Code Name "Cobra": The Plan to Bomb Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty©

The Carlos bombing of RFE(RL in Munich in February 1981 was considered a failure by the Romanian Intelligence Service and they planned another attack.  Here are some details. 

In September 1984, Constantin Constantinescu, a code clerk of the Romanian embassy in Bonn, defected to the West. To establish his bona fides, he presented a copy of a thirteen-page physical surveillance report of RFE/RL written by the Romanian foreign intelligence service (CIE) officer Ion Constantin sometime between October and December 1983. Constantinescu indicated that he could "save" a copy of this report from destruction as he saw its significance, and there was a breakdown in the normal destruction process.

 

Of extreme interest was the physical description of the wall of RFE/RL along the main street Oettingengtrasse and analysis of the working of the entrance and exit gates of RFE/RL. This report was not necessarily accurate in this regard. Nor was it regarding the location and use of the CCTV cameras on the building. One could conclude: the surveillance conducted at the front of the building was limited due to fear of detection. The summary of the debriefing also mentioned that the surveillance report contained references to "certain offices on the first floor." Presumably, these "certain offices on the first floor" referred to the Romanian Service of RFE/RL.

 

Constantinescu said he believed that the headquarters in Bucharest “was collecting information on the radio station to carry out intimidating acts against the personnel in the station’s Romanian section.” And he did not believe that there was interest “in having the facility seriously damaged.”

 

Also of interest in the debriefing summary was the mention of the headquarters group in Bucharest responsible for organizing "physical attacks on anti–Romanian personnel abroad" and the words "usually hires foreigners to carry out the operations themselves." Constantinescu lacked other knowledge of contemplated action against RFE/R; he had not seen any additional telex information or other written reports on RFE/RL or individual Romanian Service members of RFE/RL.

 

In December 1983, one or two days before leaving for temporary duty to Bucharest, Ion Constantin handed Constantinescu documents for destruction. Usually, both he and Constantin should have destroyed them together. But Constantin was in a hurry and left the material with Constantinescu to destroy. When Constantinescu saw the report on RFE/RL, he immediately realized the report's importance and retained it. He did not hear anyone besides Constantin discuss this topic at the Romanian missions in Cologne and Bonn.

 

Constantin's thirteen-page report and sketch, which the defector brought out, was a physical surveillance report on the RFE/RL, including:

• traffic in the area,

• traffic signs and parking,

• RFE/RL and the wall surrounding it,

• the different entrances and gates,

• certain offices on the first floor,

• the presence of specific security personnel and other installations in the immediate area.

 

Constantin concluded his report by noting that he had collected different city plans, tour books, and postcards. He attached them to the report as an appendix, which also contained twenty-four photos of RFE/RL and its immediate surroundings (Hilton Hotel, Bavarian Bank, Isar River, etc.). Constantin wrote in his report that he had walked through the entire area.

 

From discussions with Constantin, the defector learned about a group at CIE Headquarters, designated C-428, which dealt with such "diversionary" acts as physical attacks on anti–Romanian personnel abroad. C-428 depended on CIE residencies abroad to collect information in support of its plans but usually hired foreigners to carry out the operations themselves. Constantin had received instructions, presumably originally from C-428, to collect detailed information on the RFE/RL facility in Munich, referred to by the code name "Cobra." Constantinescu recalled that Constantin remarked: "They want to place bombs at the Radio Station."

 

Constantinescu learned that similar surveillance reports on the RFE/RL facility had also been submitted to C-428 by Constantin Ciobanu, the CIE resident, and Dan Mihoc, a CIE officer, both at the Romanian embassy in Bonn. In December 1983, while in Bucharest, Constantin was given two days of briefing by C-428 and was shown the reports from Ciobanu and Mihoc. Even though his report had been evaluated as "good," Constantin was asked to obtain additional information of interest (Constantin did not elaborate on this). In 1984, Constantin made two more trips to Munich, where he asked one of his collaborators to help him in this project.

 

In November 1984, the German government ordered the expulsion of the above-named “diplomats.” Media coverage was intense. For example, the German newspaper Die Welt’s detailed article on the expulsion contained this ominous reference to Dan Mihoc: “His superiors in Bucharest ordered Mihoc in January this year to buy a set of specialist medical works about poisons that autopsies could not trace, and he sent the volumes to the Romanian capital."

