August 21, 2018

RFE’s Ionel Corniiu (Cornel) Chiriac (1942-1975): The Tragic Life and Death of a Murdered Romanian Disc Jockey ©

As the story goes, on August 21, 1968, a popular, young disc jockey at Radio Bucharest emotionally reacted to the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia by surreptitiously inserting a recording of the Beetle’s song “Back in the USRR” in his playlist -- all music broadcast over Radio Bucharest had to be cleared by a censor in advance. By playing this song, the disc jockey was fired. Some months later, he escaped Romania, eventually joined Radio Free Europe and became one of RFE’s most famous disc jockeys, playing jazz and pop music back to his homeland.

Below we will briefly look at the life and death of this iconic Romanian disc jockey.

Ionel Corneliu (Cornel) Chiriac was born in Uspenka, Bessarabia, on May 9, 1942. He and his family moved to Pitesti, Romania, where he attended public school. In 1962, he moved to Bucharest and for three years studied Romanian Grammar and Languages at the Pedagological Institute.

Reportedly, when he was 12 years old, he first heard jazz music played by legendary disc jockey Willis Conover over Voice of America short-wave broadcasts. The influence was so strong that on his application for employment with Radio Free Europe, he gave Willis Conover as one of his references.

Jazz was forbidden music in the 1950s in Romania. By the early 1960s, jazz was no longer forbidden and in 1963, Chiriac became the first disc jockey to play jazz over the radio. Jazz clubs sprang up in Bucharest and Chiriac would play music and participate in discussion groups about jazz.

By the middle of the 1960s, pop/rock music was gaining popularity in Romania and Chiriac was Radio Bucharest’s first pop/music disc jockey. His program was called Metronom and was heard at 5:15 pm to 6 pm. He was able to get records from the American Embassy and due to his good knowledge of English, translated the lyrics into Romanian for his listeners. (On his 1969 employment application for RFE, he listed three American Embassy persons at the American Embassy in Bucharest.)

For the first time, young Romanian listeners had a contrast  of freedom to Communist propaganda. This brought him into conflict with the censors but apparently not enough to cause his termination.  

In the summer of 1968, his radio show was called Metronom 68 and was heard live daily from Hotel Flora in Mamala on the Black Sea. Chiriac would afterwards meet his listeners and they would drink and discuss music throughout the night. 

After the invasion of Czechoslovakia, there was censorship of texts and less Western pop/rock music played over Radio Bucharest. His show was canceled and jazz music reintroduced.  Chiriac learned of a jazz congress in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia and made an application to attend.  He used the services of a famous graphic artist Zica Barol to change the title of the application to Bratislava and Austria. Chiriac then received official permission to travel to Bratislava and Austria. He traveled with a group of 40 others to Bratislava, attended the jazz congress and took a train to Austria, where he applied for political asylum and was sent to a refugee camp in Traiskirchen.

Chiriac then wrote a letter to Radio Free Europe in March 1969, in which he complained that RFE did not broadcast to the youth of Romania and he would gladly go to Munich and present a music program. At that time, pop music was not broadcast in the belief that the acoustics of short wave were not favorable to such music.  The Romanian Broadcast Service director Noel Bernard read the letter and decided to send one of the younger staff members Max Banush to Austria to meet Chiriac and make an assessment of his possible use by RFE. 

Banush fouind him at the refugee camp and after an interview decided he would be right for the RFE broadcasts to the young generation. Chiriac’s application for asylum was still pending and he could not leave Austria. Banush decided to take Chiriac to Germany without permission of the Austrians government. At night and in the rain they drove to the border and Chiriac got out of the car before the checkpoint and unseen crossed over the border to Germany. Banush then passed through the border control and tried to find Chiriac. After at least one hour, he found Chiriac soaked to the skin from the rain and they drove on to Munich.

