Radio Free Europe Operating in a Safe Mode: Lessons Learned from Hungary 1956 to Czechoslovakia 1968 ©

The USSR-led military operation using cryptonym “Danube” began at 23:00, August 20, 1968, when hundreds of thousands of soldiers using thousands of tanks, trucks, and other vehicles, plus airplanes, invaded Czechoslovakia putting an end to the short-lived freedoms known as “Prague Spring.” 

Almost immediately, the battle for men’s minds using radio began. Radio Free Europe went on an emergency broadcast basis in the early morning hours of August 21, 1968, that lasted to September 5, 1968. The emergency contingency planning sessions that took place in July foresaw twenty-four-hour continuous news, commentary, and extraordinary American management tight control of program content. They had used the events surrounding the 1956 Hungarian Revolution as a “lessons learned exercise.

The actual date and time of the Soviet-led invasion caught Radio Free Europe off-guard as many of its top managers were on vacation and had to be recalled. Even the Free Europe Committee President, William Durkee, was in Spain and had to fly back to New York, where he was based. A policy task force was set up in the RFE Central News Room, with a 24-hour management presence for control and guidance. All information fed to programming departments (BD) was screened for content, any of which was objectionable, and/or alarmist information was either eliminated on identified as “Background Information Only” (BIO). All program scripts devoted to Czechoslovakia were reviewed for approval, or not, by the American policy staff.

“Background Information Only” material i.e., not for broadcasting, included:

• All names of traitors and collaborators
• Alarmist reports of upcoming KGB arrests or Czechoslovak intellectuals. All mentions of the names of those arrested or about to be arrested.
• All Czechoslovak clandestine radio reports (and subsequent Western media pick-up of these reports) of the rejections of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Moscow agreement 
• All references to calls for a neutralist policy of Czechoslovakia.
• Alarmist reports of possible Soviet invasion of Romania or Yugoslavia.
• Alarmist reports of the current danger of World nuclear war.
• Reports on, or anything, which might be interpreted as encouraging resistance by Czechoslovaks, unless this clearly qualified as a passive resistance.
• Any material which, by any stretch of the imagination, could have been interpreted or understood by RFE’s listeners as a hint that the U.S. or the West would intervene militarily to alter the situation in Czechoslovakia or to prevent Soviet action against Romania.
• All but moderate, factual, and limited reports on the presence and fate of Czechoslovak refugees in the West. While reporting official western government statements, we were are careful as we could be in order to avoid giving the impression of encouraging defections.

Normal broadcasting was altered by all Broadcast Departments; popular music was eliminated and services consisted primarily of serious music, news, and information, plus whatever commentaries were believed essential. The commentaries were reviewed in English translation prior to their being broadcast.

Arrangements were made to keep all the language services on the air 24 hours a day. This meant a reduction in normal transmitter strength to Poland and Hungary, giving allowing for full coverage to Bulgaria and Romania.  

No news items on Czechoslovak subjects were issued prior to clearance by top management. The intention was to keep tight control, even if from time to time clearance procedures might have caused slight delays in news programming.

In the afternoon of August 21, 1968, RFE sent two teams of journalists to the border points Germany-Czechoslovakia and Austria-Czechoslovakia. The teams were under “rigid instructions” not to enter Czechoslovakia under any circumstances – teams of RFE personnel had entered Hungary in 1956 and some were even detained by Soviet troops. The teams also were under instruction, “To find out what is going on, behave as normal journalists and in no way push themselves off as representatives of RFE.” After their arrivals, the teams announced that there was no evidence of mass flights of refugees across the borders. 

On August 23, 1968, RFE sent a mobile monitoring and recording team to the German-Czech border to monitor the low-powered local radio stations that sprang up after the invasion. This team augmented the large RFE monitoring station outside Munich at Schleissheim. The purpose of the team, which was told to be inconspicuous, was, “To get the best possible coverage of remaining Czechoslovak radio stations and any new clandestine broadcasting, which develops.” Although RFE also had monitoring stations in then West Berlin, Vienna, and Thessaloniki to monitor RFE transmitter strength and quality, they also could have been used to monitor Czechoslovak radio broadcasts, but there is no record that they were used that way.

