The Tragic Story of Two Cold War CIA Estonian Agents Hans Toomla and Kalju Kukk, Part Two ©

Part Two
 
Kukk’s and Toomla’s mission in Estonia was "locating, assessing, recruiting, and briefing several qualified and useful legal residents to have them communicate with us and furnish intelligence on a long term basis. Having accomplished this, the agents will then attempt to exfiltrate, along with a knowledgeable, legal resident whom we could debrief, train and return within the shortest time."  
 
Their specific targets included:
 
Warning of Soviet offensive or defensive preparedness:
 
·      Trends in active or passive air-defense readiness
·      Intensification of conscription
·      Mass deportation of the population from coastal areas and the Islands
·      Intensive troop movements into the area.
 
Tallinn Airfield at Lasnamae:
 
·      number and type of aircraft using the field; 
·      length, direction, and surfacing of runways; 
·      location of radio and radar stations; 
·      location and type of anti-aircraft defenses;
·      location and type of fuel storage. 
 
They were trained by CIA’s DOB in the United States as penetration agents I July 1953-April 26, 1954 (9 months, 26 Days) and August 1953-April 26, 1954 (8 months, 19 days), respectively.
 
They were then flown to Germany for final training and dispatching. On May 6-7, 1954, an unmarked C-54 transport plane took off from the Frankfurt-am-Main airport with Kukk and Toomla on board. Kukk and Toomla parachuted into south­ern Estonia near Auksaar Village, moving into Kergu Village near Vändra, where Toomla's mother Liis Toomla lived with his sister Helgi Noormaa. 
 
On June 30, 1954, they made their first broadcast from a farmhouse. The KGB put the farm under surveillance. On July 11, 1954, they made their last radio contact as the KGB attempted to arrest both of them. Toomla resisted and was shot. Kukk was arrested, imprisoned, and confessed. 

The KGB played a short counterespionage radio game until January 2, 1955, but eventually, that failed due to Kukk’s not playing along. He then was put on trial and sentenced to death. Kukk was executed in Butõrka Prison in Moscow on June 27, 1955

The USSR Council of Ministers' Committee for State Security (KGB) issued a statement that was carried in Soviet newspapers Pravda and Izvestia on January 15, 1955, and reported by various major and grassroots newspapers in the United States: 

"In the summer of 1954, two American agents were dropped by parachute into the Estonian Republic from an American plane that had violated the Soviet border. Through the steps taken by state security agencies, these spies were discovered sometime later in a forest in one of the districts of the Estonian Republic. One of the spies put up armed resistance to arrest and was killed in an exchange of shots. The second was captured. The detained American spy proved to be Kaliu Kukk; the one killed was Hans Toomla." 
 
The statement went on to list what Kukk and Toomla had in their possession
 

·      A machine gun with ammunition, 
·      four revolvers, 
·      two portable transmitters, 
·      ciphers and codes, 
·      ampules of poison in case of arrest,
·      fabric topographical maps,
·      two ROBOT cameras, 
·      blank Soviet passports, 
·      military identity cards and certificates, 
·      counterfeit seals of Soviet institutions, 
·      Swedish and Norwegian crowns and 
·      Eighty thousand rubles in Soviet money.

A later report of the “2nd Counter-Intelligence Department of the State Security Committee of the Council of Ministers of the Estonian SSR” contained this critical remark: “The pursuit of the spies KUKK and TOOMLA lasted almost two and a half months, and although the spies were arrested, an analysis of the course of the pursuit showed that some agency and operational links were poorly organized, especially service both on trains and in groups.”

 
According to the terms of the agents' CIA contracts, “the death benefits were to be paid if no information regarding their existence was brought to the U.S. Government's attention for two years after the date of the agents' last contact with appropriate Government representatives.” $20,000 for payment of death benefits to the beneficiaries designated by Kukk and Toomla was approved. 

The Tragic Story of Two CIA Cold War Estonian Agents Hans Toomla and Kalju Kukk, Part One ©

 Part One

The original Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) project LCHOMELY was submitted for approval on January 4, 1950, and aimed at utilizing Estonian emigre groups, leaders, and organizations for the purpose of contacting underground resistance forces in the Estonian SSR and infiltrating agents into the area. The project's objective was to provide funds for the support, development, and exploitation of the Estonian Resistance Movement:

During the first two post-war years, there were frequent reports relating to extensive partisan activity in Estonia. However, except for isolated bands with no centralized control, it is doubtful if there is any significant resistance today, although there is unquestionably much latent resistance. There are probably several hundred Estonians living in the woods where they escaped in preference to deportation. 

