Early CIA Cold War Foreign Intelligence Operations in Lithuania, Part Three ©

On April 18-19, 1951, for the second infiltration, a CIA doubleton team of Julijonas Būtėnas  (“Steve”) and Jonas Kukauskas-Kukis (“Jack”) were dropped into the Kaunas area of Lithuania. Juozas Luksa was informed on March 1, 1951, by a wireless message from CIA that Kukauskas and Butenas were going to be dispatched: "Be prepared receive Steve and Jack in period 14-27 March." On a blind broadcast to Luksa on March 12, 1951: "March operation delayed until May. Await instructions." Even if Luksa was not informed of the exact time of arrival of Kukauskas and Butenas, he did know the approximate time of arrival. 

Their mission was:

• Establishment of contact with the underground resistance forces in Lithuania.

• Reorganization of the underground resistance forces along more practical lines.

• Establishment of reliable wireless transmission and secret writing communication between Lithuania and the American Zone of Germany.

• Procurement of positive and operational intelligence. 

Būtėnas was the “jumpmaster” for the first parachuting of the three agents in October 1950 (see Parts One and Two). He had been a journalist in Lithuania. In 1939 he was admitted to the Lithuanian Union of Journalists. He became the head of the VLIK information office and taught Lithuanian refugees English. After WWII, he was in a displaced persons camp in Würzburg, Germany, home of VLIK.

Būtėnas was recruited for intelligence work in September 1949 through officials of VLIK. He had been living in an International Refugee Organization (IRO) camp in Pfullingen, Germany. He was initially recruited to act as a translator and agent instructor. From 1949, Būtėnas lived in a safe house in Munich with Luksa. Later, from about May 1950, he lived with all the agents trained for CIA dispatches, including Jonas Kakauskas-Kukis. It was not until August 28, 1950, that he was assigned to a team for dispatch. 

After they landed in Lithuania, Būtėnas first separated from Kukauskas-Kukis and contacted the underground headquarters in the Tauras Region. As one story goes, Būtėnas and Petras Jurkšaitis (Beržas-"Birch"), the commander of a partisan unit, and Kukauskas were in a partisan forest bunker when they were surrounded by Lithuanian security forces (MGB) on May 22, 1951. Būtėnas and Jurkšaitis were killed in the fighting. Kukauskas surrendered. Another story is that the two were killed in a farmhouse in the village of Altoniskiai, by Lithuanian security forces. The farmer was supposedly drunk and gossiped with his neighbors, who informed the security forces. Yet another version of  death is that Būtėnas bit into the cyanide pill and killed himself. 

 

However, in April 1956, the Lithuanian language newspaper "Teviskes Ziburiai" (The Lights of Homeland), published in Toronto, Canada, reported that Butenas was alive and in a forced labor camp after being caught by security forces, put on trial, and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. 

 

In any event, he was buried in an unmarked grave. There is a memorial cross with a parachute in Kazlų Rūda, Lithuania. On May 19, 1999, Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus posthumously awarded Būtėnas the Order of the Vytis Cross, 3rd degree. 

Jonas Kukauskas 

In February 1938, Kukauskas a student in Vilnius, attempted to cross the Polish border into Lithuania to deliver information to the Lithuanian Intelligence Service. He was apprehended by the Polish counter-intelligence, interrogated, and brought to trial. He was released because his act was determined to have been that of an “irresponsible boy” rather than an agent of  an intelligence service.

In 1944 Kukauskas crossed Poland and arrived in Berlin. He later studied and the university in Frankfurt. In October 1946, he was recruited by the Operations Chief of Vlik for a mission organized by French intelligence. At Pfullingen, Germany, he was trained in communications until May 1947. 

In May 1948,  he was taken to Paris, where he was given intelligence training, including jump techniques by the French. There had been no contact with French representatives except for their instructors. In April 1950, after the French dispatch failed to materialize, Kukauskas was dismissed by the French case officer and were escorted by a French representative to Strasbourg. He was met by a representative of VLIK, who sent him on to Munich. Jonas Kukauskas was then recruited by CIA’s Office of Special Operations (OSO) and trained outside Munich.

Radio Game “Neman”

Afterr being captured by the Lithuanian security force, Kukauskas agreed to cooperate with them in a radio game “Neman” with CIA. A special ten-man department was created to direct this operation.

Kukauskas sent his first message on June 15, 1951. He reported that he and Būtėnas were separated and Būtėnas was killed without giving details. He continued sending messages with general information until November 29, 1951, when he stopped. He sent a message to CIA again in April 1952 with the excuse that his silence was due to a faulty generator.

Kukauskas contacted Luksa and got him to agree to a meeting in Pabartupis village forest near Kaunas. The meeting never occurred as Luksa was killed or committed suicide during an ambush by Lithuanian security forces. 

The Project Renewal request for Fiscal Year 1953-1954, included this comment:

The following represents an approximate analysis of reports received on Lithuania since May 1952 … 57 messages received from one Fl agent inside Lithuania giving an accurate picture of the present resistance situation in that country. 

Moreover, 

Since March 1953 three s/w letters received from our agent in Lithuania have established that he was probably-not under Soviet control as of December 1952. In the three letters received, he reported large round-ups of partisans resulting from treachery on the part of certain partisan leaders. In these encounters, his wit equipment was lost and most of his partisan unit destroyed. 

He was last known to have been in hiding; but in contact with an established mail-drop. Money was sent to assist this agent. Based on the letters received, there is some certainty in the assumption that this agent is not under Soviet control and that previous information on contacts in Lithuania sent by him may be used in future operations. 

In March 1953, Kukauskas sent a message: “Strong local security measures in December 1952 resulted in the destruction of a large segment of the Lithuanian resistance movement. The CIA agent himself was wounded in a skirmish with security troops and forced to go into hiding with friends.” 

In July 1953, CIA’s Chief of the Soviet Russia Division wrote:

In our last mission to Lithuania in April 1951 we dispatched two agents. One of the two agents was killed by MGB forces a. few weeks after arrival. The other agent succeeded in contacting the partisan forces, developing limited contact with legal living citizens, and maintaining continuous contact with CIA via W/T and S/W for the past 2 years. 

Kukauskas stopped sending W/T messages in 1953, but continued sending secret writing letters.  CIA believed that Kakauskas was under KGB control, but they continued the operational game:

The channels are used to obtain reactions to international events, to elicit information on its modus operandi, and to acquire intelligence information in instances when we believe that it would be unprofitable for the RIS to practice deception. 

CIA decided to exfiltrate Kakauskas, even though he was assumed to be under KGB control:

[B]ecause of the unusual length of time during which he allegedly managed to "live black" with little support, and also because of information obtained during debriefings …. However, correspondence with him is being maintained, and he is being played "straight" with the hope of eventual exfiltration. He has always indicated a desire to return to the West. . 

Agents were recruited and trained, but the exfiltration attempt was never made. Kukaukas’s last known contact with CIA was in the Spring 1956. 

 

 

Early CIA Cold War Foreign Intelligence Operations in Lithuania, Part Two ©

L-R, Sirvys, Luksa, Tumpys

Biographical sketches of the first three CIA penetration agents:

Juozas Lukša, (true name), aliases: Juozas Adomaitis, Adam Mickiewicz, and Skrajunas, the underground name assigned in October 1947, when he was about to depart to the west.

Lukša was born on August 10, 1921, in Veiveriai, Lithuania. On March 4, 1941, while an engineering student at the University of Kaunas, he was pledged into the Lithuanian Activist Front, an underground, clandestine anti- Soviet resistance movement. On May 6, 1941, he was arrested by the NKVD, but on June 23, 1941, he was set free by Lithuanian partisans as the Soviets retreated before the German advance. He allegedly was involved in a war-time atrocity in Kaunas on June 27, 1941.

In May 1945, the Lithuanian Partisan Movement was organized to unite all partisan activities in and south of Kaunas. He became Chief of the Documents Section. He was ordered to proceed south of Kaunas to contact independent partisan groups and unite them with the Lithuanian Partisan Movement (LPS). He failed in this mission since it was discovered that MKVD agents had penetrated the LPS. In September 1945, the LPS was reorganized and went underground. 

From January 1946-April 1947, Luksa commanded a partisan group and acted as Chief of Press and Information. In April 1947, he was sent to Poland to establish contact with Lithuanian organizations outside the Iron Curtain. Upon his return, he was appointed Chief Intelligence Officer for the underground in his district. In December 1947, Luksa left Lithuania on a mission through Poland and eventually arrived in Sweden.

Luksa wrote a memoir under the pseudonym Juozas Daumantas, with the original Lithuanian title Partizanai už geležinės uždangos, translated as "Partisans behind the Iron Curtain." It was first published in 1950 in the USA. The book was republished with "Fighters for Freedom, Lithuanian Partisans versus the USSR." 

Luksa was in communication with the CIA by wireless transmission between November 16, 1950, and the last message on December 8, 1950, and secret writing letters between November 1, 1950, and the last one on January 14, 1951. In September 1951, Luksa was betrayed by another CIA penetration agent and killed in an ambush by Lithuanian security forces.

Benediktas Trumpys (Rytis)

Trumpys (Trumpis) was born October 1, 1919, in Radoiliskis, Lithuania. He graduated from Siauliai high school in 1938. Subsequently, he was employed as a bookkeeper, railroad worker, and painter (in Pommern, Germany, from 1944 until Gcrany's capitulation). Until 1946, Trumpis was held in the Lubeck DP Camp. Between 1946 and 1949, he served with the 4204 Labor Service Company. Upon leaving the Labor Service Company, he was to inform his friends that clearance for his immigration to the US had come through, and he was taking free time before reporting to Bremerhaven. 

He was killed by Lithuanian security forces on May 20, 1951, in a bunker in the Altoniškės forest of Zapyškis area

Klemensas Sirvys (Sakalas, “Frank”)

Sirvys was born on February 4,  1926, in Kybartai, Lithuania. Until 1944 he was a high school student in Lithuania. Between 1944 and 1946 he was held in Hanau and Gunzen-Hausen DP camps. From 1946 until his recruitment by OSO, Sirvys served in the 4204 Labor Service Company in Bamberg, Germany. 

He was captured on July 24, 1952, put on trial, and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment and five years of exile. He returned to Lithuania in 1970 and died in 2003 in Kybartai.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Early CIA Cold War Foreign Intelligence Operations in Lithuania, Part One ©

AEGEAN was the cryptonym for a joint Office of Policy Coordination (OPC)-Office of Special Operations (OSO) project that began in November 1948. It was created to support the “Lithuanian Resistance Group” (The Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania –Vyriausiasis Lietuvos išlaisvinimo komitetas (VLIK). OPC supported VLIK for political and psychological warfare (PP); OSO was responsible for foreign intelligence (FI) activities: 

1. Procure information from Lithuania and the Baltic generally. 
2. Procure information from other parts of the USSR. 
3. Use the Lithuanian facilities as a channel for two-way movement of personnel in OSO service and, as necessary, for the movement of equipment, documentary data, and instructions. 
4. Use the Lithuanian facilities for such intelligence activities of OSO interest as may become necessary, to which the Lithuanian facilities, in the West or in the homeland, will lend themselves. 

The AEGEAN project was approved on June 21, 1949: "This project calls for the use at appropriate seasons (usually spring and autumn) of air and sea dispatch facilities. The necessary support equipment consists of wireless transmission equipment, secret writing supplies, personal arms, medical equipment, medical supplies, and negotiable items, such as watches, venereal drugs, and jewelry. Documentation needs will normally be taken care of by the project participants themselves. "

There were two objectives in the project plan that was under the control of the CIA's Munich Operational Base (MOB):  

 

1. Procurement of intelligence from the Baltic States and contiguous areas. 
2. Development of support base in the Lithuanian SSR as a transit point for agents to be dispatched into RSFR, Belorussian SSR, and Ukrainian SSR.

 

There were four targets: 

 

1.   Development of Special OSO-controlled morse code communications from the Lithuanian SSR to the American Zone in Germany and Sweden. 

2.   Development of sea, land, and/or air courier routes - between the American Zone in Germany and the Lithuanian SSR for the two-way movement of personnel, material, and information. 

3.   Development of safe areas, houses, and routes in the Lithuanian SSR to transit personnel, material, and information to and from RSFSR, Belorussian SSR, and Ukrainian SSR. 

 

The project operations were set to begin on July 1, 1949. The OPC project was approved by ADPC Frank Wisner. on July 23, 1949, under the cryptonym BGLAPIN. The project's first year was devoted primarily to the recruitment, training, and briefing of agent personnel. 

Lithuanian General Paulius Plechavicius then residing in the British zone of Germnay was to be the CIA contact person. Plechavicius was chief of the operating (military) section of VLIK. He had experiences in Lithuania during WWII in anti-Soviet activities. He was to move to Munich. The VLIK Operational Section personnel in Sweden was to be integrated into the project as were VLIK operational personnel assigned to the French intelligence service for the parachuting operations into Lithuania. 

 

On October 4, 1950, one team of three men was dropped by parachute into the area of Branischusen, Kaliningrad Oblast. The plane was an unmarked C-47 piloted by two Czech WWII veterans.

The first agents were Juozas Luksas, Benediktas Trumpys, and Klemensas Sirvys. French Intelligence had initially been selected for a mission in 1949, but the French decided to abandon the mission. CIA took it over. 

The mission of the first team was, "Establish wireless transmission as well as secret writing communications with the American Zone of Germany, and to reorganize the underground organization in LSSR into a support organization for American-controlled procurement activities." The three had been trained at a camp in Kaufbeurren, and learned Morse code, radio communications, and sabotage. For the operation, they were given weapons (Schmeisser MP-32 sub-machine gun), grenades, radios, cyanide tablets, ten watches, 3,000 rubles, 2,000 dollars, and food.

First CIA Foreign Intelligence Operation into Latvia in the early Cold War, Part Three ©

As we have seen In Part Two, Riekstens, Ozolins, and Balodis successfully parachuted into Latvia on August 26, 1952. But since Balodis left the airplane a few seconds later, he landed too far from the other agents to coordinate their next moves. 

Riekstens and Ozolins then proceeded according to plan on their journey to Tukums. Balodis headed off to Riga.

While underway, Riekstens and Ozolins were discovered by soldiers but could escape unharmed. But, reportedly, Ozolins dropped a map with the word "Dreimani” written on it. Dreimani was the name of the farm where Riekstens spent part of his childhood and was their goal.

Ozolins KGB Card

It turns out that Edvin Ozolins was a KGB agent with the cryptonym PILOT. He had walked into the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden, on or about December 10, 1950. He offered his services as an agent and was accepted by Moscow. 

After Riekstens and Ozolins reached the farmhouse on September 7, 1950. They were hidden in the barn. On September 11, 1950, soldiers surrounded the barn, and a firefight broke out. Riekstens did not give up and reportedly bit the hidden poison capsule sewn into his coat lapel. He died instantly. 

A later published account of his action had three KGB officers shooting Riekstens after he opened fire on them. Riekstens father was called in to identify his son but was refused permission to bury him. Rieskstns was eventually buried in an unmarked grave.

Ozolins surrendered to the soldiers and told him he was an agent named PILOT. The Latvian MGB eventually confirmed this with Moscow. Ozolins then participated in a Latvian MGB/KGB operational game METEOR used against the CIA to lure two American agents into Latvia: Leonids Zarins and Arturs Brombergs. They were captured and put on trial. This will be covered in a later posting.

Balodis KGB Card

As for Balodis, he reached his goal, but in August 1953, he was either captured or turned himself into the MGB and became agent CAPTAIN, with the alias Kārlis Krūmiņš. He became involved in an operational radio game by sending 48 MGB/KGB radio messages to CIA. The last message was received in December 1956. This radio game will also be covered in a later posting. 

Copies of the KGB cards are courtesy of the Latvian Centre for the Documentation of the Consequences of Totalitarianism (CDCT) 

First CIA Foreign Intelligence Operation into Latvia in the early Cold War, Part Two ©

Part Two

The information below comes from declassified CIA files.

On August 26, 1952, Alfreds Riekstins, Edvins Ozolins, and Nikolay's Balodis were dispatched by air to Latvia. They were dropped SE of Liepaja, directly at the center point between Macit and Trekni. The operational plane, a C-47, left the Wiesbaden airbase at 4:44 pm on August 26, 1952, and returned on August 27, 1952, at 04:14 am. Each agent carried an average of 120 lbs of equipment.

Operational Plan: Immediately after being parachuted, the agents were to proceed due NE until they reached the Venta river near Nigrande, approximately 25 kilometers from the drop zone. It was expected that they would reach this point on their 5th night in Latvia. Upon arriving at the Venta, they would await the beginning of a new night on the western banks to enable them to cross the river, make the original W/T contact (to be made by Balodis on Riekstins’ W/T set), and separate, with Rriekstins and Ozolins going northward while Balodis proceeds eastward. 

Riekstins and Ozolins were to proceed to the Meki area where most of their gear was buried. They would take the 100,000 Rubles for British Intelligence Service-supported partisans and bury them at a suitable burial place. Upon their return to their equipment, Riekstins was to make radio contact and report the location to the partisan money cache. The plan then called for a move to the Tukums area where Ozolins would separate from Riekstins at the earliest opportunity and proceed to Riga, after first having arranged a dead letter drop with Riekstins. 

Balodis was to proceed from the Venta river to within 25 Km of Renge, where he would cache his equipment then board a train for Riga at the Renge or Auch station. He was to take whichever departed first; time permitting, he would eat and procure a food supply for his trip. From his destination, be that Valk or Gulbene, he was to proceed to look up numerous prospective contacts whom he has previously known and who were scattered all the North East corner of Latvia. In addition, he would attempt to establish contact with the Catholic resistance in Latgale. It was rumored that the headquarters of this resistance was in Rezekne, on the southern fringe of Balodis’ operational area. He hoped that one of his contacts in Vilani would lead him to this resistance movement.

It was estimated that Riekstins would reach his operational area (Tukums vicinity) within 15 days: Ozolins would reach Riga a day or two later, and Balodis would reach his area within 15 days. 

According to the .jump master, the agents' morale was good; they had been eager to jump and had shown no unusual emotional tension. They did not cry, shout, or sing during the trip; they did not eat, though they drank some coffee. They jumped in numerical order. Just before Balodis left the plane, the jumpmaster noticed that his static line was around his neck. Balodis was held back by the jumpmaster, who quickly flipped the line over C-3's head. The delay caused Balodis to jump approximately 4 seconds later than Ozolins. The delay should have caused him to be dropped between ½ to 1 mile from Ozolins.

One CIA officer commented, “The entire operation was well-conceived and quite sound. Based on the fact that the agents were well trained, well briefed, of good spirits, and were dropped without serious complications, it could be said that the operation has, so far, been very successful, when it is considered how comparatively well the agents stood the prolonged holding stage and how successful the unprecedented dispatch in the dark of the moon has been.”

Next: How everything went wrong.

 

First CIA Foreign Intelligence Operation into Latvia in the early Cold War, Part One ©

 CIA Cold War cryptonyms associated with Latvia included JBCLOUD, HBHATCH, AEFLAG (1955-1962), AEMARSH (1953-1959), AECOB, and ZRLYNCH

Project AECOB was approved in 1950 for foreign intelligence (FI) operations into and within Soviet Latvia (JBCLOUD). It involved infiltration and exfiltration of "black agents" and the recruitment of legally resident agents in the USSR, especially Latvia. The budget for Fiscal Year 1952 was c. $135,00, which is equivalent to c. $1,350,000 today.

The original purpose was to contact the resistance in the Latvian SSR by utilizing a contact group in Sweden of the Latvian resistance.

The objectives of Project AECOB included:  

• Organize, develop, and execute covert operations for the infiltration into and, as appropriate, exfiltration out of the Latvian SSR of non-American agent personnel for the purpose of establishing support points in the Latvian SSR and obtaining operational and/or strategic intelligence.
• Establish in the Latvian SSR covert resident agent personnel who can assist agents being infiltrated into other strategic areas of the USSR and who will assist in the attainment of long-range intelligence objectives.
• Establish effective clandestine contacts with, and provide assistance and guidance to whatever resistance nuclei exist in the Latvian SSR. 
• Organize and develop specially trained unconventional warfare teams to be infiltrated into the Latvian SSR and work with resistance and guerrilla forces upon the outbreak of open hostilities with the Soviet Union

The tasks of the project included

1. Recruitment, training, and dispatch of Latvian agents in the Latvian SSR. 
2. Development of s/w, wit, and courier communications with the Latvian SSR. 
3. Stockpiling of materiel necessary for the support of resistance and guerrilla groups in the Latvian SSR. 
4. Training of sabotage and unconventional warfare teams. 

The first dispatch of agents took place on August 26, 1952. They were Alfreds, RIEKSTINS, Edvins OZOLINS, and Nikolays BALODIS. They were recruited through the "Latvian Contacts Group," an emigre Latvian group, and little if any CIA control was had over them. Prior to their departure in 1952, control of this operation was taken from this group and direct CIA control was instituted. The three agents considered themselves "free and independent fighters for the liberation of their homeland. Under no conditions have they ever or do they desire to be considered as in the employ of any particular government. Their motivation, therefore, is extremely nationalistic and ideological."

 

Before the dispatch of the three agents, a final evaluation report of the three was made. Here are some of the main points of the evaluation reports:

Alfreds Riekstins, CAMUSO 1, "Imant", pseudonym Igor A. Feldman

·      To be able to assess this evaluation properly one must bear in mind the precise nature of the job the agent is expected to carry out. Riekstinss principal task will be to serve as the link, the authenticator to whatever partisan units are encountered in Kurzene. 

·      His attitude towards the assignment is excellent. He has been trying to get back to Latvia since 1946. He is especially pleased to be working with Partisans. He considers them brothers-in-arms who have not deserted the true course. 

·       Personal courage, and dedication to his mission indicate that his moral resistance would be excellent. However, his excessive self-confidence and his impetuosity might be a disadvantage to him if he were hard-pressed. 

·      He has good possibilities for successfully completing his particular mission. However, he must be strongly controlled and not allowed much initiative and responsibility. 

Edvins Ozolins, CAMUSO 2, "Herbert", pseudonym Herberts Okolo

·      Assessment of the agent in terms of his specific tasks is doubly important in the case of Ozolins,  who has neither demonstrated communications attitude nor aggressiveness in physical training. However, because he is better than average in tradecraft knows the drop zone area very well, and will serve as a contact man for work in Riga, his native city, we feel he occupies an important place on the team.

·      Subject has been quite disappointing in Communications. He had considerable difficulty in mastering Morse Code because he simply does not have the ear for it. However, he shows good aptitude for cryptography and radio theory. 

·      As regards tradecraft subject is in much the same position as Riekstins except that he has a better potentiality to apply clandestine principles to the actual situation.

·    He also is a Latvian nationalist and is dissatisfied with his life as an emigre. He has no mercenary motives. He has no family in the emigration to provide for and considers his mission the most positive and useful thing that he can do. He has often stated that he would accept any mission that the ease officers consider him best fitted for.  

Nikolays Balodis, CAMUSO 3, "Boris", pseudonym Boris Lovetsky

·      His experiences and training as regards Sovietization are the same as Rietkins and Ozolis, except that he is in a better position to understand the Russians than the other two in as much as he is half Russian, speaks the language, and comes from Latgalia almost on the Russian border. 

·      He has consistently done better than his fellows in all phases of training. He appears to be a slow-witted peasant-type person but the opposite is true. He has a sharp and shrewd practical intellect, imagination, and confidence in his ability to do a job. 

·       He has already demonstrated his willingness to fight against Communism by jumping behind Russian lines for the Germans. He hates the Communists because they nationalized his mill and he was turned from a substantial citizen to a pauper. However, he makes a sharp distinction between a Russian and a Communist since he is half Russian. He has no grudge against the Russian people. He, then, seems to have two motives, the one more altruistic, to free Latvia, and the second personal: to regain his property. However, he is definitely not an agent for purely mercenary reasons. 

·      Because of Subject's physical courage, his history as a German agent, his demonstrated leadership abilities, and his excellent motivation, the undersigned considers him an excellent risk under conditions calling for moral resistance. 

·      The undersigned does not believe that the subject would allow his two weaknesses, whisky and women, to interfere with the security of the operation.

The conclusion of the evaluation reports was: "The AECOB team appears to be one of the better-balanced teams on hand. Any one of the Individuals on the team would be found lacking in one of a number of attributes if he were being considered as a singleton but together they make a rather effective group. The factors of leadership, area knowledge, technical ability, and personal traits are well mixed."  

 

The three agents were told that they were to consider themselves as "spearheads, establishing support points and operating possibilities for others who would follow." They were happy because of this statement, as they suspected and feared that they would be used as" intelligence agents," a term they abhorred. Because of these suspicions and fears, it was continually reiterated, that "they were operational personnel who were undertaking a mission for the liberation of their homeland and to aid the U.S. government in its fight against Communism."  

 

The Tragic Story of Two Cold War CIA Estonian Agents Hans Toomla and Kalju Kukk, Part Two ©

Part Two
 
Kukk’s and Toomla’s mission in Estonia was "locating, assessing, recruiting, and briefing several qualified and useful legal residents to have them communicate with us and furnish intelligence on a long term basis. Having accomplished this, the agents will then attempt to exfiltrate, along with a knowledgeable, legal resident whom we could debrief, train and return within the shortest time."  
 
Their specific targets included:
 
Warning of Soviet offensive or defensive preparedness:
 
·      Trends in active or passive air-defense readiness
·      Intensification of conscription
·      Mass deportation of the population from coastal areas and the Islands
·      Intensive troop movements into the area.
 
Tallinn Airfield at Lasnamae:
 
·      number and type of aircraft using the field; 
·      length, direction, and surfacing of runways; 
·      location of radio and radar stations; 
·      location and type of anti-aircraft defenses;
·      location and type of fuel storage. 
 
They were trained by CIA’s DOB in the United States as penetration agents I July 1953-April 26, 1954 (9 months, 26 Days) and August 1953-April 26, 1954 (8 months, 19 days), respectively.
 
They were then flown to Germany for final training and dispatching. On May 6-7, 1954, an unmarked C-54 transport plane took off from the Frankfurt-am-Main airport with Kukk and Toomla on board. Kukk and Toomla parachuted into south­ern Estonia near Auksaar Village, moving into Kergu Village near Vändra, where Toomla's mother Liis Toomla lived with his sister Helgi Noormaa. 
 
On June 30, 1954, they made their first broadcast from a farmhouse. The KGB put the farm under surveillance. On July 11, 1954, they made their last radio contact as the KGB attempted to arrest both of them. Toomla resisted and was shot. Kukk was arrested, imprisoned, and confessed. 

The KGB played a short counterespionage radio game until January 2, 1955, but eventually, that failed due to Kukk’s not playing along. He then was put on trial and sentenced to death. Kukk was executed in Butõrka Prison in Moscow on June 27, 1955

The USSR Council of Ministers' Committee for State Security (KGB) issued a statement that was carried in Soviet newspapers Pravda and Izvestia on January 15, 1955, and reported by various major and grassroots newspapers in the United States: 

"In the summer of 1954, two American agents were dropped by parachute into the Estonian Republic from an American plane that had violated the Soviet border. Through the steps taken by state security agencies, these spies were discovered sometime later in a forest in one of the districts of the Estonian Republic. One of the spies put up armed resistance to arrest and was killed in an exchange of shots. The second was captured. The detained American spy proved to be Kaliu Kukk; the one killed was Hans Toomla." 
 
The statement went on to list what Kukk and Toomla had in their possession
 

·      A machine gun with ammunition, 
·      four revolvers, 
·      two portable transmitters, 
·      ciphers and codes, 
·      ampules of poison in case of arrest,
·      fabric topographical maps,
·      two ROBOT cameras, 
·      blank Soviet passports, 
·      military identity cards and certificates, 
·      counterfeit seals of Soviet institutions, 
·      Swedish and Norwegian crowns and 
·      Eighty thousand rubles in Soviet money.

A later report of the “2nd Counter-Intelligence Department of the State Security Committee of the Council of Ministers of the Estonian SSR” contained this critical remark: “The pursuit of the spies KUKK and TOOMLA lasted almost two and a half months, and although the spies were arrested, an analysis of the course of the pursuit showed that some agency and operational links were poorly organized, especially service both on trains and in groups.”

 
According to the terms of the agents' CIA contracts, “the death benefits were to be paid if no information regarding their existence was brought to the U.S. Government's attention for two years after the date of the agents' last contact with appropriate Government representatives.” $20,000 for payment of death benefits to the beneficiaries designated by Kukk and Toomla was approved.