 

The Bavarian State Counterintelligence Agency’s Annual Report for 1984 contained this remark:

 

When an intelligence officer of the Romanian Embassy in Bonn defected to the West in 1984, important information was obtained on the activities of the Romanian Intelligence Service on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. The defector presented evidence of the preparation and the actual carrying out of criminal activities with a political background by the Intelligence Service, represented by officers of the Romanian Foreign Intelligence Service CIE who had diplomatic status with the Romanian Embassy in Bonn.

October 15, 1951, Parachuting CIA Chestnuts into Albania ©

 On October 15, 1951, CIA's "Chestnut Team" of five men parachuted into Albania shortly after midnight on Mli Grab (hill 1275), approximately three kilometers away from their scheduled drop zone. The terrain was mountainous and wooded with no reasonably safe landing zone. The leader, Sal Kepi, hesitated before jumping after realizing this was not the scheduled drop zone. Still, when the number two man asked why he was delaying his jump, he responded by immediately jumping. The others followed him down.

The team landed on the side of a snow-covered mountain. Sal Kepi sprained both heels; Mitar Hagjija landed in a tree. The other three men landed without casualties. The bundles landed about a mile away; several had landed on trees and were left where they had fallen. It took the men approximately two hours to assemble. Afterward, the leader, who was the only team member familiar with the drop area, told his men that he was not altogether familiar with this present location. 

The team walked in single file, headed by Sulejman Elezi, who took over the lead because of the foot injuries suffered by Kepi. The latter was Immediately behind Elezi. At 6 a.m. October 15, while still walking in single file, the team was fired upon by the Communists. The battle lasted until 4 p.m. October 15, when they managed to escape the area. It was believed that one of the Communists was wounded. Duka's clothing' was hit by a bullet, but there were nobody injuries. At this point, the three men who managed to escape lost all contact with the other two men. What happened to them was not known 

On October 16, they went to a small isolated house to ask for food. A woman came to the door but refused to give them any help. She told them that although she was not a Communist, she and her family would be in danger if the three men remained. She asked them to leave. They only managed to rescue a little food from their bundles and were hungry. The woman refused to take any gold or dollars and did not assist them further.

On October 16, while only one kilometer from the border, they came across two sleeping soldiers. Because they did not know how far from the border they were, they proceeded quietly. A short time before this, the men waded across a small river (name unknown). Here, Ilias Jonus lost his forged identification papers as well as his gold pieces. Duka and Hagfifa managed to save their documents, although Hagfifals papers were slightly damaged by water. 

They crossed the border into Yugoslavia about three days after making their landing in Albania. 

They continued their trip to the Greek border and made their crossing on October 30, near Kastrican, Greece. The crossing took place without incident. The Greek border patrol attempted to interrogate the men (through an Albanian interpreter), but the attempt stopped when Liman Duka, the spokesman, refused to answer anything. They immediately gave themselves up to the Greek authorities by using the code password. 

A later CIA report criticized this operation:

The report indicates that almost from the time the team landed, their efforts were directed wholly at survival and evasion. Aside from the fact that three of the five members of the team were recovered, no other tangible results are indicated and the mission should probably be termed a failure in terms of men lost and time and money spent 

Khrushchev and Radio Free Europe, Part 5: "Sticking a Pinprick into an Elephant" ©

Nikita Khrushchev visited the United States for the second time in September-October 1960 for the United Nations General Assembly meetings. Reportedly, at one point, he angrily stood up with a shoe in his hand and banged the shoe on the table at which he was sitting. I use the word "reportedly" because there is no photo or film of Khrushchev banging on the table with a shoe—although photojournalists, film, and television crews packed the Assembly auditorium. The incident, in any event, has become another bit of Cold War folklore.

 

On 9 October 1960, he gave his only US interview in a WNTA television program Open Air moderated in New York by television personality David Susskind.  The program was broadcast on a delayed, syndicated basis over more than 250 TV and radio stations of the NTA network (National Telefilm Associates). Hundreds of viewers phoned the studio to protest Khrushchev's appearance. 