RFE saw its role in the crisis as a watchful observer, commentator, and cross-reporter. Soon after the invasion, Soviet and other East European communist media began to develop a pattern of attack similar to that mounted around the 1956 Hungarian events. A major effort in this connection was the attempt to link RFE directly with the clandestine or free Czechoslovak radios still operating. It was claimed that RFE directed the activities of these stations, counter-revolutionaries, etc. 

On August 23, 1968, RFE withdrew the news team from the Austrian-Czech border, as refugee flow simply did not occur. The German border team under Bill Marsh remained a few days, in case the flow of refugees increased. It did not; eventually, this team returned to Munich.

Although the Bavarian government set up a fund to financially help Czechoslovaks who were unable to return to their county, RFE set up its own “carefully administered” fund to help those in need and wanted to contact Bavarian government officials.

Radio Free Europe’s Audience in Czechoslovakia prior to and including the invasion in percent of adults as listeners:

1966               1967 –             Late Spring      Aug 1 – 21      Post

Early 1968      1968                1968                Invasion

46%                 51%                 45%                 34%                 71%

As Radio Prague’s freedom further increased, RFE’s audience went down. This was clearly demonstrated by the downward trend in listenership size between 1967 and August 1968. Since RFE’s aimed to contribute to the development of free communications media in its broadcasting area, RFE had come close to fulfilling its mission in Czechoslovakia. Therefore, the drop in RFE’s Czech and Slovak audience was expected and constituted success rather than failure.

The careful planning and execution of RFE’S crisis response activities paid off:  famed Czech writer Milan Kundera, for example, said at the time that he was, “Very impressed by the programs because of their restraint, accuracy, and objectivity, and because of the wise and ‘statesmanlike’ tone and standpoint expressed in some of its commentaries… this appreciation is shared by other writers, as well as by television and radio workers.”

Photographs courtesy of RFE/RL

Clandestine Radio Station "Vltava" during the Soviet-led Invasion and Occupation of Czechoslovakia, 1968-1969 ©

A clandestine radio station usually sounds like any other broadcasting station. However "legitimate" a clandestine station might sound, however, it is "extralegal" and deceptive in its operation. Here are some key elements that distinguish a clandestine broadcaster from "ordinary" broadcasters:

• Clandestine broadcasters are deceptive. They often lie about their location, sponsoring government or organization, and their intentions. Programming is essentially propaganda, and may largely be half-truths or outright lies.
• Clandestine broadcasters aim to bring about political changes or actions in a target country. They may want to incite revolution in another country or simply to influence the populace of the target country to be more sympathetic toward the country or organization operating the clandestine.
• Clandestine broadcasters are temporary. Since the purpose of a clandestine is political, clandestine stations usually leave the air quickly when political situations change…

(DXing.com)

The USSR-led military operation using cryptonym “Danube” began at 23:00, August 20, 1968, when hundreds of thousands of soldiers using thousands of tanks, trucks, and other vehicles, plus airplanes, invaded Czechoslovakia, putting an end to the short-lived freedoms known as  “Prague Spring.” Almost immediately, the battle for men’s minds using radio began. Below, we will look at the pro-Soviet clandestine radio station “Radio Vltava (Moldau).

Radio Vltava Background

At a meeting in Warsaw on July 14-15, 1968, of the leaders of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Poland, East Germany (DDR), and Hungary, the results included sending a letter to Prague, part of which read, “The situation in Czechoslovakia was unacceptable” and warned, “We cannot approve of foreign influences leading your country off the path of socialism and presenting the danger of Czechoslovakia’s being torn off from the socialist community.” 

Shortly after this meeting, East Germany’s propaganda radio station Radio Berlin International increased its broadcast strength and began broadcasting in Czech and Slovak.