On June 2, 1969, Cornel Chiriac broadcast his first daily Radio Free Program, “Metronom 69.”  Even with the poor quality of the program due to short wave transmissions, “Metronom 69” became a big hit with the youth of Romania. Hundred of listeners anonymously monthly sent letters to Chiriac showing RFE management how big an impact pop/rock music could have. Many letters complained about political conditions of the youth, their problems in schools, etc. In addition to playing music, he read excerpts of the letters during his program. Listeners throughout Romania then realized that their problems were not unique but were the same through the country—this was a threat to the Communist monopoly of information in Romania and the cult of personality of Nicolae Ceausescu. A domestic Romanian intelligence report written in 1970 showed the impact of Chiriac’s programs: 

Lately there is an increase in programs by the radio station "Radio Free Europe" that have hostile influences on our youth. Interest of young people was stimulated by the new program, titled "Metronome", commented by the fugitive Cornel Chiriac, which not only is trying to influence listeners, but also incite them to acts inimical to our Party and state policy.

Unfortunately, the Romanian secret police (Securitate) began looking for the senders of some intercepted letters addressed to Chiriac. Those who were discovered were arrested, put on trial, and sent to prison for “anti-Communist behavior.”

Music was Cornerl Chiriac’s life in Munich. He had few friends and was homesick for Romania. He began drinking heavily, had an automobile accident while drunk, paid a fine, and lost his driver’s license for a year. In December 1970, he was so drunk he damaged his office and was reprimanded. He then wrote a letter of apology to the director of RFE, in which he wrote, “If there is any excuse it is that my roots are still in Romania and that although two years have passed since my defection I find it difficult to find a balance in a country with which I feel little in common. That is why at times, to my dismay, I am my own worst enemy.”  For the next three years, he worked at RFE without further problems.

After his death, a RFE program in tribute to him contained this passage: “Somewhere in his soul, Cornel could not get reconciled with his thought that, while hundreds of thousands, if not millions of youths in Romania adored him, here in Munich, he was just someone.” 

Cornel Chiriac’s last program “Metronom 75” was aired on March 4, 1975. Afterwards, he went from restaurant to restaurant in Munich as was his want, meeting visitors from Romania and seeking good conversation. At about midnight, he met a young German in a one restaurant. They left together. That was the last time Chiriac was seen alive. At about 1 AM, his body was discovered next to his car. He had been stabbed 12 times in the chest.  A few days later, 17-year old Mario Grop was arrested and charged with manslaughter. He denied any political reason for killing Chiriac. Grop was known as a small-time criminal and was identified by a witness in the restaurant by his photo in the police files. The true motive for the murder was not discovered and police theorized that it was armed robbery only. There was wide newspaper coverage of the murder, including newspapers in Munich, Die Welt, and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.

One can draw the conclusion that the murder of Cornel Chiriac in March 1975 was political and not a robbery attempt: these are some of the incidents of Romanian hostile actions against RFE and its Romanian staff,   
  • 1975 was a turning point in Romania’s reaction to RFE programs: for the first time in a 2-½ year hiatus, Romania renewed media attacks on RFE. 
  • Emil Georgescu, another popular RFE broadcaster, was the victim of automobile accident in 1976, and, received many threatening letters afterwards, and there was an attempted murder in July 1981, during which he was stabbed over 25 times in the chest. 
  • Book bombs were sent to RFE freelancers in 1981 in Paris and Germany, injuring two. 
  • And RFE itself in February was the target of a bomb attack by the terrorist known as Carlos the Jackal, in cooperation with Romania.
In an article for RFE/RL, “Memories of a Romanian Icon,” Eugen Tomiuc wrote,

The regime feared him. His shows were never about music alone. They were about liberty, oppression, politics, dictatorship -- and music. Perhaps he had become too popular and influential among Romanian youths.

In the days after Chiriac's death, my friends and I discreetly wore black bands on the lapels of our school uniforms. When asked whether someone close had died, we would all reply, "Yes, a very good friend." Many Romanian youths made the same gesture. While other RFE journalists had been targeted or even killed by the Securitate, it was Chiriac's death that hit closest to home -- for he was one of us.

Cornel Chirac was cremated with his ashes returned to Romania. His grave in the Reinvierea cemetery in Bucharest has in someways attained the same status as that of one of his music idols Jim Morrison of the popular rock group The Doors in Paris – devoted fans visit to pay tribute, leave flowers, and notes to him. On the gravestone is a copy of his photograph in the studio at Radio Free Europe.