 

And, other viewers called to complain about spot announcements during the program, which extolled the work of Radio Free Europe: the time ordinarily given to sponsored commercials was devoted to filmed announcements about RFE. One depicted a  soldier smashing a radio set belonging to a family listening to Radio Free Europe. 

Susskind later said that Khrushchev "just got rigid with anger" when an aide passed him a note during the show telling him about the Radio Free-Europe spot announcements. 

 

Victor Sukhadrev, his interpreter, relayed Khrushchev's comment in the next station break: "How dare you!" But after a few seconds, the Soviet leader calmed down and smiled. "Well, do anything you like. We will win. We will win." Susskind later apologized to Khrushchev, saying he knew nothing of the RFE commercials.

 

According to a UPI report published on 11 October 1960, Khrushchev said his aide handed him a note during the Sunday television appearance advising him that public service announcements for Radio Free Europe were broadcast during station breaks. He added, "I spoke to my partner (moderator David Susskind) about it. I told him what you are trying to do—you are trying to stick a pinprick into an elephant—a mighty elephant, the Soviet Union."

 

On 17 October 1960, television station WNTA apologized for carrying anti-communist announcements during the interview with Khrushchev. The announcer noted that "last night that many viewers had questioned the propriety of the Radio Free Europe announcements." He added, "While we believe that the content of these announcements, an eloquent plea for free speech, is worthy of exposure on our radio and TV stations, we wish to express our regret al their unfortunate placement on the particular program on which Mr. Khrushchev was a guest."

 

October 1, 1985, Radio Free Afghanistan began broadcasting ©

 One of the forgotten chapters in the Cold War history is that the United States first broadcast shortwave radio programs to Afghanistan as Radio Free Afghanistan on October 1, 1985. RFA's broadcasts began with a reading from the Koran.

It was the height of the Cold War when the Soviet Union was fighting insurgents in that country. The Soviet Union had first sent its army to Afghanistan on Christmas eve 1979 when it intervened to support the "Communist" government against the American-supported Afghan Islamic fighters: the mujahedeen.

 

RFE/RL, the American financed station RFE/RL in Munich, Germany, expanded, for the first time in over 30 years, its broadcasting services outside the target areas of East Europe and the USSR. RFE/RL broadcast to Afghanistan extensive war coverage in Dari--one of the significant languages in Afghanistan as an adjunct of the Radio Liberty Division. Radio Free Afghanistan broadcast twice weekly Dari 30-minute programs and expanded its broadcasting to one hour daily, five days a week in 1986.  

 

  A second language, Pashto, was added in September 1987. RFE/RL's mandate was "to provide uncensored news and information about the war in Afghanistan and to serve as a free surrogate radio for the Afghan resistance."  

 

  Then RFE/RL President Gene Pell said, "The people of Afghanistan continue to wage a gallant resistance to the Soviet occupation.  These broadcasts are an important measure of the U.S. government's commitment to that struggle and the principle of political self-determination ... Although it is difficult to broadcast to a war-torn country, RFA maintains a proper journalistic tone and approach, favoring a free, united, independent, and Muslim Afghanistan." 

 

As part of RFE/RL's "phase down" and Congressional budget cutting after the Cold War ended with the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union in 1991, Radio Free Afghanistan broadcast its last program on October 19, 1993, with, "It was proud to be part of the struggle against the Soviet occupation and that the Service always endeavored to bring freedom, peace, and democracy to Afghanistan."

 

RFE/RL Renews Broadcasting To Afghanistan

 

The United States Congress in December 2001 approved funding to resume broadcasts to Afghanistan as part of the post-September 11, 2001, "war on terrorism."

 

On January 30, 2002, RFE/RL, now located in Prague, Czech Republic, launched broadcasting to Afghanistan in the Dari and Pashto languages. At a brief opening ceremony in Prague, RFE/RL President Thomas A. Dine said, "we are proud to be given this opportunity to help build a peaceful and democratic Afghanistan through the medium of news and information." 

CIA's Use of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) in its Quest for strategic Information about the USSR in the early Cold War, Part One ©

" I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma ..."

