after World War II was crowded with "displaced persons" (DPs) who had been liberated from concentration camps or were former forced laborers in German factories. In 1945, the US Army set up the 430 Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment in occupied Vienna, Salzburg, and Linz, Austria. CIC had the primary function of “denazification” and searching to arrest “Nazi war criminals” and put them on trial.CIC was then tasked with screening these displaced persons to return them to their respective homelands or  after 1948 to the USA. With the completion of the Iron Curtain, CIC Austrian operations evolved into intelligence gathering in Czechoslovakia and Hungary through the use of couriers to infiltrate into and exfiltrate from both. 

 

One CIC intelligence-gathering operation reportedly was Project WACO, which involved CIC using anti-Communist agents in Czechoslovakia 1948-1949 to gather intelligence and recruit new agents behind the Iron Curtain—"couriers."

 

In cooperation with and support of CIC, "White Legion Radio” went into operation in April 1950, broadcasting live from Ried /Innkreis in the American Zone in Upper Austria in a studio in the "Villa Mayer," in which CIC staff also lived. The range of the transmitter on shortwave was at least about 300 kilometers to reach a large part of Slovakia and Moravia. 

 

In 1951, the manager of The White Legion radio station Catholic Priest Kamil Sumichrast in the Benedictine Monastery in Salzburg sent to Slovakia with the aim of creating a reporting group of the White Legion: Ernest Strečanský, Alexander Tihlárik, and Jozef Krutý. 

 

In July 1952, a Slovak Catholic priest visited displaced-persons camp 1001 in Wels, Austria. He told a refugee about the arrest of five men, who reportedly had attempted to cross from Austria into Czechoslovakia. The refugee then told a CIC agent based in Salzburg, who in turn wrote a report on July 30, 1952, which read, in part:

 

During the period of late June and early July 1952, the following named Czechoslovak refugees who had previously fled the CSR to the comparative safety of the US Zone of Austria were apprehended and arrested by the StB… as they attempted to return to
the CSR for unknown reasons: 

·      Ernest Strečanský, 

·      Peter Pavlovič, 

·      Anton “Tono”  Časta, 

·      Alexander Tihlárik, and 

·      Jozef Krutý, 

 

The names were checked against CIC files in Austria, and a summary report was written by CIC Special Agent (S/A) Clyde E. Taylor on July 30, 1952. One CIC agent report received was dated November 6, 1951, and read, in part: "Strechansky, Ernest, Possible Czech Intelligence Personality, … as an employee of Radio Free Europe in Salzburg was asking suspicious questions ot CSR refugees concerning their anti-Communist acquaintances. He was known to have exhibited a considerable interest in the "White Legion," an anti-Communist organization comprised of Czechoslovak refugees, and the KOVANDA Group, which allegedly gathers intelligence information for a US agency in Germany.” 

 

Another CIC report, "Radio Free Europe – Theft of Documents," dated December 10, 1951, mentioned that "Strechansky, who had been employed at RFE as a secretary allegedly confiscated some confidential documents from the RFE office in Salzburg." The CIC report dated April 4, 1952, read, in part, "Slovaks Allegedly Operating on behalf of the Russian Intelligence Service in Austria, Oliver Stankovsky is allegedly in the employ of one Ernest Strechansky and is paid 2,000 Schillings as well as room and board.” 

 

CIC special agent Taylor concluded his report with: "The above information is submitted because the undersigned believes that if Czech authorities have actually intercepted the five named refugees, they will, after debriefing, attempt to trade them their freedom in exchange for their acceptance to work as Czech intelligence operatives in the US Zone of Austria. If any of the persons mentioned above appear in Salzburg, they will be subjected to a detailed interrogation to prove or disprove whether they are operating for the CIS." 