At 05:25, August 21, 1968, the frequency 1430 kHz (medium wave or am band) used by Radio Berlin International (RBI) began broadcasting in Czech and Slovak with the call sign “Radio Vltava” (Radio Moldau). A quick analysis of the speakers’ poor knowledge of the broadcasts languages showed that they were not Czech or Slovak but were Russians and Germans, who used expressions not in modern Czech. Reportedly, “Ideological expressions often give the impression of having been taken directly from Russian manuals and translated badly.” Moreover, “It has been noticed that Vltava’s announcers pronounce Russian names with a perfect Russian accent instead of using the customary Czech pronunciation of these names.”  

Radio Vltava broadcast 19 hours a day from 05:00 to 24:00. Its programs averaged:

• 35 percent, Czechoslovakia’s internal developments, 
• 25 percent, non-Czechoslovak specific themes, 
• 20 percent, international reports, and 
• 10 percent, music.

 “Our Country” and “Socialist Voice of Truth” were used in its broadcasts and its music identifying tone was Czech composer Smetana’s tone poem “Vltava” thus attempting to show it was indeed a Czechoslovak radio station:

Five minutes after Radio Vltava's first broadcast (05:30), Radio Prague warned its listeners that the Vltava had “nothing to do with Czechoslovak Radio.”  A short time later, Radio Prague broadcast, “Do not listen or pay attention to the Vltava station, and do not pass on instructions given by this station.” This was repeated until Radio Prague was forced off the air at 07:28. 

Later a make-shift Radio Prague started broadcasting as "Radio Free Prague." Jan F. Triska, Political Science Professor, Stanford University, was in Prague at the time of the invasion. He left Prague in a convoy of 150 vehicles and drove to Munich on August 23, 1968, when he told RFE of his observations and experiences, including:

I heard the following broadcasts on the clandestine Radio Free Prague twice: “Tell Czechoslovaks who understand German to listen to Radio Vienna. If you don’t know German, listen to Radio Free Europe…Don’t listen to Radio Vltava. Listen to foreign broadcasts now, but particularly after we can no longer broadcast.”

Radio Vltava did not tell the listeners who were behind the broadcasts or where it was located – thus becoming a clandestine radio station. Its transmitters were later identified as being in Wilsdruff, near Dresden, and Karl-Marx-Stadt (now Chemnitz). By October 1968, the staff consisted of 

• 21 political specialists
• 24 translators and speakers
• 2 monitors
• 6 secretaries
• 4 managers
• 2 drivers

On February 12, 1969, Radio Vltava was last broadcast. Reportedly, it stopped broadcasting due to Czech government protests. The next morning at 05:30, Radio Berlin International resumed broadcasting on the same frequency at first in German, with later short broadcasts in Czech and Slovak that had little of nothing to do with Czechoslovakia.

"Workers' Voice of the Republic" (Delnicky hlas republic) was another short-lived pro-Soviet clandestine radio station that began broadcasting in Czech on short-wave and medium wave (1178 kHz) on or about August 22, 1968. It stopped broadcasting on September 3, 1968, after it announced that it, "had fulfilled its 'patriotic and partisan' task towards the Czech." RFE monitors made a tentative identification that the broadcasts originated out of Hungary. Another station was "Radio Zare" (Glow), which began broadcasting on August 29, 1968, and was identified as possibly broadcasting from Poland.

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1978 CIA Document on Romania's Efforts to damage or undermine Radio Free Europe through hostile and violent actions ©

In 2015, The U.S. State Department released Foreign Relations of the Untied States (FRUS): Volume XX, Eastern Europe, 1977-1980.  

            

According to the preface, 

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of Jimmy Carter. As with previous volumes in the Foreign Relations series, this volume provides only a snapshot of the global character of Cold War politics.

The focus of this volume is on the Carter administration’s policy toward the Communist governments in Eastern Europe, specifically Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia.

