The Origins of CIA’s Clandestine Radio Station Novaya Ukraina ©

In 1948, the CIA's Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) selected the émigré organization Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (ZP/UHVR) as the "most reliable, best organized, and operationally most experienced group for use in exploiting anti-Communist activity of the Ukrainian resistance group then active in Ukraine." For the next five years, CIA and ZP/UHVR conducted extensive joint foreign intelligence operations using the cryptonyms AEACRE and CARTEL and the political and psychological warfare operation AERODYNAMIC, which included propaganda leaflets and materials smuggled into Ukraine or dropped by balloons. CIA also infiltrated intelligence agents into Ukraine, but most were killed or captured by the Soviet forces.

 

Project PBCRUET, submitted on June 17, 1950, included this objective: “The exploitation and expansion of the Ukrainian resistance movement. To establish a "black" radio transmitter outside (and possibly eventually inside) the USSR for broadcasts to Ukraine." The immediate objective of PBCRUET was: “To provide the ZPUHVR with sufficient funds, printing presses, and printing paper to assist this organization in carrying on psychological warfare activities directed against the Soviet regime and the Soviet forces of occupation. 

 

CIA approval request, dated April 30, 1953, "Justification for S.R. (Soviet Russia) Division of Athens Radio Facilities for Clandestine Broadcasting to the USSR," listed the following as reasons for creating a new radio station: 


 

There are no clandestine psychological warfare assets presently available through which we can reach the audience in these strategic areas. The people in these areas will be receptive targets for black broadcasts. Anti-Soviet nationalism is a potent force in both regions and can be exploited. It was precisely in theme areas that anti-Soviet resistance forces arose during World War II. The population has suffered since the end of the war from the MGB-MVD campaign to eradicate the remnants of these farces. Mass deportations have occurred in these areas since the war and have added to the hatred of the Soviet regime. 

 

The same memorandum listed the aim of the “black” radio broadcasts: 

 

[S]timulate and intensify discontent and disaffection to the Soviet regime and provide the target audiences with hope of ultimate liberation. This will be accomplished through broadcasts in the native language of the target audience, based on factual events and national and cultural history. These broadcasts will stimulate national consciousness among the minority groups addressed and will urge them to maintain pride in the individuality of their various national cultures. Concurrently the proposed broadcasts will encourage passive resistance, earning against premature uprisings but urging organized passive resistance, which can develop into something more active when conditions permit. 

 

The objectives of the clandestine radio project now with the cryptonym RANTER were listed in a July 21, 1953 project outline: 

 

The objective of this project is to utilize the broadcast time available on the KUBARK (CIA)  radio installation PYREX at Athens, Greece, for the broadcast of a series of programs to be directed to: 

 

·      Soviet officialdom, 

·      Soviet military forces stationed in the Ukraine, 


·      The Indigenous civilian population of the Ukraine, 


·      Underground movement, 


·      Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). 




The tasks of the project were to: 


 

·      Furnish evidence of outside sympathy and understanding for the Ukrainian peoples. 


·      Intensify anti-regime disaffection by encouraging resentment, bitterness, and distrust of the Soviet regime and its personalities. 


·      Maintain national consciousness among the Ukrainians and urge them to maintain pride in the individuality and heritage of their culture. 


·      Create dissatisfaction among Ukrainian military personnel within the Soviet armed forces stationed in Ukraine. 


·      Create and intensify dissatisfaction among the Ukrainian civil authorities to the Soviet regime. The submitting division gave the following why the black broadcasts were necessary: This project is based on the need to make a more significant propaganda impact on this strategic target audience. Currently, the only PBPRIME (the United States, i.e., Voice of America) and KUBARK (CIA) propaganda efforts directed to the target area consist of Voice of America broadcasts and the Radio Liberation effort to the Kyiv area in the Russian language. 


 

The presentation of clandestine broadcasts, specifically tailored to the target audience's needs delivered on a close and friendly basis, will augment the existing inadequate PBPRIME and KUBARK efforts.

 

The July 1953 project outline also listed the method of preparing the broadcasts: 

 

·      It is proposed that the S.R. Division be authorized to plan a psychological warfare campaign to be implemented initially over the PYREX radio station located in Athens, Greece.