Winston Churchill 

Beginning with this posting, I will be looking at CIA’s use of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) by infiltrating agents into the USSR in its quest for strategic information in the early Cold War.

REDSOX was CIA’s cryptonym for Operations involving the illegal return of defectors and emigres to the USSR as agents to infiltrate the USSR. Most REDSOX agent candidates were recruited from the estimated two million World War II displaced persons (DPs) of Slavic origin located in Europe. CIA‘s Soviet Russia (SR) Division infiltrated at least fifty REDSOX agents into the Soviet Union -- another estimate is that 85 agents were infiltrated via parachutes, land, or sea. 

CIA’s Combined Soviet Operations Branch (CSOB) in Munich, Germany was responsible for the dispatching of agents into the USSR.  The majority of these operations were directed against Western Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the Baltic countries and were "essentially one-way operations with few adequate provisions for exfiltration", i.e., they did not come back. According to one CIA report, “One chronic drawback during this period was that the Soviet authorities shrewdly revealed the capture and compromise of many of our agents in the newspapers.” 

In 1952, the CIA created the Domestic Operations Branch (DOB), cryptonym AEACRE, to support operations of the Office of Special Operations (OSO) and Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). The purpose of the Basic Plan of AEACRE was, 

To provide for the establishment of a Domestic Operations Base in or near Washington for the interrogation, assessment, training, briefing, and preparation for dispatch of agents for infiltration into the USSR. An increasing number of problems relative to operational security is hampering REDSOX training activities in Germany, Japan, and Turkey. Since the pool of possible agent recruits is diminishing in Europe, as a result of immigration, a large part of the recruiting will now have to be done in the Western Hemisphere.

In 1953, responsibility for the recruiting and training agents was transferred to the Domestic Operations Branch (DOB) in the United States. One reason being that processing of Soviet defectors showed that seven out of ten defectors were discovered to be Soviet agents sent to the West.

From 1953 to 1955, only a few REDSOX operations were launched, and only three agents were dispatched in 1953 and none in 1954. In 1955, the planning and execution of REDSOX operations were renewed as exclusive DOB projects. The following are summaries of some of the projects:

1.     Project AESCOUTER: This operation was a joint Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS)/CIA maritime penetration of the Northwestern USSR to gather photographic intelligence on a high-priority Soviet airfield. The training of two Norwegian citizens recruited by the NIS and one NIS case officer was completed successfully. In/exfiltration will be by maritime means with an alternate overland exfiltration possibility. The operation will be mounted in the late summer of 1956, as soon as darkness conditions permit. 

 

2.     Project AECANARY: This was a double-agent operation for the buildup and the acquisition of Counter-Espionage information and incidental Foreign Intelligence information. DOB assessed, trained, and dispatched the agent as a typical REDSOX border crossing agent. This agent's preparation presented many unique handling, training, and security problems. He was dispatched across the Turkish/USSR border in the summer of 1955 

 

3.     Project AENICKLE: It was an attempt to use a recent young Soviet Army defector to recruit a Soviet citizen in place. The Soviet to be recruited as an engineer in a Moscow jet-aircraft engine plant and a friend of the agent's father. The agent, AENICKLE, was declared a bona fide defector by Defector Refugee Center in Frankfurt on 8 September. He was favorably reassessed and re-polygraphed by field case officers before his move to the U.S. As was standard DOB practice, he was reinterrogated and assessed on his arrival at DOB. The interrogation revealed hitherto undiscovered discrepancies in this agent's story. The Office of Security, the Counter Intelligence Staff, and the FBI were advised. 

 

4.     Project AEDRLFTER: This is an approved project developed by DOB to provide balloon equipment and facilities in Iran to infiltrate agents into the Soviet Union. The project was implemented in Iran by one SR staff officer with the knowledge and consent of the Shah of Iran. 

 

5.     Project AEPISTOL: This joint Iranian Intelligence Service/CIA low-level border crossing project was developed with AEACRE funds and supported from Headquarters by DOB case officers. It aimed to gather operational intelligence and establish a covert apparatus in the Soviet Turkmen area East of the Caspian Sea. Two agents have already been recruited, trained, and dispatched. They were successfully exfiltrated debriefed in the field. 