            

The five White Legion men were put on trial June 23-24,1953, pled guilty, and were sentenced to long prison terms;

 

·      Strečanský        16 years

·      Casta                 16 years

·      Tihlarik             15 years

·      Kruty                15 years

·      Pavlovič           25 years           

For more information, see Chapter  9 in 

 

The Origins of CIA’s Clandestine Radio Station Novaya Ukraina ©

In 1948, the CIA's Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) selected the émigré organization Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (ZP/UHVR) as the "most reliable, best organized, and operationally most experienced group for use in exploiting anti-Communist activity of the Ukrainian resistance group then active in Ukraine." For the next five years, CIA and ZP/UHVR conducted extensive joint foreign intelligence operations using the cryptonyms AEACRE and CARTEL and the political and psychological warfare operation AERODYNAMIC, which included propaganda leaflets and materials smuggled into Ukraine or dropped by balloons. CIA also infiltrated intelligence agents into Ukraine, but most were killed or captured by the Soviet forces.

 

Project PBCRUET, submitted on June 17, 1950, included this objective: “The exploitation and expansion of the Ukrainian resistance movement. To establish a "black" radio transmitter outside (and possibly eventually inside) the USSR for broadcasts to Ukraine." The immediate objective of PBCRUET was: “To provide the ZPUHVR with sufficient funds, printing presses, and printing paper to assist this organization in carrying on psychological warfare activities directed against the Soviet regime and the Soviet forces of occupation. 

 

CIA approval request, dated April 30, 1953, "Justification for S.R. (Soviet Russia) Division of Athens Radio Facilities for Clandestine Broadcasting to the USSR," listed the following as reasons for creating a new radio station: 


 

There are no clandestine psychological warfare assets presently available through which we can reach the audience in these strategic areas. The people in these areas will be receptive targets for black broadcasts. Anti-Soviet nationalism is a potent force in both regions and can be exploited. It was precisely in theme areas that anti-Soviet resistance forces arose during World War II. The population has suffered since the end of the war from the MGB-MVD campaign to eradicate the remnants of these farces. Mass deportations have occurred in these areas since the war and have added to the hatred of the Soviet regime. 

 

The same memorandum listed the aim of the “black” radio broadcasts: 

 

[S]timulate and intensify discontent and disaffection to the Soviet regime and provide the target audiences with hope of ultimate liberation. This will be accomplished through broadcasts in the native language of the target audience, based on factual events and national and cultural history. These broadcasts will stimulate national consciousness among the minority groups addressed and will urge them to maintain pride in the individuality of their various national cultures. Concurrently the proposed broadcasts will encourage passive resistance, earning against premature uprisings but urging organized passive resistance, which can develop into something more active when conditions permit. 

 

The objectives of the clandestine radio project now with the cryptonym RANTER were listed in a July 21, 1953 project outline: 

 

The objective of this project is to utilize the broadcast time available on the KUBARK (CIA)  radio installation PYREX at Athens, Greece, for the broadcast of a series of programs to be directed to: 

 

·      Soviet officialdom, 

·      Soviet military forces stationed in the Ukraine, 


·      The Indigenous civilian population of the Ukraine, 


·      Underground movement, 


·      Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). 




The tasks of the project were to: 


 

·      Furnish evidence of outside sympathy and understanding for the Ukrainian peoples. 


·      Intensify anti-regime disaffection by encouraging resentment, bitterness, and distrust of the Soviet regime and its personalities. 


·      Maintain national consciousness among the Ukrainians and urge them to maintain pride in the individuality and heritage of their culture. 


·      Create dissatisfaction among Ukrainian military personnel within the Soviet armed forces stationed in Ukraine. 


·      Create and intensify dissatisfaction among the Ukrainian civil authorities to the Soviet regime. The submitting division gave the following why the black broadcasts were necessary: This project is based on the need to make a more significant propaganda impact on this strategic target audience. Currently, the only PBPRIME (the United States, i.e., Voice of America) and KUBARK (CIA) propaganda efforts directed to the target area consist of Voice of America broadcasts and the Radio Liberation effort to the Kyiv area in the Russian language. 