 

·      It is proposed that programs in the Ukrainian language be produced and recorded on magnetic tape in New York and flown to Athens for broadcast by personnel attached to PYREX. It is realized that programming from this distance is not as efficient and timely as it would be if located nearer the transmitter. However, this is the only means where immediate advantage can be taken of the PYREX facility. This project's program activities will be transferred accordingly when future operation conditions permit the programming to be prepared closer to the transmitter site. At first three tapes a week for fifteen minutes each broadcast time will be prepared. With the increase in script output and availability of air time, the broadcasts can be expanded. 

 

(Extracted from Cold War Frequencies: CIA Clandestine Radio Broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe)

 

February 8, 1955, President Eisenhower's Message: The Battle for Men's Minds

 

[Delivered over closed-circuit television from the White House]

I AM happy to be with you tonight for I strongly believe that Radio Free Europe and the Crusade for Freedom are vital to success in the battle for men's minds.

Many of us learned during the war that the most potent force is spiritual; that the appeal to men's minds produces a dedication that surmounts every trial and test until victory is won.

To toughen, strengthen, fortify such dedication to the cause of freedom is the mission of Radio Free Europe.

Substantial progress has already been made. The free world is growing stronger because its peoples are growing in their determination to stand together and in their faith that freedom and justice will triumph.

Radio Free Europe, each day of the year, nourishes this growth.

Here at home, we Americans face the future with confidence. But we must also face up to the dangers that still lurk about us. We must ever work to strengthen our posture of defense and to reinforce our alliances and friendships in the free world.

While we maintain our vigilance at home and abroad, we must help intensify the will for freedom in the satellite countries behind the Iron Curtain. These countries are in the Soviet backyard; and only so long as their people are reminded that the outside world has not forgotten them--only that long do they remain as potential deterrents to Soviet aggression.

The great majority of the 70 million captives in these satellite countries have known liberty in the past. They now need our constant friendship and help if they are to believe in their future.

Therefore, the mission of Radio Free Europe merits greater support than before. It serves our national security and the cause of peace.

I have long given the Crusade for Freedom my strong endorsement. I did that because I am familiar with its purposes, its operations, the people who run it, and, perhaps, most important--its hard-hitting effectiveness as an independent American enterprise.

I know that our country and our friends behind the Iron Curtain can count on you for active participation and leadership in this most critical of all battles--the winning of men's minds. Without this victory, we can have no other victories. By your efforts, backed up by America, we can achieve our great goal--that of enabling us and all the peoples of the world to enjoy in peace the blessings of freedom.

 

Note: This message was broadcast to 35 meetings held under the auspices of the American Heritage Foundation.

 

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Message to Nationwide Meetings in Support of the Campaign for Radio Free Europe. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/233885

 

 

The Cold War Misadventures of Ukrainian Parachutist Alexei Pavlovich Kurochkin, Part Two ©

 

Part Two

    

Before being sent to the USSR on espionage missions, he graduated from an American intelligence school for seven months in West Germany. It trained agents-radio operators, and therefore the main subject at the school was radio communications, which he did every day until 6 o'clock. Classes on the study of radio and parachuting took place in the city of Kaufbeuren. The agent trainees also were constantly in the town of Bad Worishofen, where they studied: 

 

·      conspiracy, 

·      the structure of aviation and tank units of the USSR, 

·      photography, 

·      topography, and 

·      sabotage.

·      how to forge seals and signatures on documents, which introduced us to Soviet documentation, radar, the Navy, the category of agents, etc.

 

They were forced to systematically listen to Voice of America programs in which vicious slander against the Soviet Union was stated and to read anti-Soviet newspapers published by various white émigré organizations in West Germany. In a word, they were presented with all kinds of slander against Soviet reality, while the American way of life was praised in every possible way.

 

At the same time, to be aware of the events taking place in the Soviet Union and freely navigate the territory of the USSR, they were allowed to read Soviet newspapers daily and listen to radio broadcasts. About a month before graduation, they practiced a cover story under which they were supposed to act when performing espionage missions.

 

The teaching staff of the reconnaissance school, with the exception of one instructor, consisted of Americans who carefully conspired their real names, replacing them with fictitious, moreover Russian, names.

 

The instructor of the intelligence school was under the nickname "Vsevolod", posing as a former Soviet intelligence officer. The head of the school was an American major named "Andrey ."The radio business was conducted by the American "Jan." An American intelligence officer taught parachuting with the rank of captain. His assistant was a lieutenant, and he also conducted training sessions with us on sabotage. Under the name "Alexey," an American lieutenant was assigned to the agents as an observer.