For more information, visit 


For those who understand German (there is some English, too), an excellent 2009 (repeated in 2018) radio program “Lost in Music – Die Cornel Chiriac Story” with music and excerpts from Chiriac’s programs can be heard at


There are many excerpts from his RFE programs to be heard on youtube.  One of good quality, for example, his Chiriac’s tribute to Jim Morrison of the group The Doors. 


There is a Facebook page “in Memoriam Cornel Chiriac” at


And in Romanian, the home page devoted to Cornel Chiriac is













August 18, 2018

Radio Free Europe Operating in a Safe Mode: Lessons Learned from Hungary 1956 to Czechoslovakia 1968 ©

The USSR-led military operation using cryptonym “Danube” began at 23:00, August 20, 1968, when hundreds of thousands of soldiers using thousands of tanks, trucks, and other vehicles, plus airplanes, invaded Czechoslovakia putting an end to the short-lived freedoms known as “Prague Spring.” 

Almost immediately, the battle for men’s minds using radio began. Radio Free Europe went on an emergency broadcast basis in the early morning hours of August 21, 1968, that lasted to September 5, 1968. The emergency contingency planning sessions that took place in July foresaw twenty-four-hour continuous news, commentary, and extraordinary American management tight control of program content. They had used the events surrounding the 1956 Hungarian Revolution as a “lessons learned exercise.

The actual date and time of the Soviet-led invasion caught Radio Free Europe off-guard as many of its top managers were on vacation and had to be recalled. Even the Free Europe Committee President, William Durkee, was in Spain and had to fly back to New York, where he was based. A policy task force was set up in the RFE Central News Room, with a 24-hour management presence for control and guidance. All information fed to programming departments (BD) was screened for content, any of which was objectionable, and/or alarmist information was either eliminated on identified as “Background Information Only” (BIO). All program scripts devoted to Czechoslovakia were reviewed for approval, or not, by the American policy staff.

“Background Information Only” material i.e., not for broadcasting, included:

  • All names of traitors and collaborators
  • Alarmist reports of upcoming KGB arrests or Czechoslovak intellectuals. All mentions of the names of those arrested or about to be arrested.
  • All Czechoslovak clandestine radio reports (and subsequent Western media pick-up of these reports) of the rejections of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Moscow agreement 
  • All references to calls for a neutralist policy of Czechoslovakia.
  • Alarmist reports of possible Soviet invasion of Romania or Yugoslavia.
  • Alarmist reports of the current danger of World nuclear war.
  • Reports on, or anything, which might be interpreted as encouraging resistance by Czechoslovaks, unless this clearly qualified as a passive resistance.
  • Any material which, by any stretch of the imagination, could have been interpreted or understood by RFE’s listeners as a hint that the U.S. or the West would intervene militarily to alter the situation in Czechoslovakia or to prevent Soviet action against Romania.
  • All but moderate, factual, and limited reports on the presence and fate of Czechoslovak refugees in the West. While reporting official western government statements, we were are careful as we could be in order to avoid giving the impression of encouraging defections.

Normal broadcasting was altered by all Broadcast Departments; popular music was eliminated and services consisted primarily of serious music, news, and information, plus whatever commentaries were believed essential. The commentaries were reviewed in English translation prior to their being broadcast.

Arrangements were made to keep all the language services on the air 24 hours a day. This meant a reduction in normal transmitter strength to Poland and Hungary, giving allowing for full coverage to Bulgaria and Romania.  

No news items on Czechoslovak subjects were issued prior to clearance by top management. The intention was to keep tight control, even if from time to time clearance procedures might have caused slight delays in news programming.

In the afternoon of August 21, 1968, RFE sent two teams of journalists to the border points Germany-Czechoslovakia and Austria-Czechoslovakia. The teams were under “rigid instructions” not to enter Czechoslovakia under any circumstances – teams of RFE personnel had entered Hungary in 1956 and some were even detained by Soviet troops. The teams also were under instruction, “To find out what is going on, behave as normal journalists and in no way push themselves off as representatives of RFE.” After their arrivals, the teams announced that there was no evidence of mass flights of refugees across the borders. 