 

CIA Project AEBASIN approved on October 16, 1952, included all operations into Estonia: Foreign Intelligence, Psychological War missions, and responsibilities of the Soviet Russia Division. It included developing Estonian emigre groups outside of the USSR for support operations, covert political activities, and psychological warfare directed against the Estonian SSR. 

 

Recruiting agents took place in Sweden, Germany, and the United States. In May 1952, LCHOMELY recruitment efforts in Sweden were canceled due to "The unfavorable character of persons involved in recruiting, including controversial Estonian politicians.” The agent candidates recruited prior to May under LCHOMELY declined to undertake the mission in October 1952. It was then considered necessary to concentrate all efforts for AEBASIN agent recruitment in the United States. 

 

Two agents trained by CIA’s Domestic Operations Base (FOB) included Hans Augusti Toomla and Kajla  Nikolai Kukk. Below are brief CIA biographies of both.

Hans Augusti TOOMLA had CIA cryptonyms AETAXI, AEROOT/1, codename “Artur” and pseudonym "Jerome N. Gravestone." Toomla was born on a farm in the Parnu District of Estonia on March 16, 1924. One CIA document contained the following description:  

He is an action agent currently being trained for infiltration into the Estonian SSR. He has many relatives and friends in the target area who may provide some support to him. The subject is 30 years old and a seasoned front-line veteran of the Estonian front during World War II, and has had experience with the Estonian partisan forces. The recruiter recommended him as a man with a well-develop character, an old soldier and a bitter enemy of the Communists and Russians; he is undertaking the assignment as an opportunity to work against the Russians in Estonia—an opportunity for which he waited for a long time.

Kalju Nikolai KUKK had cryptonyms RNCHANGE, AEROOT/2, codename “Karl” and pseudonym “Alden K. Neighbarger”. Kukk was born in Sindi, Estonia, on January 26, 1921. CIA described him this way: “He has relatives and friends whom he hopes to be able to contact for operational support. He has front-line experiences fighting the USSR with Germany during the war. He and Toomla are friends of long-standing and appear to have confidence in each other."

One CIA report contained this comment about them: “On the whole, it must be noted that the agents are of the average type and possess no outstanding qualifications either in general or in any one particular field. Whether or not they will be able to perform the difficult tasks expected of them can only be evaluated toward the latter part of their training when their capability of performing and employing the subjects learned will be tested in practical exercises.” 

 

Moreover,  “Toomla and Kukk are dependent on the CIA for help in rehabilitation after completing their missions; their salaries and bonuses remain under Agency control. They are apparently not subordinated to any government or émigré political organizations. Their motivation is based on ideological opposition to Communism and the Bolshevik occupation of their native land."

 

They were promised $10,000 death benefits and a $5,000 bonus each after completing the two-year mission.

CIA’s Early Cold War REDSOX Foreign Intelligence Operations into Ukraine, Part Two

 Request for Renewal of Project AEACRE for the Fiscal Year of 1957

“From 1953, until late 1955, relatively few REDSOX operations were conducted…It has been said that every REDSOX agent whose capture is revealed by the Soviets has positive psychological value as it indicates positively to any dissident elements within the Soviet Union that we in the "West" are still actively interested in their cause. Such advertisement also shows anti-Communist elements outside the "IRON CURTAIN" that the West is still actively opposing the Communist regimes.

 

“Since the resuscitation of the REDSOX activity in September 1955, DOB has had some minor successes and some major setbacks that were in most part not due to the lack of professional handling but to factors beyond our control. Recent successes of short border crossing operations indicate that with proper agents, adequate training, and documentation, we are capable of successful short-range penetrations of the Soviet Union. And with good communication equipment and dependable in/exfiltration support, deeper penetrations of the Soviet Union will be possible.