 

Simultaneously with him, five more spies were trained at the American intelligence school, who was known to him only by nicknames: "Peter," "Boris," "George," "Leonid," and "Ivan. He showed about the external signs and the personality of these agents at the previous interrogations. He didn't know any other information about them. He gave correct testimony on this issue during the investigation. Three American agents, nicknamed "George," "Boris," and "Peter," dropped out of school in March 1951, but he didn’t know where they went or what happened to them.

 

The Americans did everything they could to cover up their actions related to the infiltration of spies into the territory of the USSR. For example, the three agents left Bad Worishofen in a passenger car in an unknown direction and arrived in a city, which, as they later learned, was located about 40 kilometers from Frankfurt am Main (presumable Wiesbaden). Before reaching the airfield, they were dressed in American military-style working uniforms, which they removed only in the plane that was in the hangar. At 7 pm on May 1, 1952, the aircraft took off. It flew through Poland at a speed of about 300 kilometers per hour. At 02:30, they were parachuted.

 

In clarifying the testimony he had given earlier, he admitted that, at the direction of American intelligence, he had to collect:

 

·      various espionage information about the deployment of military units of the Soviet Army; 

·      on the political mood and economic situation of the population; and

·      acquire Soviet documents, including passports, military tickets, travel, and vacation certificates.

    

The Americans also attached importance to collecting information that made it possible to better know Soviet reality. They, for example, were interested in the regime on railway transport, the fare on the train, tram, bus, taxi and other modes of transportation; prices for food and manufactured goods, the characteristics of a particular city, etc. The collection of this kind of information was also part of his espionage duties.

    

Along with this, on the instructions of the Americans, he had to find two or three people with anti-Soviet views or a criminal record and persuade them to flee abroad. These are the tasks of American intelligence that he must complete during his three-month stay on the territory of the Soviet Union.

 

Although the Americans trained us not only as radio operators but also as demolition agents and conducted practical exercises with us on committing various kinds of sabotage, including blowing up bridges, railway tracks, and other objects, however, he did not do any sabotage or terrorist acts.

 

He did not know about the nature of the assignments received by the agents "Leonid" and "Ivan."

 

The Americans supplied him with 

 

·      a submachine gun, 

·      two pistols, 

·      a radio transmitter,

·      a camera, 

·      a pistol in the form of a pen, a special compound for masking traces from service dogs, 

·      Soviet money of 34,000 rubles and various kinds of food concentrates and medicines.

·      In addition, he was given two sets of fictitious documents in the name of Nikolai Kuzmich PLATONOV and one KOPYTOV for the electric welder of the Krasny Oktyabr artel from the mountains. Kamenka, Kirovograd region

 

On May 3, he radioed the American radio center and reported a safe landing. Since he had to carry out the espionage work himself, on the same day in the evening, he left the agents "Leonid" and "Ivan," burying the radio transmitter and other equipment not far from the landing site.

 

Being at the station in the mountains of Odessa, on May 6, 1952, he met an unknown person who turned out to be (FNU) Arestov, according to his passport. He said that he had recently been released from the forced labor camp where he was serving his sentence. He was not working anywhere and was in a difficult financial situation. Taking advantage of the favorable condition, Kurochkin suggested to Arestov that he sell his passport. At first, he hesitated, then agreed. Kurochkin paid him 200 rubles for the passport. He bought another passport for 350 rubles around May 11 in a train car going to Odessa. 

    

He stole the third passport: in Kharkov in the city market, he met a certain Masliy, then invited him to a tea room, got him drunk, then put him in a taxi car and, using Masliy's strong intoxication, stole his passport from his pocket, and left him on one of the streets city ​​and fled.

 

He did not let any of these people know about his criminal plans and had no intentions to use them in espionage work.

He met some relatives: his wife, her mother, and others. Kurochkin told them that while serving in the Soviet occupation forces in Austria, He fled the army to the West, where he had contacted the Americans, who transferred him by plane with espionage missions to the Soviet Union.

 

He managed to persuade one KLIMOV, whom he met at the Martsevo station, Rostov Region, to cross the border. Believing him to be a vagabond, he invited him to travel with him, promising that he could supply him with money and clothes. KLIMOV agreed and became my companion.