On August 23, 1968, RFE sent a mobile monitoring and recording team to the German-Czech border to monitor the low-powered local radio stations that sprang up after the invasion. This team augmented the large RFE monitoring station outside Munich at Schleissheim. The purpose of the team, which was told to be inconspicuous, was, “To get the best possible coverage of remaining Czechoslovak radio stations and any new clandestine broadcasting, which develops.” Although RFE also had monitoring stations in then West Berlin, Vienna, and Thessaloniki to monitor RFE transmitter strength and quality, they also could have been used to monitor Czechoslovak radio broadcasts, but there is no record that they were used that way.

RFE saw its role in the crisis as a watchful observer, commentator, and cross-reporter. Soon after the invasion, Soviet and other East European communist media began to develop a pattern of attack similar to that mounted around the 1956 Hungarian events. A major effort in this connection was the attempt to link RFE directly with the clandestine or free Czechoslovak radios still operating. It was claimed that RFE directed the activities of these stations, counter-revolutionaries, etc. 

On August 23, 1968, RFE withdrew the news team from the Austrian-Czech border, as refugee flow simply did not occur. The German border team under Bill Marsh remained a few days, in case the flow of refugees increased. It did not; eventually, this team returned to Munich.

Although the Bavarian government set up a fund to financially help Czechoslovaks who were unable to return to their county, RFE set up its own “carefully administered” fund to help those in need and wanted to contact Bavarian government officials.

Radio Free Europe’s Audience in Czechoslovakia prior to and including the invasion in percent of adults as listeners:

1966               1967 –             Late Spring      Aug 1 – 21      Post
Early 1968      1968                1968                Invasion

46%                 51%                 45%                 34%                 71%

As Radio Prague’s freedom further increased, RFE’s audience went down. This was clearly demonstrated by the downward trend in listenership size between 1967 and August 1968. Since RFE’s aimed to contribute to the development of free communications media in its broadcasting area, RFE had come close to fulfilling its mission in Czechoslovakia. Therefore, the drop in RFE’s Czech and Slovak audience was expected and constituted success rather than failure.

The careful planning and execution of RFE’S crisis response activities paid off:  famed Czech writer Milan Kundera, for example, said at the time that he was, “Very impressed by the programs because of their restraint, accuracy, and objectivity, and because of the wise and ‘statesmanlike’ tone and standpoint expressed in some of its commentaries… this appreciation is shared by other writers, as well as by television and radio workers.”



Photographs courtesy of RFE/RL


August 15, 2018

Clandestine Radio Station "Vltava" during the Soviet-led Invasion and Occupation of Czechoslovakia, 1968-1969 ©

A clandestine radio station usually sounds like any other broadcasting station. However "legitimate" a clandestine station might sound, however, it is "extralegal" and deceptive in its operation. Here are some key elements that distinguish a clandestine broadcaster from "ordinary" broadcasters:

  • Clandestine broadcasters are deceptive. They often lie about their location, sponsoring government or organization, and their intentions. Programming is essentially propaganda, and may largely be half-truths or outright lies.
  • Clandestine broadcasters aim to bring about political changes or actions in a target country. They may want to incite revolution in another country or simply to influence the populace of the target country to be more sympathetic toward the country or organization operating the clandestine.
  • Clandestine broadcasters are temporary. Since the purpose of a clandestine is political, clandestine stations usually leave the air quickly when political situations change…
(DXing.com)


The USSR-led military operation using cryptonym “Danube” began at 23:00, August 20, 1968, when hundreds of thousands of soldiers using thousands of tanks, trucks, and other vehicles, plus airplanes, invaded Czechoslovakia, putting an end to the short-lived freedoms known as  “Prague Spring.” Almost immediately, the battle for men’s minds using radio began. Below, we will look at the pro-Soviet clandestine radio station “Radio Vltava (Moldau).