The Carter administration also continued the previous administration’s policies toward modernization of broadcasting capabilities of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) into Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. While a decision on modernization had been taken in 1976, and reapproved at the beginning of Carter’s administration, implementation of the decision faced bureaucratic hurdles. Pressure from the Federal Republic of Germany to consider relocating RFE/RL from Munich added to the complexity. As the relationship with the Soviet Union deteriorated following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the administration redoubled its efforts to modernize the Radios, increase their efficiency, and expand their audience, especially in Muslim regions "of the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf."

There are 36 declassified documents, which deal with Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the Voice of America.
 Of special interest is Document 58 in the volume “Intelligence Information Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency” dated September 21, 1978. The subject is “Efforts by Romanian President Ceausescu to damage or undermine Radio Free Europe.” The source of the report was not identified, but, because of the high-level information, one could guess it was General Ion Mihai Pacepa: he was the highest-ranked intelligence officer to defect to the West, when he defected to the U. S. at the end of July 1978. In any event, here is the CIA report:

58. Intelligence Information Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency^[1]

Washington, September 21, 1978

COUNTRY Romania

DATE OF INFO April 1978 to July 1978

SUBJECT Efforts by Romanian President Ceausescu to Damage or Undermine Radio Free Europe

SOURCE [1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]




1. Romanian President Ceausescu, on returning from his trip to the United States on 18 April 1978, during which Radio Free Europe (RFE) infuriated him by coverage that included live broadcasts of the playing of an outdated Romanian anthem and a press conference during which Ceausescu was required to deal with facts that had been kept hidden from the Romanian people, ordered that the Directorate General of Foreign Intelligence (DGIE) draw up a study of the occasions on which RFE had presented the Romanian Government and especially Ceausescu in an unfavorable light. The study was to deal also with methods used by RFE for collecting information (as RFE data were often very timely and accurate) and with the role played in the process  by the American and West German Embassies [in Romania]. The study would serve as a basis for lodging a protest to the United States at some time in the future. Ceausescu asked at the same time for talking points that might be used with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, President Walter Scheel and Chairman of Social Democratic Party Willy Brandt in asking that RFE be compelled to quit the territory of West Germany. 


            

Some of these points, he added might be useful in Paris, where, he added, there was special need to put an end to the broadcasts by RFE commentators Monica Lovinescu and Virgiliu Ierunca. Perhaps he would go on to ask the Spanish Premier and Portuguese President that the relay stations in those countries be dismantled. An entire diplomatic campaign was not to be excluded, he said. (Source Comment: The importance that Ceausescu and the Romanian Government attach to RFE is reflected in the fact that a daily bulletin on RFE content is prepared by AGERPRES; Ceausescu receives one of the dozen copies made of the bulletin.)  


            


2. Ceausescu after reflection levied additional requirements for the campaign against RFE. Suggestions were needed, he declared to Source, for luring one or more RFE employees to Romania with the idea that on their return home they would denounce RFE as a tool of the United States and the CIA. But while working to discredit RFE Ceausescu wanted to make simultaneous efforts to influence RFE to take a softer line toward Romania. Ceausescu suggested that it might be feasible to organize a roundtable discussion between RFE staffers and true-blue (meaning DGIE-directed) Romanian intellectuals in the hope that RFE would begin to look with more sympathy on Romanian activities. 


            


3. According to General Alexandru Danescu, Deputy Minister of Interior, an opening for practicing suasion occurred in early July 1978 when a sportswriter (name unknown) for Romanian TV on his return from a trip to Germany came to Danescu to say that in Germany he had met Noel Bernard, RFE Romanian Desk Chief, whose wife he had known in the past. Bernard had mentioned to the journalist his interest in making a trip to Romania, in whatever guise—official or not, with public announcement or not, even using another name. Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei was advised, and the matter was discussed by Danescu and Andrei with Ceausescu, who said that the journalist should be sent back to Germany to tell Bernard that he had learned that the Foreign Ministry concurred in Bernard’s visit and that if Bernard would tell him when he intended to come and in what manner the journalist would arrange the rest of the trip with the Foreign Ministry. The journalist was to return to Germany in August and it was hoped that the Bernard trip would take place at an early date. Events since then are not known (Blog note, Bernard did not make the trip). 