 

From conversations with him, it turned out that he did not work anywhere and was engaged in theft. This allowed Kurochkin to establish a trusting relationship with him, after which he directly suggested that Klimov flee abroad. Klimov accepted my proposal without hesitation. Kurochkin believed that Klimov intended to go overseas with him, but his calculations were not justified. 

On May 26, 1952, while in the forest, Kurochkin was watching the area to outline his further path to the border, at that time, Klimov hit him on the head with a stone and disappeared; the next day Kurochkin was detained.

He did not hide the fact that, on the instructions of the Americans, a number of Soviet citizens should be persuaded to go abroad illegally. He did not set such a goal. His relatives only helped him to hide for two days and did not give him up to the Soviet authorities, which is why he opened up to them as an American spy.

 

Despite the fact that he was equipped with a powerful radio to communicate with the Americans, however, his attempt to establish contact with them by radio on May 17, 1952, due to the lack of audibility, was not successful. Subsequently, he did not make any attempts to contact by radio.

Kurochkin tried to send two radiograms. One of which indicated that he had lost the password for communicating with the Americans in Turkey, in connection with which he asked to be told a different password. He indicated that he had acquired three Soviet passports in the same radiogram. The content of the second radiogram was reduced to a description of one of the passports.

 

If he managed to exfiltrate, then in the future, according to the plans of the Americans, he would be transferred a second time to the Soviet Union. Based on this, he was asked to bury the radio station and other equipment and to illegally sneak into Turkey himself. For this purpose, He was supplied by American intelligence with a topographic map on which the route of crossing the Soviet-Turkish border was indicated. Once in Turkey, he had to address the Turks in their language. Kurochkin remembered the three necessary words and asked them to take to Erzerum, to the head of counterintelligence, who would put him in touch with the American intelligence officers using a predetermined password. Parts of a comb and a photo card served as his password. Other parts of these objects are in Erzurum. If, when added together, they coincide along the lines, it will be apparent to the Americans who he was and for what purpose he came. In addition, as the Americans stated, there was my photograph in Erzurum.

The above summary is taken from his interrogation report.

On June 29, 1952, the other two parachutists were arrested in Rostov-on-Don. All three were intensely interrogated, refused to play in any radio games, were tried, convicted, and executed as American spies.

There was no intelligence developed and the long hours of training were naught.  

 

The Cold War Misadventures of Ukrainian Parachutist Alexei Pavlovich Kurochkin, Part One ©

On May 2, 1952, American penetration agents VOLOSHANOVSKY, KOSHELEV, and KUROCCHKIN, parachuted out of an airplane on May 2, 1952, west of Kyiv in the Tsuman district Volyn region of Ukraine.

 

This post will focus on the misadventures of one of them: Alexi Pavlovich Kurochin, born in 1927, a native of the village—Dyakovo, Susaninsky district, Kostroma region, a citizen of the USSR, with lower education. 

   

In 1941, he dropped out of elementary school and got a job at the Kostroma industrial complex. After three months, he got in touch with a criminal group and stopped doing socially beneficial work. He was arrested four times by the police for systematic thefts and was tried twice. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment. He served his sentenced was released in early 1945.

 

He worked as a driver's apprentice in the regional office "Gossortfond" in the mountains of Kostroma. In December of the same year, Kuochkin was called up for military service and sent to the 177th Rifle Division, where he took the military oath. However, his criminal past, promiscuity, and indiscipline took over, and after a few days, he deserted from the Soviet Army. Having bought a birth certificate for 60 rubles in the name of Roman Pavlovich Zakharov, born in 1930, he managed to get a passport, too.

    

Living under other people's documents, until 1950, he worked in the cities Novorossiysk, Odessa, and Taganrog as an electric welder at various enterprises, and at the end of 1950, he was drafted into the army under the name Zakharov. Still, this time he did not serve in it for long.

 

While serving in the occupation units of the Soviet Army in Austria, on September 10, 1951, he fled to the French sector of Vienna, where, with the help of the French authorities, he contacted the Americans.

 

He was afraid that the case of desertion from the army would sooner or later come to the surface and that he would not escape trial. In addition, it so happened that he refused to comply with the order to go to the squad on the eve of the flight. Realizing that this case would not go unpunished, he decided to run away. At that time, he had no anti-Soviet views.

 

He fled to the western sector of Vienna from Baden, where his military unit was stationed, in which he served as a driver.