Radio Vltava Background

At a meeting in Warsaw on July 14-15, 1968, of the leaders of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Poland, East Germany (DDR), and Hungary, the results included sending a letter to Prague, part of which read, “The situation in Czechoslovakia was unacceptable” and warned, “We cannot approve of foreign influences leading your country off the path of socialism and presenting the danger of Czechoslovakia’s being torn off from the socialist community.” 

Shortly after this meeting, East Germany’s propaganda radio station Radio Berlin International increased its broadcast strength and began broadcasting in Czech and Slovak.

At 05:25, August 21, 1968, the frequency 1430 kHz (medium wave or am band) used by Radio Berlin International (RBI) began broadcasting in Czech and Slovak with the call sign “Radio Vltava” (Radio Moldau). A quick analysis of the speakers’ poor knowledge of the broadcasts languages showed that they were not Czech or Slovak but were Russians and Germans, who used expressions not in modern Czech. Reportedly, “Ideological expressions often give the impression of having been taken directly from Russian manuals and translated badly.” Moreover, “It has been noticed that Vltava’s announcers pronounce Russian names with a perfect Russian accent instead of using the customary Czech pronunciation of these names.”  

Radio Vltava broadcast 19 hours a day from 05:00 to 24:00. Its programs averaged:

  • 35 percent, Czechoslovakia’s internal developments, 
  • 25 percent, non-Czechoslovak specific themes, 
  • 20 percent, international reports, and 
  • 10 percent, music.

 “Our Country” and “Socialist Voice of Truth” were used in its broadcasts and its music identifying tone was Czech composer Smetana’s tone poem “Vltava” thus attempting to show it was indeed a Czechoslovak radio station:


Five minutes after Radio Vltava's first broadcast (05:30), Radio Prague warned its listeners that the Vltava had “nothing to do with Czechoslovak Radio.”  A short time later, Radio Prague broadcast, “Do not listen or pay attention to the Vltava station, and do not pass on instructions given by this station.” This was repeated until Radio Prague was forced off the air at 07:28. 

Later a make-shift Radio Prague started broadcasting as "Radio Free Prague." Jan F. Triska, Political Science Professor, Stanford University, was in Prague at the time of the invasion. He left Prague in a convoy of 150 vehicles and drove to Munich on August 23, 1968, when he told RFE of his observations and experiences, including:

I heard the following broadcasts on the clandestine Radio Free Prague twice: “Tell Czechoslovaks who understand German to listen to Radio Vienna. If you don’t know German, listen to Radio Free Europe…Don’t listen to Radio Vltava. Listen to foreign broadcasts now, but particularly after we can no longer broadcast.”

Radio Vltava did not tell the listeners who were behind the broadcasts or where it was located – thus becoming a clandestine radio station. Its transmitters were later identified as being in Wilsdruff, near Dresden, and Karl-Marx-Stadt (now Chemnitz). By October 1968, the staff consisted of 

  • 21 political specialists
  • 24 translators and speakers
  • 2 monitors
  • 6 secretaries
  • 4 managers
  • 2 drivers

On February 12, 1969, Radio Vltava was last broadcast. Reportedly, it stopped broadcasting due to Czech government protests. The next morning at 05:30, Radio Berlin International resumed broadcasting on the same frequency at first in German, with later short broadcasts in Czech and Slovak that had little of nothing to do with Czechoslovakia.

"Workers' Voice of the Republic" (Delnicky hlas republic) was another short-lived pro-Soviet clandestine radio station that began broadcasting in Czech on short-wave and medium wave (1178 kHz) on or about August 22, 1968. It stopped broadcasting on September 3, 1968, after it announced that it, "had fulfilled its 'patriotic and partisan' task towards the Czech." RFE monitors made a tentative identification that the broadcasts originated out of Hungary. Another station was "Radio Zare" (Glow), which began broadcasting on August 29, 1968, and was identified as possibly broadcasting from Poland.


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August 07, 2018

1978 CIA Document on Romania's Efforts to damage or undermine Radio Free Europe through hostile and violent actions ©


In 2015, The U.S. State Department released Foreign Relations of the Untied States (FRUS): Volume XX, Eastern Europe, 1977-1980.  
            