            


4. RFE coverage has also stirred Ceausescu to violence in the past. According to First Deputy Minister of the Interior Nicolae Doicaru, at least two actions were ordered in Paris. One concerned a man named [Serban] Stefanescu, who had been given permission to emigrate from Romania after having walked in front of the Intercontinental Hotel in Bucharest carrying placards denouncing Ceausescu; the President on being informed said that a man that foolish could only be stopped by killing him, so it was easier to kick him out of the country. On reaching France, however, Stefanescu began demonstrating in front of the Romanian Embassy for his mother to be allowed to depart Romania. When RFE began to carry items concerning the case, Ceausescu became indignant and ordered Doicaru to have Stefanescu put out of action, repeating his standard admonition that the man should not be killed and that the perpetrators should not appear to be Romanians. Two men were dispatched to Paris. Stefanescu’s habits were observed, with the decision being made to grab the man and throw him down a subway stairwell that he passed daily. This was in fact done and Stefanescu was not heard from again. 


           

Lovinescu

5. The other Paris case Source heard about from Doicaru involved Monica Lovinescu, the  commentator (mentioned in Paragraph One above) whom Ceausescu was still trying to silence as of spring 1978. Lovinescu’s sin was to concentrate her criticism on Ceausescu, a tactic that always evoked a strong reaction from him. He earlier ordered Doicaru to harm her physically. Doicaru on this occasion used two Arabs. [In November 1977] they entered her apartment, a struggle ensued and Lovinescu fell to the floor in a way that made the assailants think she was dead. They fled. Ceausescu berated Doicaru for the laxness of the operation when Lovinescu came back on the air. 

            

Georgescu

6. On an earlier occasion, Doicaru said that Ceausescu had given indications of how to deal with one of his most acid critics at RFE in Munich, Emil Georgescu. Ceausescu said the man’s teeth should be knocked out so that he could not speak on the radio and that this could perhaps best be done with a traffic accident. Doicaru used the two men who had proved their mettle with Stefanescu. They went to Munich, studied Georgescu’s movements, left for Austria to rent two cars with alias documents, and then returned to Munich to await Georgescu at a curve previously selected. One of the cars was used to ram Georgescu, and the other to flee the scene. Georgescu did not speak on RFE for four months after that. Although RFE had mentioned the accidents that had befallen Stefanescu and Lovinescu, nothing was said about Georgescu’s accident. Ceausescu declared his pleasure to Doicaru. The incident had a sequel. Georgescu’s wife not long thereafter called her mother in Romania and said that Georgescu had been hurt in an accident caused by Romania but that this was the wrong tactic; he might stop his broadcasts in return for something like granting his mother-in-law permission to leave the country but he would not be deterred by threats to himself. The call was intercepted and Ceausescu was advised. Let her go, he ordered, and the mother-in-law was told she was being put through by phone to Munich to announce her imminent arrival. Georgescu subsequently turned to practicing law. (Note: Georgescu did not leave RFE and continued his criticism of Ceausescu, which led to the murder attempt in July 1981). 


---

[1]Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–026, Subject Files F–R, Romania. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Paul Henze forwarded the report to Secretary of State Zbigniew Brzezinski under a September 22 covering memorandum. In his memorandum, Henze noted that in August, Noel Bernard, Romanian Bureau director at Radio Free Europe, was invited to visit Romania, and that the RFE leadership sought approval for the visit. In light of the report, Henze recommended that Bernard’s visit be indefinitely postponed. Brzezinski approved the recommendation.

Paul Henze was also a former manager of Radio Free Europe in the 1950s. For additional information, here is the link to the full FRUS volume: 

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v20/d58(Last viewed August 2018)

Radio Free Europe and the Invasion of the Colorado Beetles ©

The East German anti-American propaganda or disinformation campaign involving Colorado beetles began in May 1950, when the Amt für Information der Regierung der DDR published a 24-page propaganda pamphlet HALT Amikäfer (Stop Yankee Beetles). The pamphlet included maps, illustrations, and the allegations that American planes had dropped Colorado beetles over the potato fields to induce  starvation--use of "entomological warfare." The pamphlet described how, “Both private farmers and members of the collectives have expressed their outrage at the most recent crimes of American air gangsters.” 