 

The presentation of clandestine broadcasts, specifically tailored to the target audience's needs delivered on a close and friendly basis, will augment the existing inadequate PBPRIME and KUBARK efforts.

 

The July 1953 project outline also listed the method of preparing the broadcasts: 

 

·      It is proposed that the S.R. Division be authorized to plan a psychological warfare campaign to be implemented initially over the PYREX radio station located in Athens, Greece.

 

·      It is proposed that programs in the Ukrainian language be produced and recorded on magnetic tape in New York and flown to Athens for broadcast by personnel attached to PYREX. It is realized that programming from this distance is not as efficient and timely as it would be if located nearer the transmitter. However, this is the only means where immediate advantage can be taken of the PYREX facility. This project's program activities will be transferred accordingly when future operation conditions permit the programming to be prepared closer to the transmitter site. At first three tapes a week for fifteen minutes each broadcast time will be prepared. With the increase in script output and availability of air time, the broadcasts can be expanded. 

 

(Extracted from Cold War Frequencies: CIA Clandestine Radio Broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe)

 

February 8, 1955, President Eisenhower's Message: The Battle for Men's Minds

 

[Delivered over closed-circuit television from the White House]

I AM happy to be with you tonight for I strongly believe that Radio Free Europe and the Crusade for Freedom are vital to success in the battle for men's minds.

Many of us learned during the war that the most potent force is spiritual; that the appeal to men's minds produces a dedication that surmounts every trial and test until victory is won.

To toughen, strengthen, fortify such dedication to the cause of freedom is the mission of Radio Free Europe.

Substantial progress has already been made. The free world is growing stronger because its peoples are growing in their determination to stand together and in their faith that freedom and justice will triumph.

Radio Free Europe, each day of the year, nourishes this growth.

Here at home, we Americans face the future with confidence. But we must also face up to the dangers that still lurk about us. We must ever work to strengthen our posture of defense and to reinforce our alliances and friendships in the free world.

While we maintain our vigilance at home and abroad, we must help intensify the will for freedom in the satellite countries behind the Iron Curtain. These countries are in the Soviet backyard; and only so long as their people are reminded that the outside world has not forgotten them--only that long do they remain as potential deterrents to Soviet aggression.

The great majority of the 70 million captives in these satellite countries have known liberty in the past. They now need our constant friendship and help if they are to believe in their future.

Therefore, the mission of Radio Free Europe merits greater support than before. It serves our national security and the cause of peace.

I have long given the Crusade for Freedom my strong endorsement. I did that because I am familiar with its purposes, its operations, the people who run it, and, perhaps, most important--its hard-hitting effectiveness as an independent American enterprise.

I know that our country and our friends behind the Iron Curtain can count on you for active participation and leadership in this most critical of all battles--the winning of men's minds. Without this victory, we can have no other victories. By your efforts, backed up by America, we can achieve our great goal--that of enabling us and all the peoples of the world to enjoy in peace the blessings of freedom.

 

Note: This message was broadcast to 35 meetings held under the auspices of the American Heritage Foundation.

 

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Message to Nationwide Meetings in Support of the Campaign for Radio Free Europe. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/233885

 

 

The Cold War Misadventures of Ukrainian Parachutist Alexei Pavlovich Kurochkin, Part Two ©

 

Part Two

    

Before being sent to the USSR on espionage missions, he graduated from an American intelligence school for seven months in West Germany. It trained agents-radio operators, and therefore the main subject at the school was radio communications, which he did every day until 6 o'clock. Classes on the study of radio and parachuting took place in the city of Kaufbeuren. The agent trainees also were constantly in the town of Bad Worishofen, where they studied: 

 

·      conspiracy, 

·      the structure of aviation and tank units of the USSR, 

·      photography, 

·      topography, and 

·      sabotage.