 

On September 10, 1951, having deceived the administration of the garage, he left in a car attached to him and headed along the Baden-Vienna road. About half an hour later, he was in the French sector of Vienna, where he reported to the commandant's office. At the same time, no one exerted a negative influence on him and did not assist in his flight to the west.

 

He did not set himself the goal of defecting specifically to the French sector. For him, it was indifferent. He fled in the hope of placing himself at the disposal of the authorities of one of the bourgeois states. While at the commandant's office, he told the French about the circumstances of my escape from the unit. He gave them his real name, after which they took away his documents: a Red Army book, a pass to the Headquarters of the Central Group of Forces, a driver's license, and a passport for a car.

 

On the same day, he was taken to some military unit stationed in Vienna, where he was interrogated in detail about his personality and the circumstances connected with the flight from the Soviet Army. And on the third day, he was handed over to the Americans.

 

He told the French about his desire to go to America during the interrogations. On September 12, 1951, two Americans came to the location of the French military unit where he was, offered him to sit in a car with them, and took him to their sector. Within four days after that, he arrived in Vienna; he was taken by plane to Munich.

 

He told the Americans everything he knew about the Soviet military unit in which he served, the field mail number, and where it is located. He gave the Americans information about the company's strength, named its officers, and provided characterizing data on some of them.

    

Despite this, the Americans persistently and thoroughly interrogated him in Munich until September 27. At the same time, they intimidated him in every possible way and emphasized that he was allegedly an agent of Soviet intelligence.

 

Convinced that he was a traitor to the Motherland and, in his criminal past, an utterly suitable candidate for espionage tasks, the Americans offered him the chance to become an agent of the US intelligence agencies and carry out espionage work against the Soviet Union on their instructions. They let him know that there was no other way out for him.

 

He agreed to become an American spy, although he had not previously thought of establishing a connection with foreign intelligence. They offered him to become an agent of the US intelligence agencies and carry out espionage work against the Soviet Union on their instructions. 

 

He attempted to evade espionage work, citing his lack of education, but the Americans said they would train him specially.

 

No written obligation was taken away from him at the time of recruitment. For the Americans, his testimony was enough that he had twice deserted from the Soviet Army, and having contacted them, he gave out information about the military unit known to him. All this was possible and related to the means of his recruitment. 

 

After he agreed to cooperate with American intelligence, the Americans gave him the nickname "Vladimir" and sent him to an intelligence school, where they photographed him and took his fingerprints. After graduating from the intelligence school, on the eve of being thrown into the USSR, he signed an obligation stating that the Americans would monthly deposit 700 dollars in his name to the Munich Bank for subversive work in the Soviet Union. He was warned that he would be sentenced to eight years in prison for disclosing this money deal with the Americans.

    

Yanka (Ivan Andreevich) Filistovich, a Cold War Belorussian Tragic Hero, Part Three ©

As we have seen, during the night of September 24-25, 1951,  Filistovich was parachuted into Belarus and landed near the village of Panyatichi (see map). He buried his parachute, hid most of the other materials, and spent the night in the forest. On the third day, he went to the village. He met his uncle, told him about his mission, and slept in the barn. A week later, they went to retrieve the parachute and other materials. 

Filistovich wanted to meet some local anti-Soviet partisans, but they did not know or trust him. He decided to go to Vilnius, Lithuania, and did not approach the partisans until Spring 1952. He went to Vilnius as a first step to go to Grodno and eventually cross the border as part of the exfiltration plan. 

He stayed with another uncle in Vilnius for a while. Both of them went to Grodno to meet someone who could guide him across the border. He stayed there for two days and gave up the idea of crossing the border due to increased security. He returned to Vilnius and again stayed with his uncle. Using the blood/water method, he wrote his first secret-writing letter from Vilnius. He used the Paris address he had. Filistovich's twelve-year-old nephew wrote the clear text, but Soviet authorities intercepted the letter. 

Filistovich would write five more letters, the last one on July 15, 1952. But all of them were intercepted and not sent to Paris. CIA never had contact with him. He signed all letters with "Long Live Belarus!"

On or about November 20, 1951, he left his uncle and went to an aunt in Perslov. He stayed with her for about one-and-a-half months. There he met his sister, who had come to visit the family. He gave her 700 rubles before they said goodbye.

In January 1952, he again went to Lithuania before returning to his uncle in Panyatichi in March.

On May 3, 1952, he finally met up with a local partisan group and successfully convinced them he was not a Communist agent provocateur. There were only four partisans. He gave them some rubles, one of his two pistols, and two Belorussian newspapers published abroad. In July, he finally joined the partisans as an accepted member.

The partisans decided to publish appeals, newspapers, etc. but they had no printing equipment. So on June 25, 1952, they broke into a local printing house and stole some equipment, ink, and newsprint. They then burned down the printing house. 

Eventually, Filistovich ran out of money. At the end of August 1952, the partisans robbed two financial agents for five thousand rubles and one thousand rubles, respectively.

Again on the move, Filistovich went to the village of Yamolichi. He found a house that he had visited before. He was sick, and the house owner arranged to get him medicine. He also notified the local security authorities about Filistovich. Over dinner on September 9, 1952, Filistovich was given a cup of tea, but It turned out not to be with medicine but sleeping powder. He fell asleep. About thirteen MGB officers had surrounded the house in anticipation of using force to capture him. He was then transported to prison.

Filistovich was interrogated in Minsk almost daily from September 10, 1952, until January 14. 1953.

The trial against him began on October 17, 1953, and lasted three weeks. He was found guilty and sentenced to death on November 4-5, 1953. He appealed the decision, but the verdict was not overturned. The exact date of his execution is unknown—some believe it took place on November 22, 1953; others believe he was executed on March 19, 1954. 

In March 1958, a CIA review of the Byelorussian National Council included these comments:  

The somewhat over-burdened Filistovich was presumed to have sent one S/W communication, and then all trace of him was lost. He was declared dead after a two-year waiting period. 

In May 1957, a series of articles entitled Along the Wolve's Path" appeared in the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. The narrative revealed, for the first time, that the Soviets had apprehended Filistovich The articles, written with the usual anti-capitalistic tirades, employing vehement references to Fascist attempts to disrupt the unparalleled harmony of the Soviet Union through subterfuge, ended with the thought that the eternal vigilance of the Soviet citizen in his quest for the Socialist State will prevail. 

It was almost impossible to determine the time Filistovich was apprehended. The tenor of the articles was more fiction than fact. The extensive use of poetic bromides as copy fillers indicated that the Soviets were unsure about the details of the Filistovich dispatch, how long he had operated, or whom he had contacted. To cloud the authenticity of any intelligence the Agency may have received from Filistovich. The articles created the image that Filistovich had been apprehended almost immediately after dispatch.

 

 

 

 

 

Yanka (Ivan Andreevich) Filistovich, a Cold War Belorussian tragic Hero, Part Two

Yanka (Ivan Andreevich) Filistovich was born on January 14, 1926, in the village of Panyatichi, Maladzyechna volost, Vileyka district, Vilna voivodeship (now Vileyka district, Minsk region), Byelorussia. In his own words:

 

In 1943, while living in the German-occupied territory of Western Byelorussia, I was mobilized to serve in a German military formation in the so-called thirteenth battalion, which I did until the retreat of the Germans, i.e., before July 1944, as an ordinary soldier. 

 

Together with the battalion, I retreated to the territory of Poland and then was soon transferred to Italy, where, as part of the battalion, I took part in battles against the Anglo-American troops in the Forli region. 

 

As part of one company of the battalion mentioned above, from Italy, on January 6-7, 1945, I arrived in Czechoslovakia, where I did not participate in hostilities. Soon I, among three colleagues, was arrested by the Germans and imprisoned in the city of Pardubice - Czechoslovakia. I was released from prison on May 8, 1945, by Soviet troops. Soon I moved to the territory of Poland and got a job there as a secretary of the commune in the town of Staraya Kamenica. 

 

By September 1945, I returned to Czechoslovakia, and soon, around October of the same year, I moved to the American zone of occupation of Germany. I first ended up in a Polish refugee camp near the city of Nuremberg. Here I managed to enter a school that allowed me to get a matriculation certificate, but soon I was unlucky. The camp began to be disbanded, the Poles were oppressed, and I was forced to leave for Paris. I entered a Polish theological seminary in Paris, which I soon had to leave to because of the difference in religion and national origin. Continuing my stay in Paris by 1947, I completed a six-month course for electricians and a course for tool-makers.

 

In 1947, I managed to enter Sorbonne University at the Faculty of History while working in the library, earning a living. In 1948, on the initiative of several students from among Byelorussians, including myself, a Byelorussian youth nationalist organization was created in Paris under the name “Byelorussian Independent Youth Organization” (“BNAM”), whose chairman I was elected. At the same time, I was appointed editor of the Youth magazine, the organ of the above organization. Living in Paris since 1945, I had the opportunity to meet with prominent Byelorussian nationalists. 

 

In 1951, due to some deterioration in my financial situation, I left for Belgium to continue my studies. I was then recruited to work for American intelligence.

 

He was taken from Belgium to Munich in the middle of August 1951. He was then trained in for approximately one month.

 

Filistovich lived approximately 10 miles from the training area outside Munich and received as much of his training away from the main training area as possible. The only exception to this was the parachute and jump training. For this, he was taken blindfolded to and from the training area, and while there, he was exposed to a minimum of Americans. He was told to refrain from fraternizing with local residents, not to use local restaurants and cafes, and in general from becoming known in any way to those in the surrounding area of his residence. His recreation took place on a designated day each week in an area removed from both the Munich training area and his home. During this recreation period, he was always be accompanied by the CIA case officer. When on field training, Filistovich wore US Army clothing and was always accompanied by the CIA ease officer, who was also wearing US Army clothes. 

Filistovich’s Tasks as seen by CIA: 

• Filistovich will endeavor to establish contact with Byelorussian partisan groups in the area mentioned above and with their aid, to establish support bases for us for future operations. 
• Besides knowing the area in which he is to operate as well as knowing the people and the alleged partisans there, Filistovich will be provided with leads as well as photographs and documents from the BNR with which to establish his bonafide with those he is to contact. 
• In the event Filistovich is unable to make contact with the Byelorussian partisans, he will attempt to set up his own support base, relying in this case on aid from relatives) friends, and those he may be able to bribe with token gifts such as wristwatches, money, etc. 
• Filistovich feels certain that he will be able to contact the partisans, but in the event, he fails, feels certain that he can fulfill his mission of setting up a support base and remaining in the area indefinitely. (The area in which he will operate is a sparsely settled wood and swamp country, ideal for concealment over a long period of time.) In the event, 
• Filistovich succeeds in tither contacting the partisans and/or independently establishing himself safely in the area, he will make periodic visits to larger cities such as Minsk, Ablodechno, Vilna, and Vileka, to gather any intelligence information requested by us, or to merely report on the general conditions, etc. For this task, Filistovich will travel at night and remain in any large city for only a short time. If possible will also make photographs of military and industrial installations as well as of any other interesting intelligence objects. 
• A sub-task, which will also be carried out by Filistovich, is that of gathering document intelligence. Here, he will gather and report on existing or current passports, dates of issue, printing dates, etc. 
• Filistovich will also pave the way for his later return in either the later part of September 1951 or the ear]y part of October 1951. This will consist of organizing a reception committee, ground to air signals, etc., and possibly training one of his friends in secret writing to communicate with us during his absence. 

 

He was not trained in radio or morse code communication.

For the operation, he received a German machine gun, a Belgian four-shot pistol of 6.35 mm caliber, forty thousand in Soviet rubles, ten thousand Polish zlotys, more than one thousand German marks of the Soviet occupation zone of Germany, one thousand American dollars, four wristwatches, and a small alarm clock. He was also supplied with a large number of topographic maps of the western regions of Byelorussia, a Leica camera, binoculars, compass, and a pocket flashlight. 

 

In addition, he received

 

• Secret writing instruction and equipment.
• Radio Communication apparatus for burial and later retrieval
• Documents showing him to be a member of the Soviet Army on leave in Byelorussia from East Germany. If it is possible for a Red Army officer to be in civilian clothes when on leave, then a Soviet Army uniform will not be needed. 
• As an alternative, documents showing him to be a resident of a town or city of his choice. 
• Dog repellant chemicals to ward off dogs reportedly used by the Soviet police in tracking down partisans and border crossers. 
• Money to be used in Byelorussia for living expenses and bribery purposes and to aid him in exfiltrating across either Poland or Czechoslovakia into Germany. 
• Current situation report on Byelorussia including travel controls, border controls, restricted or forbidden zones, personalities, prices, etc. 

 

On the night of September 24-25,  1951 Ivan (Yanka) Filistovich was parachuted into Byelorussia from an unmarked plane flown by Polish pilots. The plan was to have Filistovich remain in Byelorussia for one month or less, exfiltrate via Poland to Germany, and then be dispatched again.