Berliner Zeitung 5/25/50

The May 25, 1950 Berliner Zeitung newspaper published in the Soviet Zone printed a map showing the route that two American planes supposedly flew as they dropped the beetles the day before.

In addition to the pamphlet, stamps with the same message were produced and distributed.


Journalists from China, Czechoslovakia, Poland, France, and Italy were invited to the village of Schönfels near Zwickau on June 17, 1950. They published a protest declaration, which included:

The unanimous testimony of the farmers, who saw the problem in the fields, is that the large number of Colorado beetles appeared a day after the American planes flew over the area. Colorado beetles are smaller than atomic bombs, but they are also a weapon of U.S. Imperialism against the peace-loving working population. We journalists, who serve peace, hereby condemn this new criminal method of the American warmongers.

On June 30, 1950, the Soviet Union Foreign Ministry delivered a protest note to the U.S. State Department stating that it had received information from the DDR that between May 22, 1950, and June 6, 1950, American planes dropped Colorado beetles in many districts of the country. On July 6, 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson rejected the protest as “Communist propaganda.” The State Department official reply to Moscow included: 

In the present world situation, fraught with explosive tensions, the Soviet Government has chosen to poison the atmosphere even further with one of the most fantastic fabrications that has ever been invented by one government against another. In this whole absurd and ridiculous propaganda invention, this is the one fact that deserves to be noted.

1951

In June 1951, there was a traveling exhibition in Czechoslovakia of the Colorado beetles ("americky brouk") that were allegedly dropped in the displayed Coca Cola bottles from American planes over the country and the DDR. Reportedly one million match boxes were distributed telling the population of the danger of the beetle and to report any findings of the bugs to the authorities.

Similar match boxes were reportedly distributed in Hungary advising those who found the beetles, dropped by the Americans, to report the findings to the police.

In August 1951, the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE) created the Free Europe Press, which was used not only for the printing of various publications in the USA and Europe but also for the printing of leaflets and launching of balloons to carry them to Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. Permanent launching sites were set up in Fronau, Freying, and Hohenhard, West Germany.

The first balloons were launched on August 13, 1951 in an open field along the Czechoslovak border. This test operation, known as the “Winds of Freedom,” was on an experimental stand-alone basis, i.e., the launching of the balloons was not fully part of a coordinated programming effort with Radio Free Europe broadcasts. The Free Europe Press printed up millions of propaganda leaflets to be launched. The leaflets contained such slogans as "A new hope is stirring," and "Friends of Freedom in other lands have found a new way to reach you." The schedule and frequencies of Radio Free Europe’s broadcasts to Czechoslovakia were on the reverse side of the leaflets.

Some of the balloons were carried away by the winds from Czechoslovakia into the East Germany (DDR) state of Saxony. Reportedly, two of the balloons were shot down by the “Peoples Police” near the cities of Chemnitz, Plauen, and Zwickau.

The leaflets were written in Czech and gave the broadcasting schedules of Radio Free Europe. Most of the population in the area did not read Czech so the East Germans decided to use the balloons and leaflets in the ongoing anti-American propaganda.

It so happens that in the summer of 1951, East Germany began the annual “voluntary” search campaign through out the country for Colorado beetles that threatened the potato fields. Now East German propaganda warned in posters about the ingenious American way of sending thousands of Colorado beetles in small bags attached to the balloons that would burst open upon landing and destroy the potato fields. 

On Sunday, September 23, 1951, over 200,000 “volunteers”, including school-aged children, from 57 communities began searching for the balloon beetles in the potato fields.  Authorities announced that 26,000 “American” Colorado beetles had been found. The anti-American Sunday campaign was announced as so “successful” that they would continue each Sunday until the harvest was completed as a symbol for the anti-American demonstrations.