·      how to forge seals and signatures on documents, which introduced us to Soviet documentation, radar, the Navy, the category of agents, etc.

 

They were forced to systematically listen to Voice of America programs in which vicious slander against the Soviet Union was stated and to read anti-Soviet newspapers published by various white émigré organizations in West Germany. In a word, they were presented with all kinds of slander against Soviet reality, while the American way of life was praised in every possible way.

 

At the same time, to be aware of the events taking place in the Soviet Union and freely navigate the territory of the USSR, they were allowed to read Soviet newspapers daily and listen to radio broadcasts. About a month before graduation, they practiced a cover story under which they were supposed to act when performing espionage missions.

 

The teaching staff of the reconnaissance school, with the exception of one instructor, consisted of Americans who carefully conspired their real names, replacing them with fictitious, moreover Russian, names.

 

The instructor of the intelligence school was under the nickname "Vsevolod", posing as a former Soviet intelligence officer. The head of the school was an American major named "Andrey ."The radio business was conducted by the American "Jan." An American intelligence officer taught parachuting with the rank of captain. His assistant was a lieutenant, and he also conducted training sessions with us on sabotage. Under the name "Alexey," an American lieutenant was assigned to the agents as an observer.

 

Simultaneously with him, five more spies were trained at the American intelligence school, who was known to him only by nicknames: "Peter," "Boris," "George," "Leonid," and "Ivan. He showed about the external signs and the personality of these agents at the previous interrogations. He didn't know any other information about them. He gave correct testimony on this issue during the investigation. Three American agents, nicknamed "George," "Boris," and "Peter," dropped out of school in March 1951, but he didn’t know where they went or what happened to them.

 

The Americans did everything they could to cover up their actions related to the infiltration of spies into the territory of the USSR. For example, the three agents left Bad Worishofen in a passenger car in an unknown direction and arrived in a city, which, as they later learned, was located about 40 kilometers from Frankfurt am Main (presumable Wiesbaden). Before reaching the airfield, they were dressed in American military-style working uniforms, which they removed only in the plane that was in the hangar. At 7 pm on May 1, 1952, the aircraft took off. It flew through Poland at a speed of about 300 kilometers per hour. At 02:30, they were parachuted.

 

In clarifying the testimony he had given earlier, he admitted that, at the direction of American intelligence, he had to collect:

 

·      various espionage information about the deployment of military units of the Soviet Army; 

·      on the political mood and economic situation of the population; and

·      acquire Soviet documents, including passports, military tickets, travel, and vacation certificates.

    

The Americans also attached importance to collecting information that made it possible to better know Soviet reality. They, for example, were interested in the regime on railway transport, the fare on the train, tram, bus, taxi and other modes of transportation; prices for food and manufactured goods, the characteristics of a particular city, etc. The collection of this kind of information was also part of his espionage duties.

    

Along with this, on the instructions of the Americans, he had to find two or three people with anti-Soviet views or a criminal record and persuade them to flee abroad. These are the tasks of American intelligence that he must complete during his three-month stay on the territory of the Soviet Union.

 

Although the Americans trained us not only as radio operators but also as demolition agents and conducted practical exercises with us on committing various kinds of sabotage, including blowing up bridges, railway tracks, and other objects, however, he did not do any sabotage or terrorist acts.

 

He did not know about the nature of the assignments received by the agents "Leonid" and "Ivan."

 

The Americans supplied him with 

 

·      a submachine gun, 

·      two pistols, 

·      a radio transmitter,

·      a camera, 

·      a pistol in the form of a pen, a special compound for masking traces from service dogs, 

·      Soviet money of 34,000 rubles and various kinds of food concentrates and medicines.