 

6.     Project Turkish REDSOX: At the request of the Turkish Intelligence Service and the (redacted), DOB supported five REDSOX operations mounted or run by the Turkish Intelligence Service. Support consisted mainly of documentation, legends, operational and area briefing, clothing, and limited finances. DOB case officers worked on this project both at Headquarters and on TDY in the field. The operations were instrumental in producing vitally necessary recent documents from the Georgian SSR and some operational and positive intelligence. One two-man team was successfully exfiltrated. 

 

7.     Project AERODYNAMIC: AERODYNAMIC was an active SR project for the past seven years and has supported the dispatch of all REDSOX agents into Soviet Ukraine. It provided financial support for the mechanism by which pouched material was brought out by underground couriers and provided the intelligence community with information of Ukrainian underground activities; the structure, aims, and personalities of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA); and the underground government, the Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR). DOB took the initiative to renew the REDSOX portions of this project. 

 

8.     Project AEPRIMER: This project is an outgrowth of the combined AEQUOR Foreign Intelligence (FI) and Political and Psychological (PP) program directed at the Byelorussian SSR. The earlier version of AEPRIMER, AEQUOR/FI, was responsible for the dispatch of five action agents into Byelorussia and established a working relationship with the leading Byelorussian emigre organization for the continuation of covert activities.

 

9.     Project ALOPECIA: This cryptonym has been given to a single contact in Brazil operating among the Ukrainian emigres. It was anticipated that his activities would be expanded to include all of South America, making him the focal point for the spotting and preliminary assessment of any action-type candidates used in Ukrainian REDSOX operations. 

 

10. Project AECUPBOARD: This is a pilot project for which approval was recently requested. It was an attempt to set up an overt package mail channel with persons in the Soviet Union. By tapping correspondence with persons who were active in the old Ukrainian underground movement, it is hoped that material, funds, and instructions could eventually be sent to persons in Ukrainian SSR. 

 

Details of some of these projects will follow in subsequent posts.

The Case of Premsyl Barak, Code Name "Albort" ©

The 1980s witnessed a new generation of intelligence agents at RFE/RL. On September 18, 1988, RFE’s Czechoslovak Service freelancer Premsyl Barak ( Code Name “Albort”) confessed to RFE/RL that he had been spying for the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service (StB) and that he was under threat from the CIS for refusing to continue doing so. For four years (1984–88), while employed as a freelancer, he reported on all RFE/RL's Czechoslovak Service activities and other émigrés living in Germany. He met at least twenty-three times with his handler, a diplomat out of Bonn's West German Czechoslovak Embassy. He received about DM 25,000 for his information.

In his later sworn testimony to German police, Barak said that he volunteered to work for the StB shortly after the return of former employee Pavel Minarik in 1976. Barak was looking for adventure and was intrigued by the Minarik story about how he had spied at RFE from 1968 to 1976. Barak stated that he was trained in "spycraft " from 1978 to 1982, with interruptions while traveling abroad as a musician for Czechoslovak musical groups. At one point, to establish his credentials in the West, under the StB supervision, he brought out supposed samizdat documents. He handed them over to an émigré writer living in West Germany, who wrote an article from the material he received.

 

The purpose of Barak's preparations and training in Czechoslovakia and traveling to meet with émigrés in the West was to get him ready to join RFE/RL in Munich. From here, he would supply the StB with internal documents, information about personnel, and various émigré groups:

Besides the previously mentioned documents, which I passed on to my contact officer, I also passed him personal notes and information about people who worked in the Czech. Dept. or belonged to Czech. émigré groups outside RFE. Besides the previously mentioned documents, which I passed on to my contact officer, I also passed him personal notes and information about people who worked in the Czech. It was part of my tasking to collect all data, personal and professional, about these people. Additionally, I received specific concrete tasking from either "Vladimir" or "Ludek” to gather additional information about particular people in whom they were interested.

On Friday, June 9, 1989, Barak's trial ended when he was found guilty and placed on probation for two years. The reason for the light sentence was that there was no evidence of any specific damage because of his activities, he had voluntarily gone to the police, and he fully cooperated with the authorities.