 

“Under the new REDSOX functional concept, which became effective only after 1 September 1955, SR/7/DOB undertook the initiation of its REDSOX projects. Though hindered by the prevailing shortage of competent staff and support personnel, the following projects were undertaken:

 

“Project AERODYNAMIC: Domestic Operation Base (DOB) has recently submitted a revised Foreign Intelligence version of this project which formerly also incorporated Psychological Paramilitary and Counter Espionage functions. AERODYNAMIC has been an active Soviet Russia project for the past seven years and has supported the dispatch of all REDSOX agents into the Soviet UKRAINE. It provided:

 

·      Financial support for the mechanism by which underground couriers brought out pouched material;  

·      Provided the intelligence community with information of Ukrainian underground activities; 

·      The structure, aims, and personalities of the UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY (UPA); and 

·      the underground government, the UKRAINIAN SUPREME LIBERATION COUNCIL (UHVR). 

·       

“The Domestic Operations Basee has taken the initiative to resurrect the REDSOX portions of this project. Recent conferences between DOB personnel and foreign representatives of the UHVR have provided the basis for establishing a spotter network among this emigre organization's membership. The UHVR keenly feels the need for reactivating some of its internal contacts in the Ukrainian underground. 

“Project ALOPECIA: This cryptonym has been given to a singleton contact in Brazil operating among the Ukrainian emigres. It is anticipated that his activities for Fiscal Year 1957 will be expanded to include all of South America, making him the focal point for the spotting and preliminary assessment of any action-type candidates who could be used in the Ukrainian REDSOX operations. It is further anticipated that this man will be brought to the United States during this fiscal period for assessment and training to prepare him better for his job. 

 

“Project AECUPBOARD: This is a pilot project for which recently requested foreign intelligence approval. It is an attempt to set up an overt package mail channel with persons in the Soviet Union. By tapping correspondence with persons who were active in the old Ukrainian underground movement, it is hoped that material, funds, and instructions can eventually be sent in to persons in the Ukrainian SSR. Eventually, safehouse and reception facilities might be established through this channel to support REDSOX and other Soviet Russia Division operations in the area.

CIA’s Early Cold War REDSOX Foreign Intelligence Operations into Ukraine, Part One ©

 In January 1950, the United States National Security Council (NSC) issued Intelligence Directive No. 13 entitled  "Exploitation of Soviet and Satellite Defectors Outside the United States." This directive specifically defined defectors as, 

 

"Individuals who escape from the control of the USSR or countries in the Soviet orbit, or who, being outside such jurisdiction or control, are unwilling to return to it, and who are of special interest to the U.S. Government because they can add valuable new or confirmatory information to existing U.S. knowledge of the Soviet world because their defection can be exploited in the psychological field."

 

NSC authorized and directed that "The Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for the covert exploitation of defectors, and shall coordinate all matters concerned with the handling and disposition of declared defectors from the Soviet Union and the satellite states to assure the effective exploitation of all defectors for operational, intelligence, or psychological purposes by the U.S. Government." 

 

REDSOX was a CIA cryptonym for Foreign Intelligence operations in the early Cold War involving “The illegal return of defectors and emigres to USSR as agents.” The information below comes from declassified CIA documents.

 

CIA's REDSOX operational plan for Spring 1952.

 

“Both the undersigned case officers and the ZP/UHVR themselves strongly agree that granted the extent of Soviet knowledge of CIA and British Intelligence dispatches of the past several years, any possibility of a May-moon-period air dispatch into Western Ukraine catching the Soviets napping must be discarded as wishful thinking; the trick has been tried too often. 

 

“Or the other hand, so long as quantities of snow are on the ground, the Soviets do not expect the woodland partisan activity of any sort, much less an airdrop of partisan couriers, who, as the Soviets well know, would have to wait for local contact until their local colleagues come out of their bunkers in late April. Therefore, it is strongly recommended by both the agents and the case officers that one of the last ten nights of March or the first five of April be utilized to dispatch the next ZP/UHVR team. March has never been used for an air mission to the Soviet Union. The next ZP/UHVR team members are frankly scared of waiting until the usual time in May. 

 

“From their point of view, a month of camping in the snow of an isolated mountain forest is far less dangerous than dropping in during the warmer weather when Soviets are out in force for the now-traditional spring anti-partisan campaign. 

 

“From our point of view, the plane and crew should by all odds be safer flying in and out in late March than would be the case in mid or late spring. Suppose the operation can be handled securely from this end. In that case, the change of schedule to March plus the use of a slightly different air approach should cancel out the effectiveness of Soviet-made plans for intercepting an aircraft or observing parachutists while they are landing. While the case officers are not air experts, they have given a lot of thought to the ground reactions to the CIA and British Intelligence Service flights of 1950 and 1951. 

 

“We know that by January 1950, the Soviets were aware that the U.S. was dropping personnel by air into Western Ukraine, but the Soviets were apparently unable to do anything to thwart the May 1950 mission. By early July 1950, the Soviets had captured alive one of the four men who had jumped in two months earlier. By Mid-August 1950, the Russian Intelligence Service can be assumed to have known all the essential facts concerning the September 1949 and May 1950 drops.

 

“Despite this, three separate air flights safely deposited a total of 22 agents in Western Ukraine in May 1951. The flights themselves were decidedly a success. Even though they repeated the pattern established the previous year, there was nothing except the flares our plane saw at the border to show that the Soviets had devised any methods for coping with the flights. 

 

"We have no information to indicate that the demise of the two British teams and the breakdown of communications with our team had a direct connection with the fact that the teams arrived in Western Ukraine by air. In brief, as far as Western Ukraine is concerned, we are not impressed with the Soviets' ability to thwart even those air operations that logic would lead them to anticipate.“

The Tragic Story of Two Cold War CIA Agents: Abdula Osmanov and Fedor Sarantsev (Sarancev) ©

TIME magazine, December 31, 1951:

"Moscow's Tass news agency announced the execution of A. I. Osmanov and I. K. Sarantsev, said to have received "special training from U.S. intelligence officers in topography, the use of weapons and parachuting." Osmanov and Sarantsev, said Tass, had been flown from Greece in a U.S. plane and dropped in Moldavia last August, for the "organization of acts of diversion, terror and espionage," after which they were to have crossed the Soviet Armenian border and reported to U.S. intelligence officers at Kars, Turkey." 

Below are details of the story taken from published Soviet Union archives.

1. September 11, 1951

No. 329 

Top secret

To comrade STALIN

As you were informed, on the night of August 14-15 this year, spies were dropped from the plane by parachutes on the territory of the Moldavan SSR by American intelligence.

One of them, OSMANOV, was detained on August 15 this year at the Bendery station. OSMANOV testified that another spy had been dropped from the same plane.

As a result of the measures taken, on September 5 of this year in the city of Alma-Ata, while trying to get a lodging for the night in the house of a collective farmer, the second spy was detained - Sarantsev Fedor Kuzmich, born in 1926, a native of the village of Blagodatnoye, Akmola region, Russian, in 1943 was Mobilized into the Soviet Army and in December of the same year was captured by the Germans, after the war he refused to repatriate to the Soviet Union and stayed in the American zone of occupation of Germany... 

2. DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC VKP (b) ON AMERICAN AGENTS OSMANOV AND SARANTSEV

December 18, 1951

Top secret

 

Question to the Ministry of State Security of the USSR

 

1. Instruct the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR to consider on December 18 the case of American spies, saboteurs, terrorists A.I. Osmanov. And Sarantsev F.K., to condemn them to death with immediate execution of the sentence.

2. To approve the text of the message of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on this case in the press (attached).

 

Published on 19.XII.51, 

 

IN THE MILITARY COLLEGE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE USSR

 

The other day the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR considered the case of American saboteurs A.I. Osmanov and Sarantseva F.K.

 

As it turned out during the investigation and at the trial, in August of this year, Osmanov and Sarantsev were parachuted from an American plane at night on the USSR territory in the Moldavan Soviet Republic.

 

Soviet state security bodies detained the criminals. During a search, it found fake documents, weapons, poison, and other means for committing sabotage and terror and large sums of money. In the area of ​​detention of Osmanov and Sarantsev, opened parachutes were taken, on which they were dropped.

 

Osmanov and Sarantsev admitted that they were recruited by American intelligence in West Germany. They were in the camps of "displaced persons" for espionage, sabotage, and terrorist activities in the Soviet Union. Osmanov and Sarantsev testified that they underwent special training in topography, firing military weapons, parachute jumping, organizing sabotage, terror, and espionage under the guidance of American intelligence officers.

During the investigation and at the trial, it was established that Osmanov and Sarantsev, upon completion of preparations for subversive work, were transferred to Greece, and from there, on an American plane and accompanied by American officers, were taken to the place of dropping on Soviet territory.

 

Osmanov and Sarantsev testified in court that, after completing the criminal assignments given to them, they had to arrive in the city of Kars (Turkey) to meet with American intelligence officers.

 

At the trial, the defendants Osmanov and Sarantsev pleaded guilty to the charges brought against them.

 

The Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court acknowledged the charge brought against the defendants Osmanov and Sarantsev under Art. 58-1 "b" of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, fully proven. Considering the severity of their crime against the Soviet state and guided by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated January 12, 1950, "On the application of the death penalty to traitors to the Motherland, spies, demolition saboteurs," the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentenced them to capital punishment - shot.

The verdict was carried out.

Source: Лубянка. Сталин и МГБ СССР. Март 1946 — март 1953 : До- кументы высших органов партийной и государственной власти / Сост. В.Н. Хаустов, В.П. Наумов, Н.С. Плотникова.

(Lubyanka. Stalin and the USSR Ministry of State Security. March 1946 - March 1953)

Soviet Cold War Operations against the Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty Ukrainian Service. Part Two

Case Study No. 2: Agent TARAS

August 31, 1989 Report Excerpt 

Subject: Operation "TARAS," stay of the object in the FRG – Information 

 

Secret Collaborator TS "TARAS" visited the FRG between July 15 and 28, 1989. The place of his stay in the FRG was Munich. Radio Liberty editors picked them up at the train station. Private cars took them to the premises of the Free Ukrainian University, where "TARAS" was accommodated for the entire stay. 

"TARAS" and another had the opportunity to participate in evaluating the activities of the Free Ukrainian University in 1988. According to the evaluation, the number of participants in the summer courses is decreasing, which, in turn, has resulted in a general decline in the university's activities. 

 

During a discussion, "TARAS" learned that the Ukrainian section of RFE currently has no problems obtaining information from the USSR. The Ukrainian section of RFE receives several dozens of phone calls daily from the USSR, in which the callers provide all necessary information. They also benefit from the increasing number of visitors from the USSR. 

 

As to the apparent lack of interest in this person among Ukrainian emigres, "TARAS" said that this situation was apparently caused by Peter G., who visited the FRG in May 1989 and who suspects that "TARAS" is a collaborator of the StB (State Security). "TARAS" is convinced that this is the result of operation "VEDA," in which he testified against Peter G. Since then, their relationship has been burdened with permanent conflicts. 

 

Case Study No. 3: Agent CERNY

September 25, 1989

 

Subject: The Ukrainian section of the radio station "Radio Liberty" in Munich, FRG - situation report

 

The editors of Radio Liberty receive their information from various sources, but recently the number of residents from the Ukraine who call and provide information has constantly been growing. 

 

Secret collaborators "SERGEJ" and "CERNY" obtained information about the Ukrainian section of Radio Liberty during their stay in Munich in August 1989. One Radio Liberty editor is currently responsible for a program called "radio mailbox." He reads letters- to-the-editors or parts of them to suit the Ukrainian program of Radio Liberty.

 

"CERNY" had the chance to briefly visit the "Radio Liberty" building. The two employees with him had to show their identification cards at the entrance. An American soldier opened the main gate, and they entered the yard by car. "CERNY" was not controlled at all. One employee accompanied "CERNY" to a studio where 11 to 13 employees worked. During his visit at RL, "CERNY" had the opportunity to spend several minutes in the security room where he and the soldier on duty watched all movements close to the RL building on a monitor. 

 

During their talks, "CERNY" was offered cooperation by the Radio Liberty editor; he asked him to deliver contributions for the Ukrainian or Slovak sections by mail or telephone and provide tips for other activities. He was interested in contributions that could be used for RL programs, mainly: the emigration of the periods 1918-1948-1968; the life of the Ukrainians living in the West; and the Ukrainian question in the CSSR.

 

At the same time, he invited "CERNY" to come again in the following year (1990) but cautioned him not to mention that he was to visit the specific editor in any documents. 

 

In the presence of "CERNY," the Radio Liberty Editor had a telephone conversation with the brothers who were members of the Ukrainian Helsinki group in Lviv. He asked them about the results of their group's meeting with the first secretary of the CPSU municipal committee in Lviv and commented on their remarks. The RL Editor claimed that currently, RL's relations with Moscow were excellent, that they receive only verified and timely information from Moscow, and he, therefore, did not want to publish certain things without the participation of Moscow, to avoid a deterioration of their relations. 

 

Because another Radio Liberty editor is a person of interest (zajmova osoba) in the OUN-matter, we ask our Soviet friends to send us reports on her activities in the USSR and an investigation of her sister, which would enable us to make all necessary preparations for their planned meeting in the CSSR. 

 

If you have any demands concerning this matter, let us know.

Case Study No. 4: Agent BORIS II

June 1989 Report 

Subject: Operation BORIS II—Information about his stay in West Germany On 24 April 1989, 

Secret Collaborator BORIS II traveled to West Germany. 

 

Further steps of this operation will be discussed at the coordination meeting in Moscow. In the meantime, we would like to know whether the V. Administration of the KGB could find out who has the telephone number extension 316 at Radio Free Europe and whether the Russian Service of Radio Liberty really had holidays between 1 and 4 May 1989. 

For more information: Chapter 8 in

 

Soviet Cold War Operations against the Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty Ukrainian Service. Part One

Introduction

 

For over 40 years, Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) were two American-sponsored radio stations in Munich that broadcast to countries behind the Iron Curtain. The radio stations were described in a secret 1969 Central Intelligence Agency report as “the oldest, largest, most costly, and probably most successful covert action projects aimed at the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.” 

For almost twenty years, thousands of persons worked at these radio stations for almost twenty years at the cost of over 300 million dollars. Yet, for years much of their existence remained covered in a Cold War shroud of mystery and intrigue. Early records no longer exist, and many persons responsible for the radio station's development have died, leaving fragmentary records. The archives of American and Eastern intelligence services remain classified, inaccessible to the public, or destroyed in the immediate post-1989 years.

 

All of the Warsaw Pact intelligence services operated against RFE/RL for over 40 years. Sometimes this was a centrally coordinated activity, and sometimes the countries ran their own operations. In this case, hostile actions spoke louder than words in the battle of ideas fought by East and West.

 

Asymmetric responses

 

"Radio Liberation from Bolshevism" first broadcast on March 1, 1953, from transmitters in Lampertheim, Germany, to the Soviet armed forces in Germany and Austria. Within ten minutes, the Soviet Union started jamming the broadcasts, an activity that would continue for another 35 years. On August 14, 1954, the Ukrainian Service of Radio Liberation (later Radio Liberty) began its first broadcast from Munich to Ukraine with these words: “Brothers and sisters! Ukrainians! We live abroad, but our hearts and minds are always with you. No iron curtain can separate us or stand in our way.” 

 

The station's name was changed to "Radio Liberation" in 1956 and then renamed Radio Liberty in 1963.

 

Émigrés from both RFE and RL faced intimidation, blackmail, murder, threats of murder, and kidnapping. The first and only direct physical attack on RFE/RL headquarters in Munich took place on February 21, 1981.  On that date, an international team of terrorists led by the infamous "Carlos the Jackal" exploded a bomb that injured employees and caused over two million dollars in damage.

 

Numerous propaganda books about both stations were published in East Europe and the former Soviet Union whenever those regimes wanted to counter the radios' effective programming with domestic and international propaganda. The information in these books was mostly fabricated with tendentious information supplied by agents inside the stations.

 

 A review of the history of RFE/RL would not be complete without mentioning some of the intelligence service activities directed against the radios and their personnel.  

 

Agents NIKOLAJ, TARAS, CERNY, BORIS II, and others were active in Soviet KGB --Czechoslovak SNB operations against the Ukrainian Broadcast Service of RFE/RL 1988-1989. 

Case Study No. 1, Agent NIKOLAJ

 

The Ukrainian minority in Czechoslovakia (mostly in Slovakia) was of concern to both the Czechoslovak intelligence service SNB ((Sbor národní bezpečnosti or National Security Corps) and the Soviet KGB. For example, the 2nd Administration of the SNB’s 12th Division sent “secret collaborators” to contact the Ukrainian Service employees of Radio Liberty and other emigres in the West. The 2nd Administration also sent reports to a Soviet KGB officer or office "P" of the 5th Department, 2nd Division. 

 

The Soviet KGB used the “secret collaborators” from Czechoslovakia, as it was known that Radio Liberty employees would not have trusted visitors directly from Ukraine, whom they would believe were "agent provocateurs." Thus, the idea was developed to use the Ukrainian minority in Czechoslovakia, especially those considered "dissidents," for intelligence operations against Radio Liberty. 

 

The following translated excerpt shows the extent of Warsaw Pact countries’ spy agencies infiltrating these stations.

 

Operation "NIKOLAJ," October 10, 1989, Report Excerpt:

 

Subject: Object "NIKOLAJ" - report about Radio Liberty. The Object of the Operation "NIKOLAJ" traveled in July and August 1989 with his wife to capitalist countries. They left Czechoslovakia via Austria in the private car of a Radio Liberty editor, who was returning home to West Germany from a visit to her husband's parents who live in the CSSR. 

"NIKOLAJ" spent three days with the Radio Liberty couple in Munich. In several discussions, he learned that the wife is currently following the Soviet press and is preparing a press review for the Ukrainian section of "Radio Liberty." She is in a better position than her husband at RL; she is a producer, has a good relationship with the head of the Ukrainian section, Bohdan Nahajlo, and the entire management of "Radio Liberty."

With the permission of RL's director and after receiving a sticker with the word "VISITOR" printed on it, "NIKOLAJ" was allowed to enter the premises of the Ukrainian section. A security guard at the entrance asked for "NIKOLAJ's" passport and kept it. "Radio Liberty" has about 1,600 employees, of whom 21 work for the Ukrainian section. 

One editor conducted an interview with "NIKOLAJ" on the topic "Ukrainian Culture in the CSSR;" he (NIKOLAJ) requested that the interview be broadcast in full and without any changes. 

Bohdan Nahaljo, as mentioned above, who is editor-in-chief of the Ukrainian section, is about 35 to 40 years old. His parents are Ukrainians, but he was born in the United Kingdom. "NIKOLAJ" also met with the editor Ivan Kacurovsky, an ethnic Ukrainian who is about 70 years old, a member of the first wave of immigrants, and who holds strongly anti-Soviet views. Furthermore, "NIKOLAJ" personally met with the announcer of the Ukrainian section Olexa Bojarko and with the Ukrainian emigre poet Ema Avdijevska. Both are using pseudonyms.

Among the Ukrainian emigres, there is little information on the lives and activities of Ukrainians living in the CSSR. The employees of the Ukrainian section of "Radio Liberty" are only interested in the situation in Ukraine and have developed no efforts to obtain information from the CSSR. They consider the CSSR to be a conservative state in which restructuring (perestroika) has not gained ground; they believe that the CSSR does not want to introduce (reforms) similar to those in the other socialist countries. 

In general, "NIKOLAJ" learned that RL currently has very reliable and quick channels to Ukraine. They receive information on all the activities of the internal opposition, demonstrations, and the situation in Ukraine and the USSR. The Ukrainian emigres also took advantage of the lack of paper in the USSR. They provided paper for certain publishing houses in the USSR to enable them to publish rehabilitated authors according to the wishes of the Ukrainian emigres and the internal opposition. 

"NIKOLAJ" had a stopover in Munich only on his way to KZ (Kapitalisticke Zeme--capitalist countries?) and back to the CSSR. He focused his attention on his stay in the USA and Canada, where he spent most of his time. Information about "NIKOLAJ's" stay in the USA and Canada will be delivered to the Soviet friends in the following report. 

The reports ended here as the collapse of Communism in Czechoslovakia took place in November 1989, and with that, the hostile activity against RFE and RL ceased. This is but one example of what went on well into the Gorbachev era and its declared policy of glasnost and perestroika. And even after the Soviet Union stopped jamming RFE/RL in November 1988.

 

(Reprinted with permission from the Kyiv Post newspaper, December 14, 2021)

Next: Agents TARAS and CERNY