·      In addition, he was given two sets of fictitious documents in the name of Nikolai Kuzmich PLATONOV and one KOPYTOV for the electric welder of the Krasny Oktyabr artel from the mountains. Kamenka, Kirovograd region

 

On May 3, he radioed the American radio center and reported a safe landing. Since he had to carry out the espionage work himself, on the same day in the evening, he left the agents "Leonid" and "Ivan," burying the radio transmitter and other equipment not far from the landing site.

 

Being at the station in the mountains of Odessa, on May 6, 1952, he met an unknown person who turned out to be (FNU) Arestov, according to his passport. He said that he had recently been released from the forced labor camp where he was serving his sentence. He was not working anywhere and was in a difficult financial situation. Taking advantage of the favorable condition, Kurochkin suggested to Arestov that he sell his passport. At first, he hesitated, then agreed. Kurochkin paid him 200 rubles for the passport. He bought another passport for 350 rubles around May 11 in a train car going to Odessa. 

    

He stole the third passport: in Kharkov in the city market, he met a certain Masliy, then invited him to a tea room, got him drunk, then put him in a taxi car and, using Masliy's strong intoxication, stole his passport from his pocket, and left him on one of the streets city ​​and fled.

 

He did not let any of these people know about his criminal plans and had no intentions to use them in espionage work.

He met some relatives: his wife, her mother, and others. Kurochkin told them that while serving in the Soviet occupation forces in Austria, He fled the army to the West, where he had contacted the Americans, who transferred him by plane with espionage missions to the Soviet Union.

 

He managed to persuade one KLIMOV, whom he met at the Martsevo station, Rostov Region, to cross the border. Believing him to be a vagabond, he invited him to travel with him, promising that he could supply him with money and clothes. KLIMOV agreed and became my companion.

 

From conversations with him, it turned out that he did not work anywhere and was engaged in theft. This allowed Kurochkin to establish a trusting relationship with him, after which he directly suggested that Klimov flee abroad. Klimov accepted my proposal without hesitation. Kurochkin believed that Klimov intended to go overseas with him, but his calculations were not justified. 

On May 26, 1952, while in the forest, Kurochkin was watching the area to outline his further path to the border, at that time, Klimov hit him on the head with a stone and disappeared; the next day Kurochkin was detained.

He did not hide the fact that, on the instructions of the Americans, a number of Soviet citizens should be persuaded to go abroad illegally. He did not set such a goal. His relatives only helped him to hide for two days and did not give him up to the Soviet authorities, which is why he opened up to them as an American spy.

 

Despite the fact that he was equipped with a powerful radio to communicate with the Americans, however, his attempt to establish contact with them by radio on May 17, 1952, due to the lack of audibility, was not successful. Subsequently, he did not make any attempts to contact by radio.

Kurochkin tried to send two radiograms. One of which indicated that he had lost the password for communicating with the Americans in Turkey, in connection with which he asked to be told a different password. He indicated that he had acquired three Soviet passports in the same radiogram. The content of the second radiogram was reduced to a description of one of the passports.

 

If he managed to exfiltrate, then in the future, according to the plans of the Americans, he would be transferred a second time to the Soviet Union. Based on this, he was asked to bury the radio station and other equipment and to illegally sneak into Turkey himself. For this purpose, He was supplied by American intelligence with a topographic map on which the route of crossing the Soviet-Turkish border was indicated. Once in Turkey, he had to address the Turks in their language. Kurochkin remembered the three necessary words and asked them to take to Erzerum, to the head of counterintelligence, who would put him in touch with the American intelligence officers using a predetermined password. Parts of a comb and a photo card served as his password. Other parts of these objects are in Erzurum. If, when added together, they coincide along the lines, it will be apparent to the Americans who he was and for what purpose he came. In addition, as the Americans stated, there was my photograph in Erzurum.

The above summary is taken from his interrogation report.

On June 29, 1952, the other two parachutists were arrested in Rostov-on-Don. All three were intensely interrogated, refused to play in any radio games, were tried, convicted, and executed as American spies.

There was no intelligence developed and the long hours of training were naught.