Here are other examples of other anti-American posters that appeared in the DDR:

 

 Norbert Muhlen wrote in the February 1, 1953, issue of the magazine Commentary 

“Potato bugs” is the derisive label given to charges the Soviets level at America. For the “hate America” campaign had begun with the story that American planes had dropped Colorado beetles—an insect popularly called  “potato bug”—over East Germany in order to destroy her potato crop (and  also by way of training American aviators for germ warfare, and at the same time opening up a market for Wall Street’s insecticides). But the East Germans never spotted any bug-carrying American planes, and they soon learned the real reason why their potato fields were full of beetles, and why they were unable to get rid of them—unlike West Germany, which had also been visited by the pests. East German insect-control experts had been fired as non-Communists, and East Germany’s stocks of insecticide had been transferred to Poland on Russian orders. By 1952 people in East Germany were sentenced to jail just for muttering “potato bug.”

The use of the Colorado beetle in propaganda appeared again in 1955, when the Czechoslovak newspaper Rude Pravo contained a commentary of one K. Vanek, who wrote, “For years and months the stream of slander spread by the heckling radio station FREE EUROPE proved that it serves one purpose: to disturb, to poison, to subvert … the subversive and espionage activities do not end … they include also sabotage in the economic sector, as for instance the spreading of the Colorado beetle.”

Erhard Geissler, identified as a German biological warfare expert said in a BBC World Service program of September 3, 2013: "The story was aimed at covering the government's own inability to fight the beetles, and provided a handy extra accusation to hurl at the Americans … the East German government did not believe the story themselves. They were not stupid. They had political convictions and they were concerned by the increasing danger of the developing Cold War, but I do not think they were stupid enough to believe their own propaganda. There is no factual basis for the story about the Yankee beetles at all."

Media Images used to support Radio Free Europe

Cold War...It is really an electric battle of information and of images that goes far deeper and is more obsessional than the old hot wars of industrial hardware.

Marshall McCluhan, Understanding Media

Below is a series of some of the images, which were used in newspaper and magazine advertisements, films, etc., to rally Americans in in support of fundraising campaigns for Radio Free Europe.

Cold War Appeals to Colleges and University Students in the Crusade for Freedom ©

 

Students and colleges and universities were a major target of Crusade for Freedom operations in the 1950s.  Below we briefly look at some of the activities.

1950

In the summer of 1950, the Crusade for Freedom organizers put out a newsletter to college and university Crusade committees with suggestions for campus activities.

THE FREEDOM BELL is the symbol of the CRUSADE. Arrange to ring your campus chimes or bells to call attention to the CRUSADE ... maybe to signalize the start ... or at intervals during the CRUSADE to indicate the triumphant 100% enrollment of each group.

ABOVE ALL, be sure your chimes ring long and loudly on October 24th, United Nations Day. All over the free world bells will ring at that time on that day. For at that time the Freedom Bell itself, by then installed in the western sector of Berlin, will first peal out its call to liberty. And just as Radio Free Europe will continue to broadcast every day to the people behind the Iron Curtain, so will the Freedom Bell ring out every day, bringing its message of hope for permanent peace and freedom.

1955 College Crusade for Freedom

The University of Minnesota had been chosen by the Crusade for Freedom as a “combined educational and fund-raising campaign” for the 1954-1955 campaign “on an experimental basis.” In February 1955, the 12th Annual Greek Week organizers at the University of Minnesota also used Radio Free Europe (RFE) and the Crusade for Freedom as its theme. Proceeds of its variety show were contributed to the Crusade campaign. 

During National Freedom Week, February 12-22, 1955, 25 universities adopted a combined education and fund raising campaign in support of the Crusade for Freedom, e.g., Barbara Gibbs, president of the student government at Ohio State University, said, “This is just the kind of program that will capture the interest of the university student.  To know you are helping to alleviate the world crisis is a gratifying thing.” 

J.W. Ashton, vice president of Indiana University, remarked, “It is most appropriate that as a part of their experience in the world of scholarship. Students should be given the opportunity to participate in so significant an activity.”

1956 Colleges Crusade

25 colleges with a student population of over 300,000 accepted to be part of the national campaign, with the purpose of making the students aware of the international crisis facing their generation and what they could do help. The Advertising Council sent a publicity kit to college newspapers and a promotional package was sent to different student groups.

           

In April 1956, college fraternities and sororities around the United States celebrated “Greek Week” by holding dances, parties, dinners, stage presentations and other social events. At the University of Iowa, “the Greek letter groups planned activities to make the campus and community aware of the efforts of Radio Free Europe and the Crusade for Freedom.“ Included  in the week’s programs was the musical show “Damn Yankees“ prepared by the Phi Kappa fraternity and Kappa Kappa Gamma sorority, with the processed going to the Crusade for Freedom.  William T. Rafael, program director of RFE, was the principal speaker at the “Greek Week“ campus convention. 

The Cedar Rapids Gazette carried photographs of university students, including one of student waiters dressed in “Balkan-inspired” costumes at an exchange dinner sponsored by the Pi Beta Sorority. 

           

The University of Minnesota had been chosen by the Crusade for Freedom as a “combined educational and fund-raising campaign” for the 1954-1955 “on an experimental basis.” In February 1955, the 12th Annual Greek Week organizers at the University of Minnesota also used RFE and the Crusade for Freedom as its theme. Proceeds of its variety show were contributed to the Crusade campaign. 

The Tau Kappa Epsilon fraternity at Indiana University in Bloomington held a car wash, resulting in $35 in contributions.

 1957College Campaign

The 1957 campaign reportedly reached over 250,000 students in 45 colleges and universities. Students at Brigham Young University, for example, wrote scripts and made tape recordings for local radio stations, made a half-hour program for broadcast over the local television station in Salt Lake City and covered the Crusade in the campus newspaper. 

Ohio State Students

At Ohio State University in Columbus, Ohio, had an extensive program that included four local television programs, classroom discussions, forums, debates, and street corner skits with solicitations. 80 fraternities and sororities participated. $2,300 was collected.

There was a leaflet drop at the University of Minnesota, which also witnessed an “Iron Curtain” dinner and forums “Are We Gaining in our Fight for Eastern Europe” and “How True is Our Propaganda?”

           

In March 1957, Evansville College, Drake University, and Emory University had College Crusade programs. At the University of Illinois, during the annual “Geek Week,” the Crusade program included a jazz concert and variety show, with the proceeds going to the Crusade for Freedom.  In Toledo, Ohio, students washed cars, manned gasoline pumps and changed tires in support of the Crusade.  At Ohio State University, 80 sororities and fraternities combined their effort during “Geek Week” for, group discussions, dinners, a “Stunt Night and a variety show. $2,300 was collected.

           

25 schools participated in a contest sponsored by the Crusade for Freedom and RFE for the most outstanding College Crusade.  From the winning college or university, one student was selected for a summer intern job with RFE in Munich.

Pennsylvania State University Chapel Choir

The Pennsylvania State University Chapel Choir went on its biennial six-week concert tour of Europe in the summer 1957, including a concert in Munich, Germany, where they also visited RFE.  Many of the 60 students were featured in local newspapers in Pennsylvania after their return home, e.g. Carole P. Young, who was featured in the New Castle, Pennsylvania News on September 4, 1957, in an article “Miss Carol Young Aids in RFE Radio Program.”  She was described as, “One of the American College students, contributing to the effort of RFE in carrying the fight of freedom directly into the camp of totalitarian Communism through this College Crusade.” 

           

Another student was Penny Robey of Smethport, Pennsylvania, who was similarly identified in the article text under her photograph, part of which read, “Thousands of American students contribute to this effort through the College Crusade, which is beamed via RFE’s transmitters to captive nations to captive nation students who are subject to Communist indoctrination.”