 

Barak was not encouraged to work full-time for RFE/RL but only work as a freelancer, and therefore he would not be under any supervisory control. As a freelancer, he would be free to come and go as he wanted, including Sundays—when he was most active. Barak admitted stealing RFE/RL stationery and envelopes, and he assisted in the distribution of anonymous letters against the former Czechoslovak Service director and other employees of that service in 1988.

For more information, see Chapter 8 in: 

September 4, 1950, Eisenhower’s Nationwide Radio Appeal for the First Crusade for Freedom ©

U.S. Army General and future U.S. President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower passionately called for an American Crusade for Freedom, in a nationwide radio broadcast, covered by the four major radio networks, from Denver, Colorado, on September 4, 1950: 

I speak tonight about the Crusade For Freedom. 

This Crusade is a campaign sponsored by private American citizens to fight the big lie with the big truth. It is a program that has been hailed by President Truman, and others, as an essential step in getting the case for freedom heard by the world's multitudes. 

Powerful Communist radio stations incessantly tell the world that we Americans are physically soft and morally corrupt; that we are disunited and confused; that we are selfish and cowardly; that we have nothing to offer the world but imperialism and exploitation. 

To combat these evil broadcasts the government has established a radio program called the Voice of America, which has brilliantly served the cause of freedom, but the Communist stations overpower it and outflank it with daily coverage that neglects no wavelength or dialect, no prejudice or local aspiration. Weaving a fantastic pattern of lies and twisted fact, they confound the listener into believing that we are warmongers, that America invaded North Korea, that Russia invented the airplane, that the Soviets, unaided won World War II; and that the secret police and slave camps of Communism offer humanity brighter hope than do self-government and free enterprise. 

We need powerful radio stations abroad, operated without government restrictions, to tell in a vivid and convincing form about the decency and essential fairness of democracy These stations must tell of our aspirations for peace, our hatred of war, our support of the United Nations and our constant readiness to cooperate with any and all who have these same desires 

One such private station Radio Free Europe —is now in operation in Western Germany. It daily brings a message of hope and encouragement to a small part of the European masses. 

Freedom Scroll 

In this broadcast, Eisenhower called on all Americans to sign the “Freedom Scroll,” with a “Declaration of Freedom,” which read: 

I believe in the sacredness and dignity of the individual.

I believe that all men derive the right to freedom equally from God.

I pledge to resist aggression and tyranny wherever they appear on earth.

I am proud to enlist in the Crusade for Freedom.

I am proud to help make the freedom Bell possible, to be a signer of this Declaration of Freedom, to have my name included as a permanent part of the Freedom Shrine in Berlin, and to join with the millions of men and women throughout the world who hold the cause of freedom sacred. 

Ike's September 4, 1950, address is an archetypal example of Cold War discourse inasmuch as it features: 

·      stark polarizations (truth vs. lies, peace vs. war, democracy vs. communism, liberty vs. slavery, death vs. life); 

·      fear appeals (secret police, slave camps, blackout, executed, blank page in history, cold-blooded betrayal); 

·      biblical allusions (birthright, venom, hissing, faith, God, devilish, bondage, sacrifice, doctrine); 

·      images of death (dying, poison, mastery of life and soul, lose American birthright, mortal fear); 

·      use of ultimate terms (freedom, God, democracy, progress, liberty, truth); 

·      savagery of the enemy (hissing, hating tirade, godless depravity, aggression and tyranny, predatory military force, ruthless men); 

·      righteousness of America (freedom, readiness to cooperate, opportunity, human happiness, hope, encouragement, peaceful intent, decent motives, decency and essential fairness); 

·      fragility of liberty (take up arms in defense of liberty, defense of freedom, destroy free government, destroy our system, destroy human liberty, overpower it and outflank it, defense of our way of life, guard it with vigilance and defend it with fortitude and faith).

Source: Martin J. Medhurst, “Eisenhower and the Crusade for Freedom: the rhetorical Origins of a Cold War Campaign,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1997.

For more information about the Crusade for Freedom, Freedom Scrolls, and Eisenhower's support, see: