First CIA Foreign Intelligence Operation into Latvia in the early Cold War, Part Three ©

As we have seen In Part Two, Riekstens, Ozolins, and Balodis successfully parachuted into Latvia on August 26, 1952. But since Balodis left the airplane a few seconds later, he landed too far from the other agents to coordinate their next moves. 

Riekstens and Ozolins then proceeded according to plan on their journey to Tukums. Balodis headed off to Riga.

While underway, Riekstens and Ozolins were discovered by soldiers but could escape unharmed. But, reportedly, Ozolins dropped a map with the word "Dreimani” written on it. Dreimani was the name of the farm where Riekstens spent part of his childhood and was their goal.

Ozolins KGB Card

It turns out that Edvin Ozolins was a KGB agent with the cryptonym PILOT. He had walked into the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden, on or about December 10, 1950. He offered his services as an agent and was accepted by Moscow. 

After Riekstens and Ozolins reached the farmhouse on September 7, 1950. They were hidden in the barn. On September 11, 1950, soldiers surrounded the barn, and a firefight broke out. Riekstens did not give up and reportedly bit the hidden poison capsule sewn into his coat lapel. He died instantly. 

A later published account of his action had three KGB officers shooting Riekstens after he opened fire on them. Riekstens father was called in to identify his son but was refused permission to bury him. Rieskstns was eventually buried in an unmarked grave.

Ozolins surrendered to the soldiers and told him he was an agent named PILOT. The Latvian MGB eventually confirmed this with Moscow. Ozolins then participated in a Latvian MGB/KGB operational game METEOR used against the CIA to lure two American agents into Latvia: Leonids Zarins and Arturs Brombergs. They were captured and put on trial. This will be covered in a later posting.

Balodis KGB Card

As for Balodis, he reached his goal, but in August 1953, he was either captured or turned himself into the MGB and became agent CAPTAIN, with the alias Kārlis Krūmiņš. He became involved in an operational radio game by sending 48 MGB/KGB radio messages to CIA. The last message was received in December 1956. This radio game will also be covered in a later posting. 

Copies of the KGB cards are courtesy of the Latvian Centre for the Documentation of the Consequences of Totalitarianism (CDCT) 

First CIA Foreign Intelligence Operation into Latvia in the early Cold War, Part Two ©

Part Two

The information below comes from declassified CIA files.

On August 26, 1952, Alfreds Riekstins, Edvins Ozolins, and Nikolay's Balodis were dispatched by air to Latvia. They were dropped SE of Liepaja, directly at the center point between Macit and Trekni. The operational plane, a C-47, left the Wiesbaden airbase at 4:44 pm on August 26, 1952, and returned on August 27, 1952, at 04:14 am. Each agent carried an average of 120 lbs of equipment.

Operational Plan: Immediately after being parachuted, the agents were to proceed due NE until they reached the Venta river near Nigrande, approximately 25 kilometers from the drop zone. It was expected that they would reach this point on their 5th night in Latvia. Upon arriving at the Venta, they would await the beginning of a new night on the western banks to enable them to cross the river, make the original W/T contact (to be made by Balodis on Riekstins’ W/T set), and separate, with Rriekstins and Ozolins going northward while Balodis proceeds eastward. 

Riekstins and Ozolins were to proceed to the Meki area where most of their gear was buried. They would take the 100,000 Rubles for British Intelligence Service-supported partisans and bury them at a suitable burial place. Upon their return to their equipment, Riekstins was to make radio contact and report the location to the partisan money cache. The plan then called for a move to the Tukums area where Ozolins would separate from Riekstins at the earliest opportunity and proceed to Riga, after first having arranged a dead letter drop with Riekstins. 

Balodis was to proceed from the Venta river to within 25 Km of Renge, where he would cache his equipment then board a train for Riga at the Renge or Auch station. He was to take whichever departed first; time permitting, he would eat and procure a food supply for his trip. From his destination, be that Valk or Gulbene, he was to proceed to look up numerous prospective contacts whom he has previously known and who were scattered all the North East corner of Latvia. In addition, he would attempt to establish contact with the Catholic resistance in Latgale. It was rumored that the headquarters of this resistance was in Rezekne, on the southern fringe of Balodis’ operational area. He hoped that one of his contacts in Vilani would lead him to this resistance movement.

It was estimated that Riekstins would reach his operational area (Tukums vicinity) within 15 days: Ozolins would reach Riga a day or two later, and Balodis would reach his area within 15 days. 

According to the .jump master, the agents' morale was good; they had been eager to jump and had shown no unusual emotional tension. They did not cry, shout, or sing during the trip; they did not eat, though they drank some coffee. They jumped in numerical order. Just before Balodis left the plane, the jumpmaster noticed that his static line was around his neck. Balodis was held back by the jumpmaster, who quickly flipped the line over C-3's head. The delay caused Balodis to jump approximately 4 seconds later than Ozolins. The delay should have caused him to be dropped between ½ to 1 mile from Ozolins.

One CIA officer commented, “The entire operation was well-conceived and quite sound. Based on the fact that the agents were well trained, well briefed, of good spirits, and were dropped without serious complications, it could be said that the operation has, so far, been very successful, when it is considered how comparatively well the agents stood the prolonged holding stage and how successful the unprecedented dispatch in the dark of the moon has been.”

Next: How everything went wrong.

 

First CIA Foreign Intelligence Operation into Latvia in the early Cold War, Part One ©

 CIA Cold War cryptonyms associated with Latvia included JBCLOUD, HBHATCH, AEFLAG (1955-1962), AEMARSH (1953-1959), AECOB, and ZRLYNCH

Project AECOB was approved in 1950 for foreign intelligence (FI) operations into and within Soviet Latvia (JBCLOUD). It involved infiltration and exfiltration of "black agents" and the recruitment of legally resident agents in the USSR, especially Latvia. The budget for Fiscal Year 1952 was c. $135,00, which is equivalent to c. $1,350,000 today.

The original purpose was to contact the resistance in the Latvian SSR by utilizing a contact group in Sweden of the Latvian resistance.

The objectives of Project AECOB included:  

• Organize, develop, and execute covert operations for the infiltration into and, as appropriate, exfiltration out of the Latvian SSR of non-American agent personnel for the purpose of establishing support points in the Latvian SSR and obtaining operational and/or strategic intelligence.
• Establish in the Latvian SSR covert resident agent personnel who can assist agents being infiltrated into other strategic areas of the USSR and who will assist in the attainment of long-range intelligence objectives.
• Establish effective clandestine contacts with, and provide assistance and guidance to whatever resistance nuclei exist in the Latvian SSR. 
• Organize and develop specially trained unconventional warfare teams to be infiltrated into the Latvian SSR and work with resistance and guerrilla forces upon the outbreak of open hostilities with the Soviet Union

The tasks of the project included

1. Recruitment, training, and dispatch of Latvian agents in the Latvian SSR. 
2. Development of s/w, wit, and courier communications with the Latvian SSR. 
3. Stockpiling of materiel necessary for the support of resistance and guerrilla groups in the Latvian SSR. 
4. Training of sabotage and unconventional warfare teams. 

The first dispatch of agents took place on August 26, 1952. They were Alfreds, RIEKSTINS, Edvins OZOLINS, and Nikolays BALODIS. They were recruited through the "Latvian Contacts Group," an emigre Latvian group, and little if any CIA control was had over them. Prior to their departure in 1952, control of this operation was taken from this group and direct CIA control was instituted. The three agents considered themselves "free and independent fighters for the liberation of their homeland. Under no conditions have they ever or do they desire to be considered as in the employ of any particular government. Their motivation, therefore, is extremely nationalistic and ideological."

 

Before the dispatch of the three agents, a final evaluation report of the three was made. Here are some of the main points of the evaluation reports:

Alfreds Riekstins, CAMUSO 1, "Imant", pseudonym Igor A. Feldman

·      To be able to assess this evaluation properly one must bear in mind the precise nature of the job the agent is expected to carry out. Riekstinss principal task will be to serve as the link, the authenticator to whatever partisan units are encountered in Kurzene. 

·      His attitude towards the assignment is excellent. He has been trying to get back to Latvia since 1946. He is especially pleased to be working with Partisans. He considers them brothers-in-arms who have not deserted the true course. 

·       Personal courage, and dedication to his mission indicate that his moral resistance would be excellent. However, his excessive self-confidence and his impetuosity might be a disadvantage to him if he were hard-pressed. 

·      He has good possibilities for successfully completing his particular mission. However, he must be strongly controlled and not allowed much initiative and responsibility. 

Edvins Ozolins, CAMUSO 2, "Herbert", pseudonym Herberts Okolo

·      Assessment of the agent in terms of his specific tasks is doubly important in the case of Ozolins,  who has neither demonstrated communications attitude nor aggressiveness in physical training. However, because he is better than average in tradecraft knows the drop zone area very well, and will serve as a contact man for work in Riga, his native city, we feel he occupies an important place on the team.

·      Subject has been quite disappointing in Communications. He had considerable difficulty in mastering Morse Code because he simply does not have the ear for it. However, he shows good aptitude for cryptography and radio theory. 

·      As regards tradecraft subject is in much the same position as Riekstins except that he has a better potentiality to apply clandestine principles to the actual situation.

·    He also is a Latvian nationalist and is dissatisfied with his life as an emigre. He has no mercenary motives. He has no family in the emigration to provide for and considers his mission the most positive and useful thing that he can do. He has often stated that he would accept any mission that the ease officers consider him best fitted for.  

Nikolays Balodis, CAMUSO 3, "Boris", pseudonym Boris Lovetsky

·      His experiences and training as regards Sovietization are the same as Rietkins and Ozolis, except that he is in a better position to understand the Russians than the other two in as much as he is half Russian, speaks the language, and comes from Latgalia almost on the Russian border. 

·      He has consistently done better than his fellows in all phases of training. He appears to be a slow-witted peasant-type person but the opposite is true. He has a sharp and shrewd practical intellect, imagination, and confidence in his ability to do a job. 

·       He has already demonstrated his willingness to fight against Communism by jumping behind Russian lines for the Germans. He hates the Communists because they nationalized his mill and he was turned from a substantial citizen to a pauper. However, he makes a sharp distinction between a Russian and a Communist since he is half Russian. He has no grudge against the Russian people. He, then, seems to have two motives, the one more altruistic, to free Latvia, and the second personal: to regain his property. However, he is definitely not an agent for purely mercenary reasons. 

·      Because of Subject's physical courage, his history as a German agent, his demonstrated leadership abilities, and his excellent motivation, the undersigned considers him an excellent risk under conditions calling for moral resistance. 

·      The undersigned does not believe that the subject would allow his two weaknesses, whisky and women, to interfere with the security of the operation.

The conclusion of the evaluation reports was: "The AECOB team appears to be one of the better-balanced teams on hand. Any one of the Individuals on the team would be found lacking in one of a number of attributes if he were being considered as a singleton but together they make a rather effective group. The factors of leadership, area knowledge, technical ability, and personal traits are well mixed."  

 

The three agents were told that they were to consider themselves as "spearheads, establishing support points and operating possibilities for others who would follow." They were happy because of this statement, as they suspected and feared that they would be used as" intelligence agents," a term they abhorred. Because of these suspicions and fears, it was continually reiterated, that "they were operational personnel who were undertaking a mission for the liberation of their homeland and to aid the U.S. government in its fight against Communism."  

 

The Tragic Story of Two Cold War CIA Estonian Agents Hans Toomla and Kalju Kukk, Part Two ©

Part Two
 
Kukk’s and Toomla’s mission in Estonia was "locating, assessing, recruiting, and briefing several qualified and useful legal residents to have them communicate with us and furnish intelligence on a long term basis. Having accomplished this, the agents will then attempt to exfiltrate, along with a knowledgeable, legal resident whom we could debrief, train and return within the shortest time."  
 
Their specific targets included:
 
Warning of Soviet offensive or defensive preparedness:
 
·      Trends in active or passive air-defense readiness
·      Intensification of conscription
·      Mass deportation of the population from coastal areas and the Islands
·      Intensive troop movements into the area.
 
Tallinn Airfield at Lasnamae:
 
·      number and type of aircraft using the field; 
·      length, direction, and surfacing of runways; 
·      location of radio and radar stations; 
·      location and type of anti-aircraft defenses;
·      location and type of fuel storage. 
 
They were trained by CIA’s DOB in the United States as penetration agents I July 1953-April 26, 1954 (9 months, 26 Days) and August 1953-April 26, 1954 (8 months, 19 days), respectively.
 
They were then flown to Germany for final training and dispatching. On May 6-7, 1954, an unmarked C-54 transport plane took off from the Frankfurt-am-Main airport with Kukk and Toomla on board. Kukk and Toomla parachuted into south­ern Estonia near Auksaar Village, moving into Kergu Village near Vändra, where Toomla's mother Liis Toomla lived with his sister Helgi Noormaa. 
 
On June 30, 1954, they made their first broadcast from a farmhouse. The KGB put the farm under surveillance. On July 11, 1954, they made their last radio contact as the KGB attempted to arrest both of them. Toomla resisted and was shot. Kukk was arrested, imprisoned, and confessed. 

The KGB played a short counterespionage radio game until January 2, 1955, but eventually, that failed due to Kukk’s not playing along. He then was put on trial and sentenced to death. Kukk was executed in Butõrka Prison in Moscow on June 27, 1955

The USSR Council of Ministers' Committee for State Security (KGB) issued a statement that was carried in Soviet newspapers Pravda and Izvestia on January 15, 1955, and reported by various major and grassroots newspapers in the United States: 

"In the summer of 1954, two American agents were dropped by parachute into the Estonian Republic from an American plane that had violated the Soviet border. Through the steps taken by state security agencies, these spies were discovered sometime later in a forest in one of the districts of the Estonian Republic. One of the spies put up armed resistance to arrest and was killed in an exchange of shots. The second was captured. The detained American spy proved to be Kaliu Kukk; the one killed was Hans Toomla." 
 
The statement went on to list what Kukk and Toomla had in their possession
 

·      A machine gun with ammunition, 
·      four revolvers, 
·      two portable transmitters, 
·      ciphers and codes, 
·      ampules of poison in case of arrest,
·      fabric topographical maps,
·      two ROBOT cameras, 
·      blank Soviet passports, 
·      military identity cards and certificates, 
·      counterfeit seals of Soviet institutions, 
·      Swedish and Norwegian crowns and 
·      Eighty thousand rubles in Soviet money.

A later report of the “2nd Counter-Intelligence Department of the State Security Committee of the Council of Ministers of the Estonian SSR” contained this critical remark: “The pursuit of the spies KUKK and TOOMLA lasted almost two and a half months, and although the spies were arrested, an analysis of the course of the pursuit showed that some agency and operational links were poorly organized, especially service both on trains and in groups.”

 
According to the terms of the agents' CIA contracts, “the death benefits were to be paid if no information regarding their existence was brought to the U.S. Government's attention for two years after the date of the agents' last contact with appropriate Government representatives.” $20,000 for payment of death benefits to the beneficiaries designated by Kukk and Toomla was approved. 

The Tragic Story of Two CIA Cold War Estonian Agents Hans Toomla and Kalju Kukk, Part One ©

 Part One

The original Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) project LCHOMELY was submitted for approval on January 4, 1950, and aimed at utilizing Estonian emigre groups, leaders, and organizations for the purpose of contacting underground resistance forces in the Estonian SSR and infiltrating agents into the area. The project's objective was to provide funds for the support, development, and exploitation of the Estonian Resistance Movement:

During the first two post-war years, there were frequent reports relating to extensive partisan activity in Estonia. However, except for isolated bands with no centralized control, it is doubtful if there is any significant resistance today, although there is unquestionably much latent resistance. There are probably several hundred Estonians living in the woods where they escaped in preference to deportation. 

 

CIA Project AEBASIN approved on October 16, 1952, included all operations into Estonia: Foreign Intelligence, Psychological War missions, and responsibilities of the Soviet Russia Division. It included developing Estonian emigre groups outside of the USSR for support operations, covert political activities, and psychological warfare directed against the Estonian SSR. 

 

Recruiting agents took place in Sweden, Germany, and the United States. In May 1952, LCHOMELY recruitment efforts in Sweden were canceled due to "The unfavorable character of persons involved in recruiting, including controversial Estonian politicians.” The agent candidates recruited prior to May under LCHOMELY declined to undertake the mission in October 1952. It was then considered necessary to concentrate all efforts for AEBASIN agent recruitment in the United States. 

 

Two agents trained by CIA’s Domestic Operations Base (FOB) included Hans Augusti Toomla and Kajla  Nikolai Kukk. Below are brief CIA biographies of both.

Hans Augusti TOOMLA had CIA cryptonyms AETAXI, AEROOT/1, codename “Artur” and pseudonym "Jerome N. Gravestone." Toomla was born on a farm in the Parnu District of Estonia on March 16, 1924. One CIA document contained the following description:  

He is an action agent currently being trained for infiltration into the Estonian SSR. He has many relatives and friends in the target area who may provide some support to him. The subject is 30 years old and a seasoned front-line veteran of the Estonian front during World War II, and has had experience with the Estonian partisan forces. The recruiter recommended him as a man with a well-develop character, an old soldier and a bitter enemy of the Communists and Russians; he is undertaking the assignment as an opportunity to work against the Russians in Estonia—an opportunity for which he waited for a long time.

Kalju Nikolai KUKK had cryptonyms RNCHANGE, AEROOT/2, codename “Karl” and pseudonym “Alden K. Neighbarger”. Kukk was born in Sindi, Estonia, on January 26, 1921. CIA described him this way: “He has relatives and friends whom he hopes to be able to contact for operational support. He has front-line experiences fighting the USSR with Germany during the war. He and Toomla are friends of long-standing and appear to have confidence in each other."

One CIA report contained this comment about them: “On the whole, it must be noted that the agents are of the average type and possess no outstanding qualifications either in general or in any one particular field. Whether or not they will be able to perform the difficult tasks expected of them can only be evaluated toward the latter part of their training when their capability of performing and employing the subjects learned will be tested in practical exercises.” 

 

Moreover,  “Toomla and Kukk are dependent on the CIA for help in rehabilitation after completing their missions; their salaries and bonuses remain under Agency control. They are apparently not subordinated to any government or émigré political organizations. Their motivation is based on ideological opposition to Communism and the Bolshevik occupation of their native land."

 

They were promised $10,000 death benefits and a $5,000 bonus each after completing the two-year mission.

CIA’s Early Cold War REDSOX Foreign Intelligence Operations into Ukraine, Part Two

 Request for Renewal of Project AEACRE for the Fiscal Year of 1957

“From 1953, until late 1955, relatively few REDSOX operations were conducted…It has been said that every REDSOX agent whose capture is revealed by the Soviets has positive psychological value as it indicates positively to any dissident elements within the Soviet Union that we in the "West" are still actively interested in their cause. Such advertisement also shows anti-Communist elements outside the "IRON CURTAIN" that the West is still actively opposing the Communist regimes.

 

“Since the resuscitation of the REDSOX activity in September 1955, DOB has had some minor successes and some major setbacks that were in most part not due to the lack of professional handling but to factors beyond our control. Recent successes of short border crossing operations indicate that with proper agents, adequate training, and documentation, we are capable of successful short-range penetrations of the Soviet Union. And with good communication equipment and dependable in/exfiltration support, deeper penetrations of the Soviet Union will be possible.

 

“Under the new REDSOX functional concept, which became effective only after 1 September 1955, SR/7/DOB undertook the initiation of its REDSOX projects. Though hindered by the prevailing shortage of competent staff and support personnel, the following projects were undertaken:

 

“Project AERODYNAMIC: Domestic Operation Base (DOB) has recently submitted a revised Foreign Intelligence version of this project which formerly also incorporated Psychological Paramilitary and Counter Espionage functions. AERODYNAMIC has been an active Soviet Russia project for the past seven years and has supported the dispatch of all REDSOX agents into the Soviet UKRAINE. It provided:

 

·      Financial support for the mechanism by which underground couriers brought out pouched material;  

·      Provided the intelligence community with information of Ukrainian underground activities; 

·      The structure, aims, and personalities of the UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY (UPA); and 

·      the underground government, the UKRAINIAN SUPREME LIBERATION COUNCIL (UHVR). 

·       

“The Domestic Operations Basee has taken the initiative to resurrect the REDSOX portions of this project. Recent conferences between DOB personnel and foreign representatives of the UHVR have provided the basis for establishing a spotter network among this emigre organization's membership. The UHVR keenly feels the need for reactivating some of its internal contacts in the Ukrainian underground. 

“Project ALOPECIA: This cryptonym has been given to a singleton contact in Brazil operating among the Ukrainian emigres. It is anticipated that his activities for Fiscal Year 1957 will be expanded to include all of South America, making him the focal point for the spotting and preliminary assessment of any action-type candidates who could be used in the Ukrainian REDSOX operations. It is further anticipated that this man will be brought to the United States during this fiscal period for assessment and training to prepare him better for his job. 

 

“Project AECUPBOARD: This is a pilot project for which recently requested foreign intelligence approval. It is an attempt to set up an overt package mail channel with persons in the Soviet Union. By tapping correspondence with persons who were active in the old Ukrainian underground movement, it is hoped that material, funds, and instructions can eventually be sent in to persons in the Ukrainian SSR. Eventually, safehouse and reception facilities might be established through this channel to support REDSOX and other Soviet Russia Division operations in the area.

CIA’s Early Cold War REDSOX Foreign Intelligence Operations into Ukraine, Part One ©

 In January 1950, the United States National Security Council (NSC) issued Intelligence Directive No. 13 entitled  "Exploitation of Soviet and Satellite Defectors Outside the United States." This directive specifically defined defectors as, 

 

"Individuals who escape from the control of the USSR or countries in the Soviet orbit, or who, being outside such jurisdiction or control, are unwilling to return to it, and who are of special interest to the U.S. Government because they can add valuable new or confirmatory information to existing U.S. knowledge of the Soviet world because their defection can be exploited in the psychological field."

 

NSC authorized and directed that "The Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for the covert exploitation of defectors, and shall coordinate all matters concerned with the handling and disposition of declared defectors from the Soviet Union and the satellite states to assure the effective exploitation of all defectors for operational, intelligence, or psychological purposes by the U.S. Government." 

 

REDSOX was a CIA cryptonym for Foreign Intelligence operations in the early Cold War involving “The illegal return of defectors and emigres to USSR as agents.” The information below comes from declassified CIA documents.

 

CIA's REDSOX operational plan for Spring 1952.

 

“Both the undersigned case officers and the ZP/UHVR themselves strongly agree that granted the extent of Soviet knowledge of CIA and British Intelligence dispatches of the past several years, any possibility of a May-moon-period air dispatch into Western Ukraine catching the Soviets napping must be discarded as wishful thinking; the trick has been tried too often. 

 

“Or the other hand, so long as quantities of snow are on the ground, the Soviets do not expect the woodland partisan activity of any sort, much less an airdrop of partisan couriers, who, as the Soviets well know, would have to wait for local contact until their local colleagues come out of their bunkers in late April. Therefore, it is strongly recommended by both the agents and the case officers that one of the last ten nights of March or the first five of April be utilized to dispatch the next ZP/UHVR team. March has never been used for an air mission to the Soviet Union. The next ZP/UHVR team members are frankly scared of waiting until the usual time in May. 

 

“From their point of view, a month of camping in the snow of an isolated mountain forest is far less dangerous than dropping in during the warmer weather when Soviets are out in force for the now-traditional spring anti-partisan campaign. 

 

“From our point of view, the plane and crew should by all odds be safer flying in and out in late March than would be the case in mid or late spring. Suppose the operation can be handled securely from this end. In that case, the change of schedule to March plus the use of a slightly different air approach should cancel out the effectiveness of Soviet-made plans for intercepting an aircraft or observing parachutists while they are landing. While the case officers are not air experts, they have given a lot of thought to the ground reactions to the CIA and British Intelligence Service flights of 1950 and 1951. 

 

“We know that by January 1950, the Soviets were aware that the U.S. was dropping personnel by air into Western Ukraine, but the Soviets were apparently unable to do anything to thwart the May 1950 mission. By early July 1950, the Soviets had captured alive one of the four men who had jumped in two months earlier. By Mid-August 1950, the Russian Intelligence Service can be assumed to have known all the essential facts concerning the September 1949 and May 1950 drops.

 

“Despite this, three separate air flights safely deposited a total of 22 agents in Western Ukraine in May 1951. The flights themselves were decidedly a success. Even though they repeated the pattern established the previous year, there was nothing except the flares our plane saw at the border to show that the Soviets had devised any methods for coping with the flights. 

 

"We have no information to indicate that the demise of the two British teams and the breakdown of communications with our team had a direct connection with the fact that the teams arrived in Western Ukraine by air. In brief, as far as Western Ukraine is concerned, we are not impressed with the Soviets' ability to thwart even those air operations that logic would lead them to anticipate.“