According to the preface, 

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of Jimmy Carter. As with previous volumes in the Foreign Relations series, this volume provides only a snapshot of the global character of Cold War politics.

The focus of this volume is on the Carter administration’s policy toward the Communist governments in Eastern Europe, specifically Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia.

The Carter administration also continued the previous administration’s policies toward modernization of broadcasting capabilities of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) into Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. While a decision on modernization had been taken in 1976, and reapproved at the beginning of Carter’s administration, implementation of the decision faced bureaucratic hurdles. Pressure from the Federal Republic of Germany to consider relocating RFE/RL from Munich added to the complexity. As the relationship with the Soviet Union deteriorated following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the administration redoubled its efforts to modernize the Radios, increase their efficiency, and expand their audience, especially in Muslim regions "of the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf."

There are 36 declassified documents, which deal with Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the Voice of America.
 Of special interest is Document 58 in the volume “Intelligence Information Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency” dated September 21, 1978. The subject is “Efforts by Romanian President Ceausescu to damage or undermine Radio Free Europe.” The source of the report was not identified, but, because of the high-level information, one could guess it was General Ion Mihai Pacepa: he was the highest-ranked intelligence officer to defect to the West, when he defected to the U. S. at the end of July 1978. In any event, here is the CIA report:

58. Intelligence Information Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency[1]
Washington, September 21, 1978
COUNTRY Romania
DATE OF INFO April 1978 to July 1978
SUBJECT Efforts by Romanian President Ceausescu to Damage or Undermine Radio Free Europe
SOURCE [1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]
1. Romanian President Ceausescu, on returning from his trip to the United States on 18 April 1978, during which Radio Free Europe (RFE) infuriated him by coverage that included live broadcasts of the playing of an outdated Romanian anthem and a press conference during which Ceausescu was required to deal with facts that had been kept hidden from the Romanian people, ordered that the Directorate General of Foreign Intelligence (DGIE) draw up a study of the occasions on which RFE had presented the Romanian Government and especially Ceausescu in an unfavorable light. The study was to deal also with methods used by RFE for collecting information (as RFE data were often very timely and accurate) and with the role played in the process  by the American and West German Embassies [in Romania]. The study would serve as a basis for lodging a protest to the United States at some time in the future. Ceausescu asked at the same time for talking points that might be used with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, President Walter Scheel and Chairman of Social Democratic Party Willy Brandt in asking that RFE be compelled to quit the territory of West Germany. 

            
Some of these points, he added might be useful in Paris, where, he added, there was special need to put an end to the broadcasts by RFE commentators Monica Lovinescu and Virgiliu Ierunca. Perhaps he would go on to ask the Spanish Premier and Portuguese President that the relay stations in those countries be dismantled. An entire diplomatic campaign was not to be excluded, he said. (Source Comment: The importance that Ceausescu and the Romanian Government attach to RFE is reflected in the fact that a daily bulletin on RFE content is prepared by AGERPRES; Ceausescu receives one of the dozen copies made of the bulletin.)  

            
2. Ceausescu after reflection levied additional requirements for the campaign against RFE. Suggestions were needed, he declared to Source, for luring one or more RFE employees to Romania with the idea that on their return home they would denounce RFE as a tool of the United States and the CIA. But while working to discredit RFE Ceausescu wanted to make simultaneous efforts to influence RFE to take a softer line toward Romania. Ceausescu suggested that it might be feasible to organize a roundtable discussion between RFE staffers and true-blue (meaning DGIE-directed) Romanian intellectuals in the hope that RFE would begin to look with more sympathy on Romanian activities. 

            
3. According to General Alexandru Danescu, Deputy Minister of Interior, an opening for practicing suasion occurred in early July 1978 when a sportswriter (name unknown) for Romanian TV on his return from a trip to Germany came to Danescu to say that in Germany he had met Noel Bernard, RFE Romanian Desk Chief, whose wife he had known in the past. Bernard had mentioned to the journalist his interest in making a trip to Romania, in whatever guise—official or not, with public announcement or not, even using another name. Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei was advised, and the matter was discussed by Danescu and Andrei with Ceausescu, who said that the journalist should be sent back to Germany to tell Bernard that he had learned that the Foreign Ministry concurred in Bernard’s visit and that if Bernard would tell him when he intended to come and in what manner the journalist would arrange the rest of the trip with the Foreign Ministry. The journalist was to return to Germany in August and it was hoped that the Bernard trip would take place at an early date. Events since then are not known (Blog note, Bernard did not make the trip). 

            
4. RFE coverage has also stirred Ceausescu to violence in the past. According to First Deputy Minister of the Interior Nicolae Doicaru, at least two actions were ordered in Paris. One concerned a man named [Serban] Stefanescu, who had been given permission to emigrate from Romania after having walked in front of the Intercontinental Hotel in Bucharest carrying placards denouncing Ceausescu; the President on being informed said that a man that foolish could only be stopped by killing him, so it was easier to kick him out of the country. On reaching France, however, Stefanescu began demonstrating in front of the Romanian Embassy for his mother to be allowed to depart Romania. When RFE began to carry items concerning the case, Ceausescu became indignant and ordered Doicaru to have Stefanescu put out of action, repeating his standard admonition that the man should not be killed and that the perpetrators should not appear to be Romanians. Two men were dispatched to Paris. Stefanescu’s habits were observed, with the decision being made to grab the man and throw him down a subway stairwell that he passed daily. This was in fact done and Stefanescu was not heard from again. 

           
Lovinescu
5. The other Paris case Source heard about from Doicaru involved Monica Lovinescu, the  commentator (mentioned in Paragraph One above) whom Ceausescu was still trying to silence as of spring 1978. Lovinescu’s sin was to concentrate her criticism on Ceausescu, a tactic that always evoked a strong reaction from him. He earlier ordered Doicaru to harm her physically. Doicaru on this occasion used two Arabs. [In November 1977] they entered her apartment, a struggle ensued and Lovinescu fell to the floor in a way that made the assailants think she was dead. They fled. Ceausescu berated Doicaru for the laxness of the operation when Lovinescu came back on the air. 
            
Georgescu
6. On an earlier occasion, Doicaru said that Ceausescu had given indications of how to deal with one of his most acid critics at RFE in Munich, Emil Georgescu. Ceausescu said the man’s teeth should be knocked out so that he could not speak on the radio and that this could perhaps best be done with a traffic accident. Doicaru used the two men who had proved their mettle with Stefanescu. They went to Munich, studied Georgescu’s movements, left for Austria to rent two cars with alias documents, and then returned to Munich to await Georgescu at a curve previously selected. One of the cars was used to ram Georgescu, and the other to flee the scene. Georgescu did not speak on RFE for four months after that. Although RFE had mentioned the accidents that had befallen Stefanescu and Lovinescu, nothing was said about Georgescu’s accident. Ceausescu declared his pleasure to Doicaru. The incident had a sequel. Georgescu’s wife not long thereafter called her mother in Romania and said that Georgescu had been hurt in an accident caused by Romania but that this was the wrong tactic; he might stop his broadcasts in return for something like granting his mother-in-law permission to leave the country but he would not be deterred by threats to himself. The call was intercepted and Ceausescu was advised. Let her go, he ordered, and the mother-in-law was told she was being put through by phone to Munich to announce her imminent arrival. Georgescu subsequently turned to practicing law. (Note: Georgescu did not leave RFE and continued his criticism of Ceausescu, which led to the murder attempt in July 1981). 





[1]Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–026, Subject Files F–R, Romania. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Paul Henze forwarded the report to Secretary of State Zbigniew Brzezinski under a September 22 covering memorandum. In his memorandum, Henze noted that in August, Noel Bernard, Romanian Bureau director at Radio Free Europe, was invited to visit Romania, and that the RFE leadership sought approval for the visit. In light of the report, Henze recommended that Bernard’s visit be indefinitely postponed. Brzezinski approved the recommendation.

Paul Henze was also a former manager of Radio Free Europe in the 1950s. For additional information, here is the link to the full FRUS volume: